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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this study is to analyse the convergence of genetically modified (GM) 
maize labelling policies in the European Union (EU) and in the region defined by the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). To investigate this, an 
examination of each region‟s policies, which are shaped according to the respective 
levels of integration, is systematically undertaken. With this, GM maize labelling 
policies that are based on agricultural efficiency, human health, environmental 
concerns and consumers‟ right to information delimit the extent and the manner in 
which convergence takes place. The resulting policy outputs in each region are 
different. The EU develops harmonised policies that establish mandatory labels for 
GM maize in terms of both product and process with the purpose to inform 
consumers about the origin of the products they acquire. In contrast, North America 
has homologated national policies to an extent that does not affect national 
preferences and interests. These different approaches demonstrate that nation-states 
are the most influential actors in policy-making, setting up GM maize labelling 
policies according to their own backgrounds, preferences, and interests. Regional 
institutions also participate, but they do so according to the level of integration 
achieved. Subsequently, different levels of participation and different policy outputs 
develop out of each region. It is observable that the EU has moved towards the 
establishment of stricter rules, as according to Vogel‟s concept of „trading up‟. A 
different case is the NAFTA region, where the level of convergence has been 
preserved despite the approximation of policies.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a trend among nation-states to form regional trading blocs. This means the 
suppression of trade barriers, as in the case of tariffs. In addition, there are other 
barriers that can impede trade. This is the case of regulatory barriers, which take the 
form of strict policies that national governments implement due to a number of 
issues: to protect the environment, to reach a certain degree of citizenry‟s trust, to 
shield local industry from unfair external competition, etc.  
The differences portrayed by such national policies between nation-states, and their 
potential convergence have signified one of the major debates in political science, 
which centres on the question as to whether and why different countries develop 
similar policies over time. Knill (2005: 764) suggests that there are two different 
types of responses. The first one refers to studies emphasising a certain degree of 
policy convergence and its underlying causal factors. The second one is advocated 
through studies that modify or challenge any expectation of policy convergence by 
emphasising differences in national institutions and opportunity structures for 
domestic actors. 
It is thus the purpose of this study to explain the dynamics of policy convergence, 
while observing its causal mechanisms. To achieve this, genetically modified food 
(GMF) labelling policies are examined. This is because a biotechnology product is 
not merely another complex product about which consumers want and need 
substantial information in order to determine their purchasing behaviour. Scientific 
development, trade processes, as well as regulators determine the appropriate policies 
in the field due to the information they possess (Hadfield and Thomson, 1998: 552). 
In this sense, emphasis has been given to the agricultural advantages that GM crops 
entail, as well as to the information that should be provided when these products are 
commercialised.  
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Differences in perspectives, due to domestic preferences and interests, can reveal that 
convergence at the regional level has not happened smoothly. Such differences have 
propelled a series of actions from national governments and regional institutions, 
which in turn lead to outcomes that differ between regional settings. Convergence 
outcomes can thus take the form of either stricter or laxer rules. If they become strict, 
they experience what is termed as „trading up‟. If the opposite happens, a „race to the 
bottom‟ is likely to be suggested. 
 
In order to understand and explain policy convergence, as well as to determine the 
existence of „trading up‟ or „race to the bottom‟, I am examining two different 
policies on labels for GM maize in two different regional settings: the European 
Union (EU) and the region where the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) has taken place. For this, their policies are explained through the analysis 
of the progress of each of the regulatory frameworks.  
 
Of all the food and crops that have been developed by biotechnology means, the case 
of maize assists in providing a deeper insight due to the following reasons. This crop 
has been at the core of regulatory processes in both regions because of its level of 
production and importance as food staple. GM maize is the only GM crop cultivated 
within the EU, has been the object of specific legislation, and is one of the GM crops 
with the most authorisation requests for release. Also, Mexico has developed more 
stringent rules about this crop with respect to its North American neighbours. This is 
because Mexico shows specific features due to the cultural, social, environmental, 
and economic implications of maize. This thus means that selecting maize as the crop 
to analyse assists in narrowing what otherwise could lead to a vast amount of 
information to examine. 
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With maize selected as the crop to scrutinise, I examine specific legislation at 
regional and national levels depending on the region in question. With respect to the 
EU, a list of initial issue-related regulations is assessed, like Regulation 1813/97 
establishing labelling rules for GM maize. Nonetheless, emphasis is made on the 
legislation that sets the policy followed at present: the EP and Council Regulation 
1830/2003 relating to the traceability and labelling of GMOs and GMF. Other 
legislation and two reports examining the implementation of regulations are also 
assessed.  
With respect to the NAFTA region, the analysis is centred on national policies. This 
is the case of the Mexican Law on Biodiversity and GMOs, which details that GM 
maize seeds need to be labelled prior to entering the country. Furthermore, focus is 
given on a Trilateral Agreement on the Documentation Requirements for Living 
Modified Organisms for Food or Feed signed among the USA, Canada, and Mexico. 
The reason for this is that this document establishes the context in which GMF labels 
take place currently. 
 
With this in mind, the purpose of my study is to examine the manner and the extent to 
which GMF labelling policies have converged in two different regional settings. This 
examination is carried on by assessing legal measures that govern the labelling issue 
and that have been developed by regional and national governmental institutions. 
Such an assessment thus provides an insight about how, and under which 
circumstances, nation-states have agreed on the approach to follow.  
Moreover, this study aims to examine the potential appearance of „trading up‟ as a 
pattern in an area that has been regulated at different levels in two different regions. 
These different levels refer to convergence being achieved through international 
agreements and through regulatory competition. On one side, the EU has adopted the 
strictest regulatory approach so far by requesting Europe-wide mandatory labels to all 
GMF. Such a stance is the result of the EU aiming to provide consumers with 
information about these products; that is, with the right to choose. On the other hand 
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is North America, where national policies focusing on the equivalence between GMF 
and conventional food, as long the former preserve the same characteristics as the 
latter, is the approach followed. However, North America shows exceptions with 
regard to GM maize seeds. 
 
The politics of GM differ between the EU and the NAFTA region due to a series of 
factors that can induce policy change: policy problems, policy legacies, policy 
preferences, political-institutional capacity, and discourse. All of them have appeared 
or been used according to the regional setting in question. 
The approaches to label in each region can potentially differ due to the institutional 
frameworks and political preferences. On one side, the EU develops a complex 
institutional setting that allows for a regional institution to initiate and to attempt 
influencing outcomes derived at satisfying the citizenry. Furthermore, by establishing 
mandatory labels, the European Commission has closed ranks with national 
governments, who have tended to take a strict stance towards GMF. On the other 
side, North America entails an intergovernmental institutional setting that does not 
allow for a regional/supranational institution to enjoy roles as those implied in the 
EU. Subsequently, this means that all powers rely on national governments that tend 
to take on labelling according to their own domestic features. It is in this regard that 
all three nation-states have reached agreements on the equivalence between GMF and 
non-GMF. However, maize represents a different aspect that has led Mexico to take a 
slightly different approach to those of its northern counterparts. 
 
These policy preferences relate to policy problems that have been far more reported 
in Europe than in North America, like the BSE crisis. This is an issue that has made 
European consumers to be more wary towards GMF than Americans, Canadians, or 
Mexicans. This comes despite the discovery of GM maize mixed with conventional 
maize in cultivation areas in North America. Furthermore, sensibility towards maize 
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in Mexican culture led the government to take a stance towards labelling sacks of 
maize seeds. Hence, these examples show that food crises and agricultural views have 
driven the cultural perspectives followed in each of the regions. The EU has 
approached wary consumers suspicious of GM products, while North America has 
focused on the agricultural advantages of GM crops. Like this, some other examples 
provide details of how these factors have made regional policies different between the 
two regions.  
 
The role of national governments presumably becomes the leading force in driving 
the manner and the extent to which policies have been converged. They have agreed 
to approximate their domestic policies for the sake of the market. They have 
committed to this through international agreements. This is the case of North 
America, where approximation of national policies has also taken place. Hence, a 
combination of regional and national policies appears to have driven the context in 
which policies succeed. The EU presents a case where nation-states share some of 
their policy-making roles to the regional institutions, mainly the European 
Commission, as its role of policy initiator implies, and the European Parliament (EP), 
with a role through the co-decision procedure. However, it has been up to nation-
states to decide the approach to follow. 
 
The structure of the present study is as follows. The second chapter offers an 
overview of GMF, their benefits and risks, as well as the context in which GM maize 
is situated in each region. Besides, it presents the importance of labels from economic 
and political perspectives. Furthermore, this chapter provides for an introduction on 
the integration process of each region. This entails the number and diversity of 
membership, degree of institutionalisation, power of regional institutions, and 
decision-making procedures. A further point refers to the definition of national 
preferences in each region, which in turn define the position of the entire region. 
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Lastly, the international context is also commented, explaining the reasons behind the 
clashes within the WTO realm and their implications. 
Chapter three explains the methodology used. The reasons behind qualitative 
methods and its use in the purpose of this study, the means to gather empirical and 
secondary information, and their respective shortcomings are also detailed. 
Afterwards, Chapter four details theoretical insights on policy convergence, its 
relationship with policy diffusion and policy transfer, the types and indicators of 
policy convergence. In addition, this chapter features the assessment of „trading up‟, 
its causes, and the respective linkage this concept has with causal mechanisms of 
policy convergence. This leads to appreciate the relevance of the concept of 
international cooperation and regulatory competition. Their subsequent explanation is 
presented, which in turn allows speaking of policy change potentially taking place in 
domestic and regional levels. Lastly, the overall literature is linked with broader 
International Relations theory that emphasises on the relevance of institutions and the 
manner through which international agreements are formed. 
Chapter five focuses on the assessment of European law on GMF labelling. Different 
regulations are examined, with Regulation 1830/2003 concerning the traceability and 
labelling of GMF being the focus of the assessment. Furthermore, the analysis of 
reports assessing the implementation of this regulation is done with the purpose of 
portraying the implications of the convergence reached. The interaction of the actors 
involved in the process of formulating this regulation is also stressed. 
Chapter six portrays the rules on GMF labelling in the NAFTA region. It begins with 
the assessment of each of the North American nation-states‟ development of policies 
on GMF. Emphasis is made on the case of Mexico because it shows different features 
with respect to its counterparts. Furthermore, there is an assessment of the Trilateral 
Agreement on the documentation requirements for living modified organisms for 
food and feed. Actors‟ views on this agreement are also addressed, which in turn 
assist in understanding the approach followed at the national level. 
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Chapter seven provides for a comparison of the convergence reached in each of the 
two regions in terms of the literature on „trading up‟ as well as on policy 
convergence. In addition, an evaluation of the extent to which regional institutions 
and national governments have influenced or driven the policy formulated is also 
included. 
Lastly, chapter eight relates the information and the findings with policy convergence 
and trading up. Also, the contribution that this study provides for is included, as well 
as the examination about reaching its objectives. 
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CHAPTER 2: RAISON D’ÊTRE OF GMF LABELLING AND 
BACKGROUND OF THE EU AND THE NAFTA REGION 
 
It is argued that genetic modification is a term that covers many processes, some of 
which have been used for thousands of years. However, the term has come to be used 
for „genetic engineering‟, where newly developed processes of molecular 
biotechnology are employed to modify single cells of a given organism (Tester, 2001: 
9). This type of research has been divided into two streams, labelled “red” for 
biomedicine and “green” for agriculture and environment.1 Under the green heading, 
there are four main classes of genetic traits with commercial value: tolerance to 
commercial herbicides; pest resistance to viruses, bacteria, insects, nematodes, or 
fungi; improvements to product quality such as the type of oils, starches, sugars or 
cellulose in the plant; and improvements to agronomic characteristics such as yield or 
salt, drought and cold resistance (Jasanoff, 2005: 34; Van Beuzekom and Arundel, 
2009:78). These manipulations often involve cross-species transfers of genetic 
material, resulting in GMOs that could not have been produced naturally through 
traditional means of mating or natural recombination (Strauss, 2006: 95).  
The production of GMOs, for use in the food industry, has been a source of a fierce 
debate between GM-supportive and GM-sceptical groups. This has caused a „new 
preoccupation‟ of nation-states because there is a new arena in which citizens demand 
and contest the exercise of state power. This preoccupation has been transferred to the 
regional level, at which governments are required to adopt a stance that partially 
reflects the respective degree of consumer concern for GMF (Gruère, 2006: 159).  
Their decisions are based on assessments of both benefits and risks of producing, 
commercialising, and labelling GMF.    
 
                                                          
1
 Red biotechnology is not assessed in the present study; therefore, it is not commented upon. 
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Among the benefits are higher production yields; the possibility of increasing food 
availability, which could alleviate hunger in underdeveloped nation-states; and the 
reduction of pesticide requirements resulting in less environmental damage. Risks 
include possible negative long-term effects on human health such as toxic effects, 
allergic reactions, changes in nutritional composition, and the effects of genes 
resistant to antibiotics. There are risks of possible negative long-term effects on the 
environment, such as an increase of herbicide resistant or insect resistant transgenic 
plants used to produce GMF, and risks of out-crossing with wild and weedy relatives 
and other unintended environmental effects, perhaps a loss of biodiversity; and the 
risk of companies practising agricultural biotechnology amassing too much power 
(Gracia and Albisu, 2003: 665 – 6).   
Besides benefits and risks, there are also ethical questions raised by GMF. They are 
identified as the consumers‟ right to be informed; and people‟s feelings against the 
„unnatural‟ manipulation of nature, both of which relate to the social and cultural 
characteristics of different societies. Hence, their labelling becomes a reliable option 
to make consumers aware of what they are purchasing and consuming. Nevertheless, 
there are deeper insights about the reasons to label, which need to be addressed. 
 
2.1. Importance of labels 
 
The value of labels depends on the importance consumers attach to certain attributes, 
identified as search, experience, and credence attribute.  Search attributes are those 
for which consumers examine product characteristics, such as price, size, and colour, 
before purchasing. Experience attributes are those that consumers evaluate after 
purchasing the product. Credence attributes refer to what consumers cannot evaluate 
even in use.  
With respect to food, labelling is generally proposed with the aim of achieving a 
social goal, like improving human health and safety, mitigating environmental 
18 
 
hazards, averting international trade disputes, or supporting domestic agricultural and 
food manufacturing industries. They develop from different views, which represent 
different perspectives from consumers, companies, third-party entities, and 
governments. All of them play a role in determining which of a food‟s many 
attributes are described on food labels.  
 
Consumers use their purchasing power (their consumption choices) and political 
activities to help determine which attributes are described on labels. Private firms 
seek out attributes that are attractive to consumers and voluntarily provide 
information about these attributes when the benefits of doing so outweigh the 
costs. Third-party entities, including private organizations, governments, and 
international organizations contribute to enhancing the intelligibility and 
credibility of information about some food attributes through standard setting, 
certification, and enforcement. These services can increase the amount of 
information supplied by labels. Governments may require that information on 
some attributes be included on food labels (Golan et al, 2001: 117 – 8). 
 
Among these influential actors, governments carry a most relevant duty due to their 
role in the policy-making process, which would aim to serve three main purposes: to 
ensure fair competition among producers, to increase consumers‟ access to 
information, and to reduce risks to individual consumer safety and health (Hadden, 
1986). Another purpose, Golan et al (2001: 118) explain, refers to governments 
influencing individual consumption choices in order to align them with social 
objectives.  
 
Governments, jointly with consumer groups, producer associations, and international 
organisations help strengthening labelling claims through standard setting, testing, 
certification, and enforcement (Golan et al, 2001: 130). Standards establish the level 
of quality that a good must possess. Using them enhances market transactions as they 
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are recognised by numerous producers and consumers. Testing services can also 
assist by strengthening producers‟ claims of product quality by providing a more 
objective measure of product attributes. Certification provides assurances to 
consumers that the information supplied by firms is correct. Lastly, governmental 
enforcement of quality standards provides further assurances that quality claims are 
valid.  
 
Also, firms use labels as one of many advertising options. A label is intended to help 
consumers differentiate the labelled product from otherwise similar products. Thus, 
the information that labels provide can be important to consumers as they can respond 
by changing their purchase decisions. Another aspect of the differentiation that firms 
establish through labels is that they can inadvertently alert consumers to negative 
aspects of products. Known as the „unfolding theory‟ (Ippolito and Mathios, 1990), 
such alert develops when consumers become suspicious of products that fail to make 
claims that other firms‟ products explicitly state. Thus, the unfolding theory implies 
that the presence of advertising, as it is the case of labels, is a signal of quality and 
that competitive products without such advertising are alerting consumers to its 
absence. 
 
As with any policy, the costs and benefits of government intervention in labelling 
must be weighed. For this, governments need to take into account economic 
efficiency, producer and consumer concerns, political expediency, public opinion, 
and current events. Golan et al (2001: 119) consider that the appropriate level of 
government intervention in labelling decisions depends on the type of information 
involved and the level and distribution of the costs and benefits of providing 
information. In this regard, selecting mandatory labelling, voluntary labelling, or no 
labelling at all can relate to the extent of the government‟s involvement, the most 
influential positions, and the economic and political gains of the policy adopted. 
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National governments can demand mandatory labelling on the grounds of consumer 
right to information and calls for fair competition. Generally, mandatory labelling 
arises in two economic situations: „when the market does not supply enough 
information to allow consumers to make consumption choices mirroring their 
individual preferences (asymmetric or missing information), and when individual 
consumption decisions affect social welfare differently than they affect the individual 
consumer‟s welfare (externality problems)‟ (Golan et al, 2001: 136). Situations of 
asymmetric information appear when the producer or seller knows relevant 
information about a product that the buyer does not know. This case can be a problem 
in markets for foods with negative credence attributes. Markets do not work 
efficiently since goods that would be profitable with full disclosure may go 
unproduced, while those of lesser value to consumers are produced instead.  The 
objective of government intervention in this type of cases is not about altering 
consumption behaviour; instead, it is to increase informed consumption (Magat and 
Viscusi, 1992). With respect to aims about correcting externality problems, 
governments may establish mandatory labels in cases when food consumption 
choices affect the welfare of others. That is, individual consumption decisions can 
have social welfare consequences, such as effects on the environment, health, labour 
conditions, and farm and industry structure. Therefore, governments may decide to 
intervene to try to maximise social benefits by imposing labels that provide 
information influencing consumer decisions. Magat and Viscusi (1992) consider this 
government policy as „information provision programs to alter people‟s economic 
behaviour‟.  
Whether the government‟s mandate to label is successful would depend on the 
perspective in question. From the economic standpoint, the costs of labelling are 
likely to be passed on to consumers. This means higher prices that can affect the 
decisions that consumers make if they do not value the added information. From the 
purpose of the label itself, posing too much information can reduce the chances that 
consumers will read it or evaluate its importance. Under these circumstances, 
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labelling policies that impose costs on certain critical groups, even if they confer 
benefits on a wide variety of groups, may be undesirable from a political perspective. 
With this in mind, mandatory labels can result in confusion and can increase 
transaction costs unless labels are „supported by clear, achievable, quality standards, 
testing services to measure the validity of labelling claims, certification services 
substantiating the validity of the quality claim and mechanism for enforcing labelling 
rules, including mechanisms to punish producers who make fraudulent claims‟ 
(Golan et al, 2001: 146) 
 
2.1.1 Observations on GMF labels 
 
There are opposing views on whether labelling is a successful approach for GMF. On 
one side, labels cannot prove useful if they aim to inform on complex information 
that can be difficult to consumers to digest. Furthermore, they can impose extra costs 
on producers (whether they label their food as GM or non-GM). On the other side, 
views on the need to label GMF have also been regarded as adequate. For Hadfield 
and Thomson (1998: 551), labelling means an attempt to respect both the real nature 
of consumer concerns about GMF and the environment of uncertainty in which any 
regulatory policy for biotechnology operates. Nevertheless, they realise labels can be 
of limited value to consumers. Therefore, they suggest a comprehensive approach to 
information policy for consumers in order to use labelling requirements to harness the 
incentives of producers and private entities to convey to consumers what they want 
and need to know. Based on consumers‟ protection policy, such an approach has 
concerns regarding fraud and misrepresentation. To being with, consumers can be 
underinformed or misinformed precisely because the high cost of becoming informed 
is relative to the perceived value of information. The complexity with which GMF is 
produced, nevertheless, goes beyond the mere information of where the food they are 
consuming is coming from. For example, there are risks that, by introducing new 
genetic material, food sources can acquire new allergenicity that consumers may not 
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be aware of (Hadfield and Thomson, 1998: 555). A further aspect to bear in mind is 
the possible toxicity that GMF may entail. That is, GMF can contain genes that have 
not previously existed in conventional food. This can come as the result of 
transferring different material to newly developed food. Therefore, it seems 
approachable to assess their potential toxicity and to inform consumers about it. 
Besides allergenicity and toxicity, GMF could modify the nutritional content of GMF 
(Kessler et al, 1992). Then, under these circumstances, it looks like GMF producers 
have not achieved complete control over the expression of novel foods. Due to all this 
possibility, scientific knowledge has important ramifications for consumer protection 
policy.  
 
It is simply a feature of the world in which consumers live that there is some 
doubt about the long-term or hidden safety of foods. Consumers cope with this 
uncertainty by assuming that government regulation and producer self-interest 
(mediated through reputation and legal liability) combine to ensure that food 
products are basically safe – or at least, that immediate risks are absent (Hadfield 
and Thomson, 1998: 561). 
 
Another approach to labels is known as „paternalistic‟ (Viscusi, 1994). By having the 
goal of inducing consumer behaviour, this concept regards consumers‟ beliefs in 
selecting products to be in line with scientific risk assessments. If a gap were to exist 
between consumers‟ perceptions and scientific assessments, the latter would be 
considered as the point of reference. However, consumers‟ risk assessments may 
exceed those of the scientific community. As stated previously, some consumers have 
concerns about nutritional, health, environmental, and ethical issues, besides 
scientific concerns. The observable divergence between what consumers expect and 
what they get can be regarded as the driving force to setting policies with respect to 
information through labels. Subsequently, some degree of monitoring GMF could be 
suggested in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the risks they pose 
beyond the scientific spectrum. With this, an effective consumer protection policy can 
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help consumers to align their knowledge and expectations for a particular type of 
food to their experiences. 
The effective consumer protection can, thus, follow one of two approaches to 
labelling. The paternalistic one is the first. That is, if best-practices health and safety 
regulation clears a specific GMF, then there is no scientific basis for additional label 
of food. This assumption implies that unknown or unidentified risks are regarded by 
producers and policy-makers as not a risk at all. Nevertheless, the idiosyncrasy of 
consumers‟ demands, allergic responses, nutrition, and diet are all excluded in this 
approach. The second approach would regard providing information about what is 
known about the GMF and any potential deviation between the GMF and 
conventional counterparts. However, this is not an easy, maybe neither feasible, 
approach as consumers may not be able to process such information or to value it. In 
fact, an excess of poorly understood information can have a negative impact on 
valuable information already existing on labels. 
To be able to overcome the deficits of both approaches, Hadfield and Thomson 
(1998: 570 – 1) propose minimal labelling alerting consumers on the divergence in 
production process and any other difference posed. Then, this „simple alert labels‟ 
can allow to distinguish GMF from conventional products. Whereas consumers who 
want to avoid GMF have a way of doing so, other consumers are allowed to demand 
more information that the market would be prompted to satisfy. In fact, providing 
required information can assist to overcome the overestimated risks of biotechnology, 
perhaps proving that aversion to GMF is rooted in affect rather than information. The 
key point, they claim, is that the function of the regulatory label should not be to 
provide information, but rather to structure the market mechanism that would provide 
information. That is, if producers become aware that consumers avoid GMF due to 
lack of information, they would devote resources to providing it. However, for Golan 
et al (2001: 177), the effectiveness of GMF labelling for addressing problems of 
missing or asymmetric information and externality problems is questionable: „A 
simple label proclaiming “this product contains biotech ingredients” does not convey 
any information about potential costs and benefits or responsibilities. Though such 
24 
 
labelling may be informative to some consumers, it may also lead to greater 
confusion on the part of others and reduce, rather than enhance, economic efficiency‟. 
 
A further comment that needs to be stressed is that, despite mandatory GMF labelling 
being suggested as an addition to producers‟ costs, labelling policies may prove 
unsuccessful if it is to transfer the costs of segregation between GMF and non-GMF. 
Even when GMF producers may need to label and certify their products, non-GMF 
producers would also need to do so. Under these assumption comes the assessment on 
whether benefits outweigh costs.  
 
Labelling advocates cite social benefits ranging from informed consumers to 
reduced risk of ecological disaster. Labelling opponents claim that the cost of 
labelling (and segregation) would be so high that food manufacturers would be 
forced to stop using biotech crops, thereby reducing the demand for biotech 
crops to the point that biotechnology would be abandoned (Golan et al, 2001: 
178). 
 
Whether to label thus influences the attitudes of the actors involved in the regulation 
process. Producers do not have the incentive to label products. This can be the result 
of positive producer attributes, like cost reducing and yield enhancing, being more 
important than positive attributes for consumers, like better flavour or nutritional 
components. On the opposite hand, if companies were to pursue a non-GMF strategy, 
they would need to eliminate GM ingredients from the product, label the product as 
non-GM, and then market the product to consumers who place a value on knowing 
that their food does not contain GM ingredients. Then, it seems likely that firms 
would prefer to avoid any potential label on the product, either as GM or non-GM. 
The costs that could appear could derive in companies losing a segment of the food 
market (that of price-driven consumers). However, companies could benefit from 
other aspects. For example, labels can enhance the firm‟s reputation for safety or 
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environmental leadership, thereby strengthening the firm‟s marketing position. In 
addition, pursuing a non-GM strategy can be the best manner to access certain 
markets. 
   
It is possible to argue that governments have a relevant authority in the context of 
GMF labelling. They do so by influencing companies on whether to reduce the costs 
of GMF labelling or increasing the benefits of labelling non-GMF. Standards, testing, 
certification, and enforcement can all facilitate the development of these markets. 
One example refers to biotech standards on tolerance levels, also known as threshold, 
of GM ingredients so the product in question can be regarded as non-GMF. On the 
opposite direction is the standard of considering GMF equal to non-GMF in terms of 
risk assessment and product equivalence. Despite being contradictory, both standards 
are backed by the respective testing, certification, and enforcement methods. This 
thus means that, in the absence of a consensus on risk, tolerance levels for GM 
content can be driven by other factors, like consumer demand, the feasibility of 
testing technologies to test for GM content, and the lobbying skills that companies 
have when approaching policy-makers. 
 
Irrespective of the approach followed, governments can ensure that information 
provided is accurate by monitoring producers. This is, if governments take the 
paternalistic approach, they guarantee that GMF are safe on scientific grounds. On 
the other hand, they can also propel reliable information in markets through a 
combination of market incentives and legal liability. The point of this is for the 
governments to regulate it so as to alert consumers about the value of information and 
therefore create a demand for information, instead of attempting to satisfy such 
demand directly. 
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2.2. The GM maize context 
 
In recent years, techniques of genetic modification have made significant 
advancements. By 2009, there were 35 varieties of GM maize registered with the 
OECD (OECD, 2009). From those, there were 29 varieties registered in any of the 
three North American countries, from which only 19 have been registered in the EU.  
GM maize has been cultivated since 1995 for production of food, food additives, 
feed, and feed additives. There are two varieties of commercially released transgenic 
maize produced by means of genetic engineering: BT maize, which produces an 
insecticide for certain types of insects and herbicide-resistant maize; in addition there 
are hybrid combinations of both (OECD, 2003). However, research is on-going, and 
its aim is to improve specific characteristics such as the adaptability to harsh 
environmental factors like drought and high salt and high heavy metal-containing 
soil, and to altered composition like the enhancement of specific amino acids (Chiueh 
et al, 2002: 25). 
 
GM maize has the potential to modify the environment, as could other crops such as 
GM soybeans, and might affect wildlife and biodiversity. One aspect of this is the 
danger that this crop can cause when spreading either by cross-pollination with non-
GM maize or by establishing itself outside the area where it was planted (Cook, 2005: 
135). A famous case in this regard was the reported evidence of GM maize varieties 
appearing mixed with native Mexican maize, although this report was dismissed by 
GM-supporters stating that there was no interference with the ecosystem of the 
Mexican region in question. Another concern is the fact that GM maize can 
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potentially damage the biodiversity of ecosystems as well as the biodiversity of maize 
itself.
2
 
 
Different biotechnology transnational companies have been producing diverse types 
of GM maize. In the EU, Monsanto is the main company receiving authorisation to 
introduce MON810-6 insect-protected maize, MON863 insect-protected maize, 
NK603 Roundup Ready maize, GA21 Round up Ready maize, as well as the hybrid 
combinations NK603 x MON810 maize, MON863 x MON810 maize, GA21 x 
MON810 maize, MON863 x NK603 maize, MON89034 maize, and MON88017 
maize. Syngenta comes second with Bt11 maize, Bt176 maize, and MIR604. Pioneer 
is another company, with authorisations for DAS1507 maize, DAS59122 x NK603 
maize; and jointly with Dow Agroscience Europe, DAS59122 maize and DAS1507 x 
NK603. Lastly comes Bayer CropScience, which has T25 maize authorised 
(European Commission, 2010). Of all of them, only MON810 maize is currently 
being in commercial use and with cultivation on a very limited scale (European 
Commission, 2009). 
 
In North America, there are more GM maize varieties besides the ones authorised for 
consumption in Europe
3
 (OECD, 2009). Here, Monsanto also produces REN00038-3 
maize, MON801 maize, MON802 maize, MON805 maize, MON809 maize, 
MON830 maize, MON831 maize, and MON832 maize. Mycogen Seeds produces 
TC6275 maize. Aventis produces MS6 maize. AgrEvo produces CBH-351 maize for 
animal feed purposes and T14 maize. Pioneer produces 676 maize, 678 maize, and 
680 maize. Dekalb Genetics produces DBT418 maize and DLL25 maize. Plant 
                                                          
2
 For a clear explanation of the diversity of maize as well as its definitions, see Bellon, M.R. and 
Berthaud, J. (2006). „Traditional Mexican agricultural systems and the potential impacts of transgenic 
varieties on maize diversity‟. Agriculture and Human Values 23: 1. March 2006. 3 – 14. 
3
 In the NAFTA region, Bt11 maize is produced by Northrup King, T25 maize by AgrEvo, and Bt176 
maize by Ciba Geigy. 
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Genetic Systems produces MS3 maize for animal feed purposes. Most recently, 
Renessen
4
 received authorisation for LY038.  
From all these varieties, the US government has authorised all GM maize varieties, 
while Canada has done so with respect to 19 varieties.
5
 Mexico has only authorised 4 
varieties.
6
 The authorisations happening in North America result from the 
performance that the USA has as the world‟s main producer of GM maize. In 2008, 
its production of national maize crop was of 35.3 million hectares, of which 85 
percent was biotech.
7
 During the same year, global production of GM maize was of 
37.3 million hectares. In total, American participation at worldwide level was of 78 
percent (James, 2008: 6 – 8).  Canada is another nation-state in which GM production 
has reached a share of 50 percent of its total maize national production (Chiueh et al, 
2002: 25), and this amounted to about 7.6 million hectares in 2008. Mexico is a 
different case in that, despite assigning 0.1 million hectares to GM crops – cotton and 
soybean – it has actually forbidden the cultivation of GM maize in its territory. This 
fact becomes more relevant in a country where maize production accounts for the 
largest share of agricultural activity (Levy and Van Wijnbergen, 1992: 15 – 17), and 
from which around 75 percent of the population get their basic nutritional needs 
(Guerrero Andrade, 2005: 20). 
 
In the EU, there are a smaller number of hectares allocated for cultivating GM maize, 
although this is increasing. While in 2005 Spain, France, and Germany accounted for 
58,000 hectares, 100 hectares, and 100 hectares respectively (Pew Initiative on Food 
and Biotechnology, 2005: 54), the following year saw a significant increase of 
hectares being used for such purpose. Spain has continued to be the leading nation-
                                                          
4
 Renessen is a joint venture of Cargill and Monsanto. 
5
 MON88017 maize, MON802 maize, MON809 maize, DBT418 maize, DLL25 maize, MS3 maize, 
DAS06275-8 maize, LY038 maize, T14 maize, MON810 maize, MON863 maize, NK603 maize, 
GA21 maize, NK603 x MON810 maize, Bt11 maize, Bt176 maize, DAS1507 maize, T25 maize, and 
DAS59122 maize. 
6
 DAS1507 maize, NK603 maize, MON810 maize, and GA21 maize. 
7
 It is estimated that 8.7 million hectares of biotech maize was devoted to ethanol production (James, 
2008: 16). 
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state with 60,000 hectares. France and Germany have increased over five-fold their 
production, and jointly with Portugal, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
represented a production of approximately 8,500 hectares (James, 2006: 3).
8
 Growth 
in these seven nation-states has increased to the point of reaching 107,719 hectares in 
2008, which is equivalent to a 21 percent year-on-year increase equivalent to 19,046 
hectares (James, 2008: 11). 
An opposite stance is taken by Austria, Italy, Luxembourg, Hungary, and Greece, all 
of whom have banned the production and the introduction of GM maize in their 
countries. Although this disagreement within the EU has led to conflicts between 
governments, it has not deterred nation-states eager to produce GM maize from doing 
so. 
 
Differences in the number of approved GM maize varieties, cultivated hectares, 
number of nation-states per region, and number of producers relate to differences 
inner to each of the geographical regions. For this reason, it is necessary to delimit 
their historical and structural features, which can in turn provide insights about the 
manner and the extent labelling policies are addressed. 
 
2.3. Regional features of Europe and North America 
 
The NAFTA region and the EU share basic elements in terms of regional integration. 
I consider the NAFTA region as being a low level of integration because it focuses 
only on the removal of trade barriers among its participant nation-states. The NAFTA 
region can also be considered as „negative‟ integration according to Scharpf‟s 
classification (1999: 45). On the other hand, the EU represents a higher level of 
integration because it relates to a common market where the unification of a number 
                                                          
8
 Romania is also keen on cultivating GM crops, although its emphasis is made on soybean, and this 
has reached a million hectares (James, 2006: 4). 
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of sensitive policies has taken place. This means that the EU embraces „positive‟ 
integration (Sharpf, 1999: 45). 
 
2.3.1. The European Union 
 
The European Union is an economic and political union of 27 member nation-states,
9
 
which was established by the Maastricht Treaty on 1993 upon the foundations of the 
EEC. Such creation formed a three pillar structure: the European Communities, a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); and Cooperation in the Fields of 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).  
It is with the First Pillar that the EU has developed a single market through a 
standardised system of laws that apply to all member nation-states. The other two 
pillars delimited cooperation in areas sensitive to the performance of nation-states 
governments.
10
 Thus, it is the First Pillar that states the development of a single 
market through a standardised system of laws which apply to all member nation-
states, ensuring the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital.  
Considered as an international organisation, the EU operates through a hybrid system 
of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. In certain areas, decisions are made 
through negotiation between member nation-states, while in others; independent 
supranational institutions are responsible without a requirement for unanimity 
                                                          
9
 Founding members: Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The 
United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland (1973); Greece (1981); Spain and Portugal (1986); Austria, 
Finland, and Sweden (1995); Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus (2004); Bulgaria and Romania (2007). 
10
 The CFSP has as a main objective to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and 
independence of the EU, and to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. JHA entails the following areas as matters of common 
interest: asylum policy; rules governing, and controls on, the crossing by persons of the external 
borders of the member nation-states; immigration policy and residence rights of third-country 
nationals; combating drug addiction, combating international fraud; judicial cooperation in civil 
matters; judicial cooperation in criminal matters; customs cooperation; and police cooperation to 
combat terrorism, drug trafficking and other serious crime through an EU-wide police intelligence 
office (Nugent, 2003: 67 – 68). 
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between member nation-states. Relevant institutions of the EU are the European 
Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Council, and the European 
Parliament. There are other institutions that express their opinions with respect to the 
decisions made. Among them, the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions are found. 
 
2.3.1.1 Institutional structure of the EU  
 
The European Commission is centrally involved in EU decision-making at all levels 
and on all fronts. This is because the Commission enjoys policy-initiating, decision-
making and supervisory powers. In this regard, the work of the Commission is 
divided into separate policy areas in a similar way as national governmental 
responsibilities are segmented between ministries. The Commission‟s best known and 
most common organisational units are Directorates General (DGs), like the DG for 
Environment, and the DG for Health and Consumer Protection. These DGs vary in 
size, and they are divided into four to six directorates, which in turn are each divided 
into three or four units.  
With these duties at European level, the members of the Commission 
(Commissioners) are not supposed to be national representatives, but should be 
completely independent in the performance of their duties due to the general interest 
that they should search for in the benefit of the Community.  
 
The Council of Ministers is the principal meeting place of the national governments. 
Its main responsibility is to take policy and legislative decisions.  The extent to which 
the Council must work with the Commission and the EP with regard to these 
decisions varies between policy areas and according to what type of decisions are 
being made. This is, the Council has the most room for independent manoeuvre when 
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it is acting under pillars two and three of the EU. The Council is less independent 
under pillar one, mainly when legislation is concerned. The reasons for this are that, 
firstly, the Council can only act on the basis of proposals made by the Commission. 
Secondly, it shares legislative decisions with the EP according to the type of 
legislative procedure employed.
11
 Irrespective of this share of power, the political 
weight of the Council is such that the Commission is bound to pay close attention to 
the ministers‟ wishes.   
A hierarchy exists in the Council. It consists of ministers, the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (COREPER),
12
 and other specialised high level 
committees, middle-ranked committees, and working groups. Decisions taken by this 
institution are reached through three different ways: unanimity, qualified majority 
vote, and simple majority vote.  
Legally, there is one Council of Ministers. However, there are more in the sense that 
the Council meets in different formations to deal with different policy areas.  
 
The European Council refers to the meetings of Heads of Government. The main 
reason for its creation was the perception that the Community was failing to respond 
adequately and quickly enough to new and increasingly difficult challenges (Nugent, 
2003: 179). Through the Maastricht Treaty, the European Council was assigned 
responsibility for identifying the general direction of the EU‟s development; it was 
given certain duties and important powers both in the CFSP pillar, and with respect to 
the European Monetary Union (EMU). 
 
                                                          
11
 Legislative procedures are described shortly. 
12
 There are two COREPERs. COREPER II is made up of the Permanent Representatives plus staff. It 
is the more political of the two COREPERs and works mainly for the Foreign Ministers and economic 
matters. COREPER I consists of the Deputy Permanent Representatives and support staff. It mainly 
deals with policy areas like environment, social affairs, transport and internal market. 
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The European Parliament (EP) is an institution that has been increasing its influence 
over time. This influence is exercised in three ways: through the legislative process, 
through the budgetary process, and through control and supervision of the executive. 
With respect to influencing legislation, the EP sometimes participates in policy 
discussions with the Commission at the pre-proposal legislative stage. Also, the EP 
can formally adopt its own ideas for suggested legislation. Thirdly, the EP‟s views 
must be sought in connection with important and sensitive legislation.  
On the opposite side, the EP‟s performance outlines certain weaknesses. Firstly, the 
EP does not have full legislative powers. That is, it does not have the final say over 
what is and what is not to become law. Secondly, it is not unusual for the Council to 
take decisions or to adopt common positions having the EP‟s opinion pending. 
Thirdly, the EP is not consulted on all Council legislation. Fourthly, the EP does not 
need to be consulted on Commission legislation. 
Much of the EP‟s work is carried out by committees, which are classified as standing 
committees and ad hoc committees. The latter are established to investigate specific 
problems and topics. The former perform various duties, such as exploring ideas with 
the Commission, fostering own initiative reports, and discussing developments with 
the President-in-Office of the Council.  
The most important task of Standing Committees is to examine Commission 
proposals for legislation. This procedure starts with the proposal being referred to an 
appropriate committee. Afterwards, the Committee appoints a rapporteur for drawing 
up a report. The resulting draft
13
 is produced for consideration of the committee 
according to an agreed timetable. The next step entails the rapporteur acting as the 
committee‟s main spokesman when the report is considered in the plenary. In this 
capacity, he or she may have to explain the committee‟s view on amendments put 
forward by non-committee members. Lastly, there are cases when the committee has 
to issue a second reading, which should be carried out in a similar way as the first 
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 Drafts are normally presented in four main parts: Amendments to the Commission Proposal; a Draft 
Legislative Resolution; an Explanatory Statement; and Annexes, including the opinions of other 
committees. 
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reading. One example of such committees is the Standing committee for 
Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy. 
 
Other institutions expressing their opinions are the Economic and Social Committee 
(ESC) and the Committee of the Regions (CoR). 
The Economic and Social Committee (ESC) is composed of representatives of socio-
economic interests. Its functions rely on issuing information reports, liaising with a 
host of other international bodies, and seeking to promote understanding between 
sectional interests. But its main role is to provide a forum in which sectional interests 
express their views on EU-related matters and in so doing could supplement the 
popular will as expressed via parliaments. The manner in which the ESC issues its 
opinions depends on a three set of circumstances: mandatory referral, optional 
consultation, and own initiatives. Nevertheless, the influence the ESC can exert is 
limited. That is, the ESC mainly issues recommendations that cover relatively minor 
points. Therefore, neither the Council nor the Commission are obliged to act upon its 
views. 
The work that the ESC undertakes is carried out by different sections that are made 
up of related interest groups. There are six sections: Agriculture, Rural Development 
and the Environment; Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social 
Cohesion; Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship; External Relations; The 
Single Market, Production and Consumption; and Transport, Energy, Infrastructure 
and the Information Society.  
The Committee of the Regions (CoR) was established to develop a regional 
dimension of Community affairs. That is, the EU is known for covering both wealthy 
and poor areas. In this sense, regional and local groupings aim to attract the attention 
of funds for their own development. They do so by providing advice under the 
Council or the Commission‟s request. 
35 
 
The size and national composition of the membership of the CoR is the same as that 
of the ESC. Furthermore, most of the work is channelled through six specialised 
committees, called commissions. These are: Territorial Cohesion Policy; Economic 
and Social Policy; Sustainable Development; Culture and Education; Constitutional 
Affairs and European Governance; and External Relations. 
 
There are other institutions and political actors that participate in the EU. Among 
them are the Court of Justice, the European Investment Bank, the Court of Auditors, 
and different interests (private and public companies, national interest groups, and 
Eurogroups
14
). All of them play different roles according to particular policy areas 
and diverse circumstances other than biotechnology and labelling of GMF.
15
  
 
2.3.1.2 EU’s policy process 
 
There is no standard policy-making process in the EU. Multiple actors interact with 
one another through different channels. The actors are classified in three different 
sets: those associated with EU institutions, with member nation-states‟ governments, 
and with interests from national and European levels. The channels vary in four 
manners: in the complexity of the decision; in the relative importance of EU, member 
nation-state and subnational processes; in their levels of seniority; and in their degree 
of formality and structure.
16
  
 
Generally, Commission legislation is subject to less review and discussion than 
Council or EP and Council legislation. The reason for this is that the Commission 
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 Eurogroups draw their membership from several nation-states and operate at the EU level.   
15
 See George and Bache (2001). 
16
 For further reading see Nugent, N. (2003), The Government and Politics of the European Union, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 5
th
 Edition. 
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legislation is usually of an administrative kind. On the other side, some Council and 
all EP and Council legislation are subject to a full legislative procedure. This latter 
case becomes the subject of representations and pressures from many interests, is also 
assessed by the EP and often also by the ESC and the CoR.  
 
Four full legislative procedures have been properly defined with the Maastricht 
Treaty: consultation, cooperation, co-decision, and assent.  
The consultation procedure refers to a single reading procedure in which the Council 
is the sole final decision-maker, subject to an EP‟s opinion and, in some cases, to 
opinions of the ESC and the CoR. The cooperation procedure entails a second reading 
process, in which the EP can exert pressure by amending or rejecting the Council‟s 
common position agreed in the first reading. However, despite the EP‟s views being 
taken seriously, they do not amount to vetoes. The assent procedure implies that the 
proposed measures have to be approved by both the Council and the EP, where the 
EP must consider proposals at a single reading and without provision for 
amendments. In this case, the EP has veto powers. Co-decision is the most complex 
of the legislative procedures. It grew out of an extended cooperation procedure in an 
attempt to increase the efficiency and speed of decision-making processes, and to 
respond to pressures for more powers to be given to the EP. The former was achieved 
by enabling the use of QMV in the Council, while the latter was achieved by 
increasing the EP‟s influence over the Council at the second reading. The co-decision 
procedure gave the EP veto powers.  
 
The consultation process is mainly used for agriculture and JHA issues; the 
cooperation procedure is confined to four areas of the EMU; the assent procedure is 
used for special cases, like international agreements and EU enlargements; and co-
decision is the procedure used for the majority of legislation with respect to the first 
pillar. 
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2.3.1.2.1 Co-decision procedure 
 
Due to its relevance on GMF labelling and its common use, the stages of co-decision 
need to be explained. The first stage comes with a proposal that the Commission 
elaborates and publishes. This is examined by the relevant committee in the EP and 
by working groups and COREPER in the Council. Furthermore, the ESC and the 
CoR are consulted on the proposal.  If the EP and the Council agree on its contents, 
the text can be adopted at the first reading. If they do not agree, the Council adopts a 
common position through QMV after receiving the EP‟s opinion. The second stage 
appears with the second reading on the proposal. In this case, the EP can approve, 
amend, reject or take no action on the common position provided by the Council. If 
the EP approves or takes no action, the Council can adopt the proposal as legislative 
act. If the EP rejects the common position by an absolute majority of its members the 
proposal collapses. Otherwise, if the EP amends the common position by an absolute 
majority of its members and the Council is unable to accept the text approved by the 
EP, a third legislative stage happens. This third stage takes place with the proposal 
being referred to a conciliation committee composed of an equal number of Council 
and EP‟s representatives. If the conciliation committee agrees on a joint text, the 
proposal is referred back to the Council and the EP for final adoption. In this final 
vote, the EP acts by a majority of votes and the Council through QMV.  
 
After adoption, there are three situations that can happen to legislation. One variation 
is that legislation may require the adoption of additional legislation. This addition can 
be of three manners. First, initial EP and Council legislation may need to be 
supplemented by implementing legislation so as to fit it to particular circumstances 
and keep it updated. Second, besides implementing legislation, further policy 
legislation may be required so as to cover in a detailed manner any issue that may fall 
within the remit of the framework. Third, there is a „new approach‟ (Nugent, 2003: 
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354) that consists of producing texts that lay down essential requirements, mainly in 
terms of health and safety and of consumer and environmental protection. Another 
situation is the transposition of legislation. This refers to directives, which do not 
become mandatory until they have been transposed into national law by the 
appropriate national authorities. This takes place by attaching administrative 
measures to existing primary or secondary legislation, introducing new secondary 
legislation, or adding new clauses to already planned primary legislation. 
The last situation appears with the need to apply legislation. In this case, it is crucial 
to identify where responsibilities between the Commission (mainly DGs responsible 
for particular policies) and national authorities lie. On one hand, the Commission 
oversees the implementation of day-to-day policy. On the other hand, national and 
subnational authorities do most of the frontline work.  
 
The overall policy process is influenced by different supranational and 
intergovernmental participant institutions, different legislative procedures, and 
different ways of supervising policy implementation infer in the relative efficiency of 
the overall policy process.  
The EU lacks a fixed, central authoritative stage where priorities can be set out and 
choices between competing options can be made. It is true, the Commission drives 
policy initiation and therefore attempts to establish general priorities; however, it 
does not have decision-making powers to carry them through. In addition, the 
Council of Ministers present troublesome features, as sectoral Councils do not link up 
with one another in a satisfactory manner and are not properly integrated in long-term 
programmes. Besides, some policy areas are less integrated than desirable. Member 
nation-states regard this as an excessive transfer of powers to the EU (Nugent, 2003: 
362). Because of this, diverse legislative procedures take place. Member nation-states 
have, through treaty provisions, assigned the manner in which different policy areas 
should be dealt with. GMF and its labelling are included within the remit of pillar 
one, implying that it is under the co-decision procedure that legislation has been 
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made. The assessment of its implementation falls, as expressed previously, within the 
Commission duties once this institution has received the information from the 
appropriately appointed national bodies. 
 
2.3.2. The region of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
 
Entering into force in 1994, the NAFTA has shown features never seen before. The 
participation of nation-states with different levels of development, economic 
performance, societies‟ involvement, and cultural views have made North America an 
interesting case for regional integration. 
With regard to maize, the NAFTA found opposition from different groups in each 
nation-state. One case was the comparative advantage, in terms of methods of 
production and efficiency, of Canadian and American farmers with respect to 
Mexican counterparts. Another case was Mexican public opposition to this policy 
area. They claimed they were sidestepped by government officials drafting the FTA, 
who considered that it was in the best interest of the country to switch to the 
production of other crops, such as vegetables and fruits aimed at the American market 
(Carlsen, 2005), and the manufacturing of a wide range of items through the 
maquiladora scheme
17
 (Nadal, 2006: 33).  
 
The idea of entering the Mexican maize market without restrictions attracted great 
interest from Canada and the USA, whose governments were lobbied by 
biotechnology transnational companies fascinated by the size of the market and the 
possibility of entering it in order to strengthen their competitive position (Brown and 
Oliver, 1992: 1507). However, American drafters were uneasy at the prospect of 
                                                          
17
 The term maquiladora refers to a factory that imports materials and equipment on a duty-free and 
tariff-free basis for assembling or manufacturing and then re-exports the assembled product, usually to 
the original nation-state.  Maquiladoras are generally set in Mexican towns and cities along the border 
with the USA. 
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including maize in the FTA because they acknowledged how sensitive the crop was 
for Mexico, and further realised the potential implications for the USA (i.e. illegal 
immigration coming from rural areas of Mexico). Despite these worries, maize ended 
up being included in the agreement. This then opened the possibility for American 
biotechnology companies to gain access to the Mexican market.  Each NAFTA 
nation-state, though, has followed different pathways and timelines in the regulation 
of biotechnology. 
 
2.3.2.1 NAFTA’s institutional structure 
 
To oversee that national developments are undertaken according to the regional 
agreement, the NAFTA established the creation of institutions formed by 
representatives of the three nation-states. This thus shows the international – and 
intergovernmental – character of the region. The central institution is the Free Trade 
Commission, which consists of cabinet-level representatives from each nation-state 
with the purpose of supervising the implementation and further elaboration of the 
agreement. They gather once a year, which mean they do not follow closely the 
performance of the agreement. For this purpose, the position of NAFTA coordinators 
was created. They are senior officials from each nation-state‟s trade departments 
focusing on day-to-day management of the NAFTA, which is a duty where they are 
assisted by over 30 Working Groups, Committees and other subsidiary bodies. In 
turn, such groups and committees have been established to facilitate trade and 
investment and to ensure that further work is carried on towards fulfilling the 
objectives of the FTA. Lastly, there is a NAFTA Secretariat, which is responsible for 
the administration of the dispute settlement provisions of the agreement. Specifically, 
this institution administers dispute resolution processes under Chapters 14 (Financial 
Services), 19 (Review and Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and Countervailing 
Duty Matters), and 20 (Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement 
Procedures) of the NAFTA.   
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On the policy area that concerns this study, a trilateral Committee on Agricultural 
Trade has been created as established in Chapter 7 of the NAFTA. Although this 
institution‟s functions focus on monitoring and promoting cooperation on the 
implementation and administration of agricultural trade (Art. 706, NAFTA), it lacks 
responsibilities beyond those referred to administrative tasks. However, this 
Committee relies on an Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes 
regarding Agricultural Goods (Art. 707, NAFTA), which issue recommendations to 
achieve effective resolution of disputes. This thus means that the national 
representatives, through the Committee, are allowed to resolve the differences 
between them. Nevertheless, if no mutually acceptable solution is found, the NAFTA 
provides for panel procedures, where the work of the NAFTA Secretariat is based on 
the dispute settlement provisions of the WTO, as provided on the objectives of the 
Chapter 20 provisions. Therefore, NAFTA rulings are following a pattern similar to 
that of an international organisation, which is an aspect that confirms the 
intergovernmental character of the agreement and the extent to which decisions on 
daily issues are made. Moreover, a „Committee on Standard-related Measures‟ was 
created, designed to facilitate the process by which member nation-states could make 
compatible their technical measures (Art. 913, NAFTA). The Committee is in charge 
of enhancing cooperation on the development, application, and enforcement of 
standard-related measures according to what had been established in international and 
regional agreements. It can also create working groups that can consult non-
governmental bodies as well as scientists if they deem it necessary. One of the 
functions of this Committee is that it addresses issues related to labelling, although 
they emphasise requirements to facilitate textile trade, rather than acting potential 
GM status of food products.   
 
Besides trade-related institutions, the NAFTA framework has entailed the signing of 
two side agreements that in turn have provided for the establishment of regional 
institutions. Labour and environment were contending issues during negotiations and 
subsequent acceptance of the NAFTA. For their appropriate observance, a 
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Commission for Labour Cooperation and a Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation (CEC) were set up, which would also function as a point of contact for 
civil society. The latter Commission had a participative role with disputed aspects of 
GM maize and its potential labelling, as it is explained further in the chapter. 
However, its lack of influence meant that trade-related perspectives prevailed. In any 
case, with such an institutional framework, where trilateral Commissions and 
Committees are at the core, North American nation-states have pushed an agenda of 
market liberalisation through a free trade agreement. This is characterised by tariff 
barriers on manufactured products, foods and crops being reduced gradually. In this 
context, the inclusion of maize trade was carefully handled because of different 
national backgrounds. 
 
2.3.2.2 NAFTA’s policy process 
 
The NAFTA aims to eliminate barriers to trade and facilitate the cross-border 
movement of goods and services between the territories of the member nation-states, 
to promote conditions of fair competition, to increase investment opportunities, to 
provide protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, and to establish a 
framework for further trilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation to expand and 
enhance the benefits of the NAFTA (Art. 102 NAFTA).  
These objectives delimit the context in which member nation-states set out their trade 
policies. These policies cover a wide range of areas. One of such policies is the notion 
of national treatment for goods from another member nation-state, which goes in 
accordance with Article III of the GATT. Another established policy has been the 
gradual elimination of tariffs in a series of goods subjected to customs duties. A 
further, relevant, aspect has been the development of the clause of Most Favoured 
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Nation (MFN).
18
 A fourth policy is the elimination of non-tariff measures, understood 
as import and export restrictions, customs user fees,
19
 and export taxes. Besides this, 
there are other relevant policies that have been set up within the NAFTA framework. 
Issues on rules of origin, customs procedures, agriculture and SPS measures, 
standard-related measures, investment, cross-border trade in services, 
telecommunications, financial services, competition, and intellectual property are 
observed in this agreement.  
In addition to these trade policies being addressed, the NAFTA allowed for the 
creation of a dispute settlement process. This process takes different forms according 
to the context of the dispute. One of them is cooperation, in which member nation-
states should attempt to arrive at mutually satisfactory resolutions of any matter (Art. 
2003). A second form is dispute settlement under WTO, although this procedure 
takes place when member nation-states cannot reach agreement at a previous, 
bilateral or trilateral, stance. WTO dispute settlement is used in cases of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) measures and Standard-related measures. That is, when disputes 
refer to human, animal, or plant life and health protection, to the environment, safety, 
and directly related scientific matters (Art. 2005). A third form is consultation, which 
takes place when a member nation-state requests it regarding any measure that might 
affect the operation of the NAFTA (Art. 2006). If consultation is unsuccessful, any of 
the member nation-states involved may request a meeting of the Commission, who 
may call on advisers, conciliate, mediate, make recommendations, or request for an 
arbitrary panel
20
 (Art. 2007). If the latter is the case, the panel may issue a final report 
that disputing member nation-states shall conform with. When there is no 
compliance, the disputing member nation-state may seek to suspend benefits in the 
same sector or in another. 
                                                          
18
 The MFN clause is a non-discriminatory trade policy commitment offered by one country to another 
on a reciprocal basis. Both countries apply the lowest import-duty and quota-restrictions on imports 
from each other, which they apply on similar imports from any other country. 
19
 The term „customs user fees‟ refers to a number of fees imposed by the USA for the processing by 
the US Customs Service of passengers, conveyances, and merchandise entering the USA. 
20
 The panel is formed by five members, who are members of the complaining and complained against 
member nation-states. One of them acts as chair of the panel under agreement of the member nation-
states involved. 
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The NAFTA has established a number of trade policies that should be observed by its 
participant nation-states. In case of potential disputes, there are settlement processes 
from different contexts that denote the intergovernmental and international characters 
of this region. The intergovernmental character appears with the creation of an 
institutional structure that performs a role that pretends to reinforce the international 
character of the NAFTA‟s processes. That is, the institutions created aim to reinforce 
trade developments reached at international stances, from where plenty of NAFTA‟s 
legal features rely on.   
This thus allows speaking of the level of integration in the NAFTA mirroring that of 
international organisations sharing similar outcomes. Reliance on GATT references 
reinforces the commitment that participant nation-states have with regard to their 
legal and trade obligations as members of this organisation. The explicit inclusion of 
SPS measures and Standard-related measures in NAFTA‟s text therefore deserves 
special mention when understanding the context of GMF labelling. 
 
2.4. International aspects of GMF labelling 
 
Biotechnology and GMF have been dealt with at the international level through 
different agreements. They are perceived from different perspectives, leading to 
different ways to approach policies on labelling GMF, including GM maize. 
In the WTO context, two international agreements with different perspectives can 
relate to biotechnology products.  One is the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
Agreement. It establishes that its member nation-states have the right to take sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant 
life or health (Art. 2.1), provided that such measures do not contravene international 
trade. Any of the measures taken should be based on scientific principles and not 
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence (Art. 2.2). A key issue contemplated 
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in this agreement is that member states should accept the sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures of exporting member states as equivalent if they demonstrate that their 
measures achieve the adequate level of the importing member states (Art. 4.1). This 
aspect relates to GMF in the sense that governments cannot restrict its handling, 
transport and packaging with regard to safety or health unless they have a sufficient 
„scientific basis‟ for this step. This thus would exclude any social, cultural or 
economic consideration from playing a role in setting health or safety standards. 
 
The other is the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement. It establishes that 
technical regulations should not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a 
legitimate objective, such as the protection of human health or safety, animal or plant 
life or health, or the environment (Art. 2.2). In this framework, labels can be deemed 
a technical regulation
21
 or a standard
22
 (Annex 1). 
This agreement also refers to products imported from any member state being given 
same treatment to those of national origin (Art. 2.1).  
This agreement is worth mentioning because its contents refer to halting the 
introduction of technical measures that could impede free trade, unless human health 
or safety, animal health, plant life fertility and robustness, or if the environment were 
threatened (Art. 2.2 of the TBT Agreement). Within this framework, labelling is also 
included. 
 
One difference is observable between the SPS and the TBT Agreements. The former 
advocates that member nation-states should accept each other‟s measures in as much 
                                                          
21
 A technical regulation lays down product characteristics or their related processes and production 
methods. It can also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking, or 
labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method (TBT Agreement). 
22
 A standard is a document approved by a recognised body, which provides for common and repeated 
use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products. It may also include terminology, symbols, 
packaging, marking or labelling requirements (TBT Agreement). 
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as they are deemed satisfactory. The latter agreement „encourages‟ member nation-
states to negotiate the mutual recognition of assessment procedures. 
 
There are views about both the TBT and the SPS Agreements in terms of GMF 
labelling. On one side, the TBT Agreement is considered to suggest compulsory 
labelling of GMF because it ensures that consumer information is provided 
(Burchardi, 2001: 87, 101). On the other hand, the SPS Agreement suggests that there 
are no reasons to label GMF as there is no scientific information indicating risks to 
health and safety (Makuch, 2004).  
 
The SPS Agreement is explicitly included in the NAFTA under Chapter 7, which 
defines the context in which agricultural trade should take place. However, there is no 
reference to terms such as „biotechnology‟, „genetically modified‟ or „genetically 
engineered‟. This is perhaps the result of the SPS Agreement considering GM crops 
as equivalent to conventional crops. 
 
Chapter 9 of NAFTA makes explicit reference to the TBT Agreement when 
determining standard-related measures. This requires the avoidance of unnecessary 
obstacles to trade when products comply with national requirements and would have 
the same purpose as similar products (Art. 907, NAFTA). In these terms, the potential 
labelling of GM maize can be understood as a technical barrier since the product is 
considered equivalent to conventional maize. Chapter 9 clearly provides for 
exemptions when there are „fundamental climatic, geographical, technological or 
infrastructural factors‟ that can be justified scientifically according to national levels 
of protection (Art. 905, NAFTA).   
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Both the SPS and TBT Agreements take into account a third perspective, that of the 
Codex Alimentarius, which is a joint programme of the FAO and the WHO and 
consists of a collection of internationally recognised standards, guidelines and 
recommendations in food, food production and food safety; while emphasising 
consumer protection (Codex Alimentarius, 2007). The Codex Alimentarius aims to 
reinforce the notion of validating the „substantial equivalence‟ between both GM and 
non-GM maize advocated by the USA and Canada and, subsequently, has resulted in 
the formulation of international labelling standards (Makuch, 2004:228) that evade 
stating the GM status of products. Its commission is recognised as the international 
authority in this sphere by the WTO. With respect to labelling, the Codex 
Alimentarius establishes that it should be provided only for nutritional purposes, or 
when it contains allergens. The reason for this position is that GM and traditional 
crops are equivalent in the way in which they are produced  
 
Another international agreement is the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB).
23
 Its 
objective is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection and safety during 
the transfer, handling and use of GMOs. It lays down the procedures for granting 
authorisation, following notification, for living modified organisms (LMOs) as well 
as a system of notification for LMOs intended for direct use as food or feed, of for 
further processing. A cornerstone of the CPB is the adoption of the precautionary 
principle.
24
 In this context, labelling is considered necessary for the introduction of 
GM seeds into a certain nation-state for cultivation. This is in order to verify that such 
GMOs have been authorised and that they comply with CPB guidelines. 
                                                          
23
 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was adopted at the Conference on the Convention on 
Biodiversity held in Montreal on 29 January 2000, which concern transboundary movements of 
GMOs. 
24
 The precautionary principle refers to measures imposed to an activity that raises threats of harm to 
human health or the environment, even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established 
scientifically. In this context, the proponent of the activity, rather than the public, should bear the 
burden of proof. It involves an examination of the full range of alternatives, including no action 
(Science and Environmental Health Network, 1998). 
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The protocol includes documentation requirements for transboundary movements of 
LMOs for research, for environmental release, and for food, feed, and processing.  
Article 18.2(a) requires documentation accompanying LMOs for food, feed, or 
processing to clearly state that they may contain LMOs. The reason behind this, 
Andrée (2007: 6) argues, was a perceived domestic economic interest in exporting 
GM crops, combined with grain traders‟ fears that even shipments with minimal GM 
content might be caught in new regulatory burdens enabled by a strong protocol.
25
 
The resulting outcome is that liability may happen if unintended LMO presence is not 
documented. Besides, importing countries may develop a multitude of policies and 
regulations.  
 
The issues that were developed under the CPB suffered a major setback that had 
major implications for the direction of discussions on documentation issues. Article 
18.2(a) was one of the most difficult issues in the CPB negotiations.
26
 Then, in an 
attempt to overcome this aspect, the USA,
27
 jointly with Canada
28
 and Argentina, 
held two meetings
29
 of LMO exporting nation-states to seek agreement on 
documentation requirements. The work of these two meetings concerned specific 
elements for a common approach on bilateral arrangements with importing nation-
states, assigning responsibility for provision of documentation accompanying a 
shipment, resolution of issues and adventitious presence (Lin and Ching, 2004). 
                                                          
25
 In turn, this led Canada to chair the Miami group, which sought to minimise the potential impact of 
the CPB on the international grain trade. 
26
 At the Second Meeting of the Parties of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (COP-MOP2, 
Montreal, 30 May – 3 June 2005) despite intense efforts of the great majority of Parties negotiations 
collapsed and the meeting failed to take a decision on the detailed documentation requirements for 
transboundary movements of living modified organisms intended for direct use as food or feed, or for 
processing. After intense and controversial talks the decision on Article 18.2(a) BS-III/10 was adopted 
at COP-MOP3 (Curitiba, 13-17 March 2006). . 
27
 According to John Pitchford, who was was the Director of International Affairs at the USDA at the 
time of CPB negotiations; the documentation requirements of the CPB were not clearly stated in the 
protocol, leaving room for multiple interpretations. In his view, the CPB had the potential to disrupt 
American export trade (USDA, 2003). 
28
 This country went from being a key supporter of the Convention on Biological Diversity (Montreal 
was appointed as the home of the secretariat for the convention), to becoming the third only to the 
USA and Argentina in the uptake of GM seeds in agricultural production. 
29
 March and June 2003. 
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The outputs from the meetings were a framework and model arrangement for bilateral 
agreements between exporter and importer nation-states. The stated intention was for 
the exporting nation-states to make similar deals with importing nation-states in order 
to facilitate the trade of GM products once the CPB was in force. This was possible 
because the CPB allows bilateral and regional agreements with non-parties. 
Nonetheless, they have to be consistent with the objectives of the CPB, without 
resulting in a lower level of protection. Subsequently, the agreement reached between 
these exporting nation-states envisaged that documentation would be triggered only 
with transboundary movements of LMOs that are authorised in the exporting country, 
except in cases when signatories of this type of bilateral agreements contractually 
defined that a shipment of 95 percent non-GMO content is considered as non-GMO 
shipment. Thus, a 5 percent threshold for unintentional presence of living GMOs 
before shipment was agreed to be tagged with the „may contain‟ phrase. 
In this way, the USA and Canada, both non-signatories of the protocol, signed a 
trilateral agreement with their NAFTA partner, Mexico. This trilateral agreement 
became important in subsequent CPB meetings, like the one held in Kuala Lumpur in 
2004 because Mexico was unwilling to agree to any decision that was not in line with 
this trilateral agreement. Also, Mexico opposed the introduction of new 
documentation requirements for living GMOs (ETC Group, 2004; Andrée, 2007: 
260).
30
 Reaching consensus during this meeting proved difficult. For this reason, it 
was agreed that identification requirements for living GMOs, the form of the 
documentation, and the threshold for adventitious presence that would trigger 
identification requirements would be set in the following meeting. This was also 
because there was the perception of many delegates feeling that a minority position 
was overrepresented when a chair‟s text looked to retain the „may contain‟ language 
(Andrée, 2007: 262). In Montreal in 2005, documentation issues remained 
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 In views of Andrée (2007: 260), trade relations with the USA were evidently a higher priority for 
Mexico than standing firm with most other protocol parties on detailed documentation requirements. 
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contentious. This included a shift in previously like-minded countries,
31
 which in turn 
meant that the draft conclusions draft required further negotiation. These took place 
in Curitiba, Brazil, in 2006. At the host‟s proposal, there were ideas about including 
the text of „containing‟ GMOs. However, Mexico was again at odds with its 
counterparts, arguing against any „contains‟ language that did not have a „may 
contain‟ option. This country‟s position was based on the possibility of maintaining a 
series of trade agreements with other countries, as well as on its commitments to the 
USA and Canada.
32
 With this, Mexico insisted on inserting a paragraph stating that 
the specific documentation requirements being negotiated would not apply to trade 
with non-parties to the protocol. 
The final outcome was that „may contain‟ labels would be used in cases when the 
living GMO was not known, while „contain‟ labels would apply when the living 
GMO was identified. With the latter phrase, listing living GMOs of species other than 
those that constitute the shipment would not be required. In either phrasing, exporters 
would be expected to provide common, scientific, and commercial names, unique 
identifier codes, and transformation events with a view to considering a decision to 
ensure that all relevant shipments clearly state that they „contain‟ or „may contain‟ 
living GMOs.  
Furthermore, there was no agreement on whether to use commercial invoices or a 
stand-alone document. The final decision was to leave it up to nation-states to 
establish their own requirements. Overall, this was considered as a victory of Mexico 
and its allies (Andrée, 2007: 268). 
 
 
                                                          
31
 Brazil and New Zealand were initially in favour of GM-free and GMF labelling regimes, 
respectively. However, as negotiations went through, they supported the „may contain‟ language. The 
reasons behind this were due to change in trading patterns. See Andrée (2007). 
32
 Comments made by Mr. Marco Antonio Meraz, member of the Mexican delegation, quoted in 
Andrée (2007). 
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2.4.1 Transatlantic conflict at the WTO level 
 
The USA and Canada have been at odds with the EU on certain issues regarding 
biotechnology. Nevertheless, the dispute between them appeared external to biosafety 
talks. This was the case of the use of growth hormones in beef production.  
The EU had justified a ban on hormones in beef imports since 1981, on the basis of 
their potential risks to human health. By the mid-1990s, the USA and Canada took 
action on this issue by working through the Codex Alimentarius in order to have 
international standards adopted that would accept residual levels of certain hormones 
in meat. With this, both North American countries lodged complaints that led a WTO 
dispute resolution panel to rule against the EU in 1997, stating that the EU‟s ban was 
not WTO-compliant because it was not based on international standards, like the TBT 
Agreement or the SPS Agreement. The panel agreed that the EU could have higher 
standards than the international standard of the Codex Alimentarius, but such 
standards would have to be scientifically justifiable. The panel also noted that despite 
the fact that the EU was providing studies demonstrating health risks of hormones 
themselves, these studies were inadmissible, as the issue was about the specific risks 
of hormone residues in foods.  
The EU appealed this decision in late 1997, referring to the precautionary principle, 
which it argued was an accepted general rule of international law applying not only to 
the management of risks, but also to their assessment (Andrée, 2007: 165). The EU 
position stated that provisions of the SPS Agreement dealing with precaution, 
including Article 5.7
33
 on provisional measures did not stop the applicability of the 
principle. Subsequently, the EU argued that these provisions did not prevent member 
nation-states from being cautious when setting health standards in the face of 
conflicting scientific information and uncertainty. At the end, the EU lost its appeal. 
However, despite being ruled against twice, the EU did not agree to let hormone beef 
                                                          
33
 Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement allows nation-states to adopt SPS measures in cases where 
relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, provided that they seek to obtain the additional information 
necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the measure accordingly.  
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into its territory. Instead, it said it would undertake further studies to demonstrate the 
risk of the hormones in a way that would satisfy the SPS Agreement. The response 
from the USA and Canada was to impose trade sanctions. 
That this case occurred at the time when negotiations were starting on the CPB was 
of great significance to the biosafety talks. The outcome of the hormone dispute case 
was a debate between sound science and precaution in the context of a discourse 
focused on human health risks (Andreé, 2007: 166). 
 
With regard to GMF, there was a dispute among the same parties. This seemed to 
take place because the American government viewed the EU‟s moratorium and 
approval process as „overly politicised at best and protectionist at worst‟ (Young, 
2003: 470).  
Unlike the meat hormones dispute, the USA initially refrained from bringing a WTO 
claim over EU restrictions on GMF, preferring to conduct bilateral and multilateral 
discussions. Four reasons were listed for this approach. 
 
(1) US authorities, in consultation with US industry, understand that EU 
authorities are severely constrained by the demands of EU consumers and member 
state politicians, and they believe that bringing a WTO case at this time could be 
counterproductive; (2) media coverage of the dispute has significantly affected the 
political and commercial playing fields within the United States itself; (3) 
following the mass demonstrations at the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle, US 
authorities are reticent to initiate a new controversial WTO case; and (4) European 
concerns over genetically modified foods have growing support around the world 
[...] (Pollack and Shaffer, 2001: 167). 
 
Despite this, the EU imposed a moratorium on the approval of GM products from 
June 1999.  
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According to the US Trade Representative,
34
 EU‟s actions had „perpetuated a trade 
barrier unwarranted by the EC‟s own scientific analysis, which impedes the global 
use of a technology that could be of great benefit to farmers and consumers around 
the world‟. Also, the USA claimed that the EU procedure to grant authorisation 
requests was based on political expediency more than on health or safety concerns. 
Those claims were dismissed by the European Commission, arguing it had already 
approved a number of GM products for marketing in the EU (Euroactiv, 2006). In 
addition, the EU‟s trade Commissioner questioned the reasons behind the US case, 
and denied the EU‟s regulatory system was discriminatory (BBC, 2003). 
 
Then, in August 2003, the USA, Canada and Argentina filed a complaint in the WTO 
about the moratorium on the introduction of GMF into its territory. These three 
countries requested the establishment of a Panel to examine the matter. Acting on this 
request, the Dispute Settlement Body established a panel towards the end of August 
2003. This panel identified three categories of complaints. One referred to the general 
EU‟s moratorium on approvals of biotech industry. Another was that various product-
specific EU measures were affecting the approval of specific GM products. The third 
category related to the safeguard measures prohibiting the import and marketing of 
specific GM products (WTO, 2006: 1069). 
 
By September 2006, the WTO Panel issued reports that examined the complaints 
against the EU‟s measures affecting the approval and marketing of biotech industry. 
In such reports, the outcome reached by the WTO Panel did not include opinions on 
whether GM products were safe, were equivalent to their conventional counterparts, 
or required pre-marketing approvals. However, the WTO Panel considered that the 
EU‟s procedures for the approval of GMOs „are SPS measures within the meaning of 
                                                          
34
 The US Trade Representative was Robert Zoellick, he was quoted by the BBC, on News Online 
(2003). 
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the SPS Agreement‟ (WTO, 2006: 1068). On an opposite view, the WTO Panel 
determined that the moratorium was not in itself a SPS measure.  
On the conclusion itself, the WTO Panel affirmed that the EU acted inconsistently 
with its obligations of the SPS Agreement.
35
 It also regarded that the moratorium as 
affecting the operation and application of the EU‟s approval procedures because it 
resulted in a failure to complete individual approval procedures without delay, hence 
giving rise to an inconsistency with the SPS Agreement.
36
 Moreover, the WTO Panel 
considered that safeguard measures taken by some member nation-states
37
 were not 
grounded on new relevant scientific evidence on risk assessment meeting the 
requirements of the SPS Agreement.  
 
A key aspect to note here is that the case did not involve nation-states that were both 
members of the WTO and members of the CPB. The EU was beholden to both 
treaties, but complainants were not. As a result, even though the EU referred to the 
protocol in its defence, the WTO dispute resolution panel held that nation-states 
could be held to account only for their obligations to treaties they had formally 
ratified. Hence, it was only on WTO grounds that the EU was held accountable for. 
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 Specifically, with the obligations established under Annex C(1)(a), first clause, and Article 8 of the 
SPS Agreement.  
36
 This referred to terms inferred in Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement (WTO, 2006: 1068). 
37
 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg. With regard to maize, the following 
were the GM cases included: T25 maize, Bt-176 maize, MON810 maize, Bt-11 maize, and MON809 
maize. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
This study focuses on the assessment of GM maize labelling policies in two regions. 
In this sense, it is necessary to delimit the kind of policy analysis to carry out. Such 
analysis is classified as „analysis of policy‟ and „analysis for policy‟ (Gordon, Lewis 
and Young, 1977; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). The former focuses on policy content, 
policy processes, and policy outputs; while the later emphasises on evaluation, 
information for policy making, process advocacy, and policy advocacy. For the 
context and purpose of this study, in which the examination of how policy 
convergence takes place over time and between two different regional settings, the 
study of policy outputs is the most appropriate type of policy analysis. In this regard, 
policy outputs are not usually developed out of a single decision. Instead, they are 
defined in terms of a series of decisions that may change over time. In this sense, the 
ways in which policy outputs appear pose certain problems for research (Hill, 2005: 
14). This refers to the object of study in policy outputs, which is generally a unique 
sequence of events. This means that little scope exists for testing earlier research by 
looking for a situation in which a process is replicated. Hence, the political 
environment in which policy experiments are conducted mean that they are unlikely 
to happen without ongoing adjustments; that is, policy change. 
 
As this study aims to analyse policy convergence, it is necessary to address the 
question of how convergence can be measured and evaluated empirically. In this 
regard, the common way of assessing policy convergence is to examine the extent to 
which policies of nation-states have become more similar to each other over time. 
With this in mind, I make use of σ-convergence (sigma convergence). Such a concept 
focuses in the evaluation of the potential decrease in variation of policies among a 
certain group of nation-states (Knill, 2005: 769). Furthermore, by making use of the 
empirical evidence, this study concentrates on the direction that policy convergence 
has taken in each region. This is where the concept of „trading up‟ comes to the fore 
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as an upwards movement of GM maize labelling policies may be  observable. This 
situation happens when policies become stricter while reaching the regional level. 
Besides of the direction, this research emphasises on a specific timeframe, based on 
the development of the legal framework created to regulate labelling of GMF. This is 
because the „time factor‟ is an important category as it relates to the degree of 
precision with which studies examine policy similarity over time (Heichel et al, 2005: 
819). 
 
Any discussion of the policy outputs needs to be grounded within the context of the 
policy process, and in an extensive consideration of the nature of power in the state. 
This results from the notion that any consideration of how the process works tends to 
involve propositions about who dominates. Omission of this, in statements about the 
policy processes, tends to have implications that there are no dominant elements in 
the state (Hill, 2005: 13). A further contribution of how the process works is provided 
by regional institutions; although they appear influenced by nation-states‟ views. In 
addition, international organisations can add their position to the process by 
prescribing policies developed within their area of remit. 
For this, reference for nation-states and regional institutions needs to be made in the 
form of variables influencing policies that lead to such similar activities. Their 
participation differs due to different institutional configurations; that is, to the extent 
to which nation-states and regional institutions participate in the convergence 
achieved.  
 
Studying policy outputs is generally carried out through the assessment of case 
studies, using qualitative methods (Hill, 2005: 14). To be able to analyse the factors 
that determine whether convergence and trading up occur and if they are successful, 
this study presents one case study on two regions that presuppose different levels of 
economic integration. One is being regarded as the highest level of economic 
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integration, including political integration, which refers to the EU. The other is 
showing basic approaches to economic integration in the form of an international 
agreement: North America. 
 
In this sense, as this study relies on qualitative methods, it is necessary to justify this 
choice and delimit its use in the context of the convergence of GM maize labelling 
policies.                    
There is the general conception that qualitative methodology narrows its scope when 
considering a reduced group of modes of data gathering and its non-numeric 
characteristics. In addition, there is the simplistic view that qualitative methods are 
anchored around single case studies, eschewing theoretical concerns (Henwood and 
Pidgeon, 1992: 101). Subsequently, qualitative methods can be viewed with some 
scepticism. One of the main criticisms levelled at qualitative research is that it is too 
subjective and that findings can be influenced by the personal beliefs and 
preconceptions of the researcher. Thus, it can be difficult to establish what the 
researcher actually did and how he or she arrived at certain conclusions. Often 
qualitative findings are based on only a small number of subjects or anecdotal 
evidence. 
Qualitative methods are more than simply data collection and perceptions of the 
researcher. The gathering, analysis and interpretation of data are always conducted 
with some broader understanding of what constitutes legitimate enquiry and 
warrantable knowledge. Qualitative methods also emphasise description and 
explanation, the representation of reality, an attitude towards theorising, and the view 
that a scientific process generates working hypotheses rather than simply assembling 
immutable empirical facts (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1992: 98). For these purposes, 
qualitative methods assist in explaining the manner and the extent to which each 
region‟s policies have taken different pathways. To achieve this, I designed a 
methodological framework that associates the hypothesis and objectives of the study 
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with the analysis of theory, which is deferred until the information is collected, 
structured and examined.  
 
This study also makes use of a comparative approach that seeks to explain similar 
activities in different countries or regional settings. This is because comparison is the 
methodological core of the scientific study of politics. Comparative analysis also 
helps to explain and test theories about the way in which policies are developed 
(Almond et al, 2004: 31). Hence, comparing the EU and the NAFTA region can 
allow assessing the manner in which policy convergence takes place. In fact, the most 
obvious and simple comparative question about the policy process is whether systems 
tend to converge or diverge (Hill, 2005: 105).  
 
For the context of biotechnology and GMF, there are many relevant activities that are 
hard to observe.  This relates to certain processes being covert, where official secrecy 
is used as a justification for restricting access to situations or data necessary to 
evaluate policies. In fact, „very much more is just kept secret without any attempt to 
offer a justification for doing so‟ (Hill, 2005: 15). Retrieving information from 
sources heavily involved in the policy-making of GMF and GM maize labelling 
policies has proven difficult. In some cases, only official documents were accessible; 
while reaching elite participants, such as policy-makers, posed several difficulties. 
However, transcripts of debates and documents from which official documents were 
issued assisted in picturing the framework by which GMF and GM maize labelling 
policies have been developed. The subsequent findings have provided a deeper 
insight than that of merely using official data. It is noticeable that a key difference has 
existed among participants in terms of accountability and provision of information. It 
was more accessible to obtain data from parliamentary bodies than from executive 
bodies. The cases of the EP and the Mexican Congress, from which retrieval of 
sensitive information was possible, differ from those of ministries depending from 
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executive governments. The USDA, SAGARPA, and the EU Council of Ministers 
exemplify this regard as official documents were the main source of information. 
Besides the depth of the information that was retrieved from these sources, it is 
necessary to bear in mind the usage given to language and the presentation of texts. 
Official documents and statements are written in a manner that differs from the 
context in which debates are held, as their transcripts demonstrate, and 
questionnaires, from which personal viewpoints and diverse insights over the same 
issue are obtained. In this regard, the interpretation of such texts can influence the 
presentation of findings. For this reason, it has been necessary to define the sort of 
questions to ask. How policy convergence takes place? To which extent GM maize 
labelling policies are converged? To which extent has trading up taken place? Their 
answers will thus contribute to the understanding of the development of a specific 
policy output. To answer these, we need to be conscious that claims provided in texts 
retrieved from different sources are influenced by the most dominant positions. In 
fact, these views are those driving the manner in which policy convergence takes 
place in the two regional settings and, subsequently, affect the resulting policy 
outputs. 
  
Due to the type of information to gather, interviews were planned. For this purpose, I 
intended to contact participants involved in the development of policies in the EU and 
in the three North American nation-states. This action was not successful whatsoever 
due to the reluctance of potential interviewees to participate or the busy agendas they 
had when interviews were requested. Nevertheless, I was able to contact Mr. Yannis 
Karamitsios, who is a Legal Officer of the Biotechnology, Pesticides and Health Unit 
(Unit D.4.) of the DG on Environment. The relevance of his information refers to him 
drafting the Commission‟s second report on the implementation of Regulation 
1830/2003. He provided copies of member nation-states‟ feedback not only of the 
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said report, but also of the feedback provided to issue the first report.
38
 Such 
information assisted in evaluating the position of national authorities before and after 
the implementation of labelling policies, as well as other important information. In 
turn, this assisted in assessing the extent and the manner in which policy convergence 
has been achieved, as well as the potential direction that the policy may evolve to. 
Another useful source of information was the retrieval of debates held among the 
MEPs, and between MEPs and Commissioners. As they led to the establishment of 
Regulations that are at the core of the present study (Regulation 1829/2003 and 
Regulation 1830/2003), they have provided useful insight on the manner in which the 
EP reached to its position during legislative procedure. This included the stance that 
each MEP had, which relied in two factors. First was the political group they 
belonged to. Second was the country of origin. A similar search for information was 
attempted for the Commission and the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, public 
information is not as deep as in the case of that retrieved from the EP. This thus 
meant that a partial insight from EU institutions was obtained. However, official 
documents and information from NGOs and other websites allow positioning the 
other institutions‟ views within the legislative framework. In addition, the position of 
national authorities on the implementation of GM labelling rules assists in setting 
parameters for studying policy convergence. 
 
With regard to the NAFTA, a similar approach was attempted. The focus was to get 
the Mexican representative that signed the trilateral agreement on transboundary 
movement of GMOs. However, he was unavailable to be interviewed as he moved in 
to another position at the Inter-American level. Due to this, I tracked, among his 
subordinates, a person who could adequately contribute to my research. This action 
led me to contact Ms. Alma Liliana Tovar Díaz, who is the Deputy Director for the 
Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms within the National Service of Agro 
                                                          
38
 To be able to have access to these documents, I had to wait for Mr. Karamitsios to consult with 
individual member nation-states on the disclosure of their respective feedback, as established on 
Regulation 1049/2001. 
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Alimentary Health, Safety and Quality. She refused to be interviewed, arguing that 
she was too busy. However, she was keen to provide information via e-mail. 
Unfortunately, her eagerness to assist to my research did not match the depth of 
information I expected for. In addition, it was proposed to obtain NABI insights from 
involved officials. However, a Canadian official refused to provide such information, 
arguing that information was shown only on a private website to which only involved 
government officials had access. 
These actors‟ refusal to participate can be related to a perceived lack of transparency 
that politics of GMF seem to have. This can be corroborated by observing that the 
Mexican representative signing the Trilateral Agreement with the USA and Canada 
did so at his own expense. And it was 10 months later that the Mexican Congress 
called him upon explaining the reasons behind such action.
39
 
 
Despite these shortcomings, the information retrieved has permitted to reach the aims 
of this study. Used correctly, documentary sources are a reliable data source 
facilitating the study of evolving accounts and attitudes of significant events. 
Documents do offer strengths of pointing clearly to what was done when and what 
the position of certain actor was. Nevertheless, a serious issue when dealing with 
documents is the question of their representativeness and meaning. In this sense, with 
written documents in the form of pieces of legislation, international agreements, news 
from different sources, transcripts, and websites; I have been able to retrieve sensitive 
data that proves my claims about convergence of GM maize labelling policies.  
 
With this in mind, the methodological structure for the present study is the following. 
Firstly, I am presenting the theoretical approaches that relate to the topic in question. 
Policy convergence, its causal mechanisms, the concept of trading up, as well as their 
link to broader International Relations theories set the parameters on which the 
                                                          
39
 The Mexican Senate requested the presence of Dr. Víctor Villalobos Arámbula on 11 August 2004.  
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information is found. Secondly, issues pertaining to each of the two regional settings 
are developed in separate chapters. The analysis of the information collected extends 
the scope of the theory and contributes to scientific knowledge through the 
operationalistic testing of the hypothesis against the empirical findings (Flick, 2002: 
41) obtained through the analysis of the two case studies. Subsequently, I compare 
the evidence shown from this empirical information. In turn, I offer a structural 
explanation for the observed variance. By comparing the selected cases, I am able to 
establish the circumstances in which the theory prove viable or not (Yin, 2003). Then, 
I develop propositions about determinants of convergence, cooperation, and trading 
up. Concomitantly, the findings from the analysis of policies determine the manner in 
which convergence of GM maize labelling takes place when national governments 
and regional institutions formulate them. Lastly, I summarise the results and 
speculate on the significance of this work for I research at large. Links across 
empirical chapters and theoretical information are inserted so as to determine the 
manner and the extent to which the objective of this study was reached. The 
determination of the hypothesis as a proven or refuted one is also expressed, which is 
an issue that helps to assess the validity of my contribution. 
 
The information presented in this study is gathered from different sources. 
Background information on the importance of labels, biotechnology, environment, 
regional features on maize production and varieties, implications for trade and 
consumers, as well as on International Relations, is retrieved from academic journals, 
books, and websites. The same sources are used for gathering information on 
theoretical issues about policy convergence and „trading up‟. This in turn provides me 
with the necessary tools to assess policy convergence; thus developing a critical 
assessment of its relevance as well as its shortcomings. This methodological structure 
assists in exploiting information helping to present a new perspective or a new 
conceptual focus (Fielding, 2004: 98, 100). With this, relying on earlier research 
allows setting the framework of this study on reliable, previously examined, grounds. 
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The chapters detailing each region‟s case study play „a supportive role‟ (Stake, 1998: 
88) since they facilitate the understanding of policy convergence by explaining 
historical developments to the policy area in question in two different regions. The 
information for these chapters is collected and classified through different means. 
Primary data provides the background information necessary to monitor the 
development of GM maize labelling. In this regard, official documents are analysed. 
For the case of the EU, regional legislation serves as Regulations on GM maize 
labelling and its related features present detailed information. All the gathered 
documents are selected according to the insight and contribution that they provide so 
as to show as deeper a perspective as possible. With respect to the NAFTA region, 
the analysis emphasises national regulations, the NAFTA document itself, as well as 
the trilateral agreement stating thresholds for labelling GM maize seeds. 
 
It is important to remark that information from literature is used without a biased 
approach despite its origins. Thus, for example, when using industry-based 
documents, information is used as merely providing the facts, without attempting to 
express the industry‟s views on the matter in question. 
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CHAPTER 4: LITERATURE REVIEW – POLICY 
CONVERGENCE AND TRADING UP 
 
4.1 Policy convergence 
 
The development of public policies at the regional level can be classified as 
convergent, divergent, identical and synchronous, or indeterminate (Seelinger, 1996: 
287). Under this classification, it has been noted that convergence appears when 
policies become similar over a defined time period. This would imply that initial 
differences existed previously between national policies. However, if the differences 
remained or increased after a specific time period, the resulting policy development 
would be divergent. Identical and synchronous development refers to national 
policies changing in the same direction and with the same magnitude, while 
indeterminate development means that parallel policy developments persist at 
different levels of stringency, but with the difference remaining the same.  
 
As one of the purposes of the present study is to explain the dynamics of policy 
convergence by observing its causal mechanisms, it is necessary to clearly define the 
concept of convergence. It has consensually been described as the tendency of 
societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes, and 
performances (Kerr, 1983: 3). However, there are different partially overlapping 
concepts that can lead to analytical confusion (Knill, 2005: 765 – 6). Policy transfer 
and policy diffusion relate to what seems to be an implicit convergence. Nevertheless, 
when they are examined it turns out that they focus on different aspects.  
To begin with, policy transfer is defined as a process by which knowledge about 
policies, institutions, and ideas in one political system is used in the development of 
policies, institutions, and ideas in another political system (Dolowitz and Marsh, 
2000: 5). Policy diffusion is observed from two different perspectives. One refers to it 
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being the spread of policies across and within political systems, „reaching from the 
voluntary adoption of policy models that have been communicated in the 
international system, diffusion processes triggered by legally binding harmonisation 
requirements defined in international agreements or supranational regulations, to the 
imposition of policies on other countries through external actors‟ (Knill, 2005: 766). 
The second view considers policy diffusion as a causal factor that directs 
international policy convergence (Busch and Jörgens, 2005: 818). The difference 
between both views is that the latter narrows the scope of the definition. It does so by 
considering causal mechanisms of policy convergence, like international 
harmonisation, imposition and voluntary diffusion, as policy diffusion. 
Besides the difference in concept appreciation between policy transfer, policy 
diffusion, and policy convergence, another variation is observable. This refers to the 
analytical focus: Diffusion and transfer are concerned with process patterns, while 
convergence focuses on effects. Specifically, policy transfer focuses on content and 
processes, policy diffusion on adoption patterns, while policy convergence seeks to 
explain changes in policy over time. 
 
Then, following the explanation of the related concepts, it is possible to define policy 
convergence as 
 
 [...] any increase in the similarity between one or more characteristics of a certain 
policy (e.g. policy objectives, policy instruments, policy settings) across a given 
set of political jurisdictions (supranational institutions, states, regions, local 
authorities) over a given period of time. Policy convergence thus describes the end 
result of a process of policy change over time towards some common point, 
regardless of the causal processes (Knill, 2005: 768). 
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To be able to measure and evaluate policy convergence, it is necessary to determine 
the extent to which national policies have become similar to each other over time. 
The most basic manner to do so is by making use of σ-convergence – sigma 
convergence – understood as the approach that explains whether policy convergence 
occurs when there is a decrease in variation of policies among different nation-states 
(Holzinger and Knill, 2005: 776; Knill, 2005: 769). In addition to it, there are three 
other ways of assessing it. Findings from Heichel et al (2005: 832 – 4) convey that β-
convergence – Beta-convergence – can occur when poor, laggard, nation-states grow 
faster than rich, leader, nation-states. Such catching-up may entail overtaking and 
thus create a greater similarity than before. A further form is γ-convergence – 
Gamma-convergence – which explains convergence by assessing nation-states‟ 
rankings for different points in time in order to examine their mobility. Convergence 
occurs if nation-states in the first ranks fall behind and subsequently catch-up over 
time. Lastly, there is δ-convergence – Delta-convergence – basing the approach to 
convergence on the decreasing distance of policies towards an exemplary model. If 
nation-states reach total similarity to a policy model, variance between them is 
therefore reduced.  
All four types of convergence emphasize on different, although interlinked, aspects. 
This means that the empirical results retrieved from each of them might be interpreted 
differently. In addition, evidence of one form of convergence does not necessarily 
mean that there is evidence of another form of convergence. Under this assumption, it 
is mandatory to define the specific type of convergence to be examined. This brings 
back the notion about the relevance of σ-convergence as the most basic form for the 
assessment of regional policies.  
 
4.1.1. Indicators of policy convergence 
 
To be able to assess convergence, it is necessary to define the basis on which policies 
across nation-states become similar over time, considered as the degree of 
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convergence. To achieve this, it is essential to clarify the differences between policy 
outputs (policies adopted by the government) and policy outcomes (effects of the 
policy in terms of goal achievement). Policy outputs are the focus in this research as 
the examination of governments‟ actions is of central relevance. This is because they 
„are the agents reacting to problem pressure, experience gained elsewhere, pressure of 
powerful external actors, economic pressure, and legal obligation‟ (Holzinger and 
Knill, 2005: 776). Hence, studying the outputs of policies of two different regional 
settings can thus provide an insight into the manner in which the degree of policy 
convergence is reached by governments when comparing the regions. 
Another indicator of σ-convergence is the scope. It refers to the number of nation-
states and policies that are potentially affected by the convergence. Scope is generally 
associated with the degree of convergence. This claim refers to cases when an 
increase in the number of converging nation-states reduces the variation of policies 
among all nation-states, although the opposite can also be the case. Thus, there is no 
straightforward relationship between scope and degree of convergence (Holzinger 
and Knill, 2005: 778). 
Lastly, the direction of convergence indicates the extent to which σ-convergence 
coincides with an upward or downward shift of the mean from a specific time to 
another. Subsequently, convergence at the top or bottom can refer to a decrease of 
standard deviation and a shift of the mean (Botcheva and Martin, 2001: 4). In other 
words, different national policies may converge while becoming stricter or laxer; thus 
setting a new parameter with respect to the converged policy. In this regard, the 
context and patterns of the direction of convergence have been examined through 
studies focusing on stringent and laxer regulations that have adopted „trading up‟ and 
a „race to the bottom‟ respectively. 
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4.2. Trading Up 
 
It is a pattern among nation-states to converge policies when they see benefits out of 
them. In order to achieve so, they have agreed on the extent to which policies should 
be converged, and the direction it should take. Mainly in economic terms, this 
increase in interdependence relies on the compatibility between domestic regulations, 
where one of them is being internationalised. The resulting consequences can have 
opposite directions. This is, if nation-states interested in converging policies share a 
similar level of strictness, convergence would succeed smoother in a strict direction. 
The same would happen if they share views on lax policies. However, the impact in 
their economic interdependence can be greater in cases where nation-states involved 
do not share common views on the direction to converge policies, despite of them 
being interested in reaching a common position. In such situations, the role of the 
most influential and powerful nation-states would be determinant in the agreed 
direction.  
As previously explained, the direction of convergence can take the form of strict or 
lax policies. From an economic perspective, the implications of a specific converged 
policy can result in the establishment of a form of regulatory competition described as 
a „race to the bottom‟ (Vogel, 1997: 556; Scharpf, 1997: 521), also known as the 
„Delaware effect.‟40 In such case, less costly regulatory and tax regimes attract 
producers who want to avoid burdensome regulations and taxes. Subsequently, a 
continuous relaxation of policies can take place, leading to the gradual spiralling 
down of regulatory standards (Princen, 2004: 127). However, this is not always the 
case as there are suggestions that the opposite can take place.  
The „California effect‟41 or „trading up‟ praises otherwise as regulatory competition 
can induce nation-states to raise the level of regulatory requirements. This can happen 
                                                          
40
 The „Delaware effect‟ is named after the American state that was able to attract companies by 
offering the least demanding standards for their corporation (Cary, 1974). 
41
 „California effect‟ is illustrative of the history of American automobile emission standards. Clean 
Air Act Amendments have allowed California to enact stricter emission standards than the rest of the 
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through three different mechanisms: terms of market access, international 
agreements, and informal mechanisms (Vogel and Kagan, 2004: 14 – 5). The 
argument behind the first mechanism is that „trading up‟ can be portrayed as 
protective regulations producing benefits for both the public and domestic 
producers.
42
 On one side, the public can perceive an increase in their living 
conditions, for example, in terms of strengthening environmental standards (which is 
the policy area where trading up was initially developed). On the other side, strict 
regulations can create a competitive advantage for domestic industries by making it 
more difficult for foreign producers from nations with weaker domestic standards to 
sell their products. Once producers comply with the strict regulations of the importing 
market, they would be encouraging their governments to strengthen their standards in 
the home market as well. This stricter approach generally takes place with respect to 
product regulation, which differs from that of process regulation. The ways in which 
a product is produced may not be deemed determinant by self-interested consumers 
(as opposed to what they can see, like the product itself); therefore, complying with 
process standards can lead to exert downwards economic pressures on national 
regulations. However, the final outcome of such pressures would be influenced by the 
strength of political pressures, which can maintain existing levels of regulation 
(Scharpf, 1997: 524). Under these circumstances, the terms of market access are one 
of the mechanisms by which trading up can take place. 
Besides the market access, another mechanism that can foster trading up is 
international agreements. Through them, an increasing scope of regulations and 
directives can be developed, resulting in strengthened, legally binding, standards 
established by international institutions. This thus provides institutions with a core 
role when setting stricter policies. But for the establishment of the regional policy to 
succeed, the participation of richer nation-states is essential as they provide less 
                                                                                                                                                                     
U.S. This has meant that other American states have had the option of choosing between national and 
California standards (Vogel, 1997: 561). 
42
 Princen (2004: 129) comments that the regulations adopted can be perceived as either adopted due to 
protectionist reasons (favouring producers) or as a way to protect non-economic values (considering 
consumers‟ views).  
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affluent nation-states with the means and incentives to modify their lax policies 
(Vogel, 1997: 566 – 8). Hence, the role of power is relevant in this context. 
 The third mechanism is the informal mechanisms, like the political mobilisation of 
civic interest groups, producers, and political entrepreneurs. Young (2003: 458 – 9) 
comments that it is indeed political mobilisation what is most commonly referred to 
as trading up. If it is sufficient, it will induce policy change. This can take place when 
political concerns in one geographical area can prompt political mobilisation in 
another; with the potential outcome of change of preferences among consumers and 
of views among producers in another area. Young explains this with an example 
about how the EU influences the USA.  
 
Regardless of the mechanism through which trading up takes place, there are three 
conditions that are needed if the California effect is to appear. Firstly, the imposition 
of stricter standards should be supported by domestic producers, who are interested in 
imposing costs on their foreign competitors, and by public interest groups, who see 
strengthening of standards as a good in itself. Second, the nation-state trying to 
impose its standards needs to have a large and rich market. That is, the country‟s 
market should sufficiently be attractive to exporters. If this is the case, they can 
support the strengthening of standards in order to preserve market access. Third, a 
California effect is more likely if there are strong international institutions that can 
harmonise policies establishing standards across nation-states.
43
 Under this 
assumption, if one nation-state with strict regulatory standards succeeds in having its 
policies adopted at the regional level, then the rest of nation-states would need to 
raise their levels of standards. 
 
                                                          
43
 Princen (2004) suggest EU institutions as good examples of this case because they can adopt 
regulations and directives that are binding to all member nation-states 
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These issues allow considering the California effect as the reason behind a shift in 
political balance (Princen, 2004: 129). This is, if producers from the exporting nation-
state strengthen their regulatory standards as the result of the importing nation-state‟s 
restrictions to trade, they can skip potential import bans. This causes a redirection of 
the position not only of exporting producers, but also of a combination of different, 
related, interests. Thus, the adoption of strict standards in the domestic realm is the 
result of the political balance between the different preferences and constraints of the 
government and involved interest groups.  
The potential change is more likely to appear if benefits outweigh the costs of 
establishing stricter standards. From the exporting side, government and interest 
groups will induce a change if the imposition of trade restrictions is credible. 
Credibility will largely depend upon the domestic support for the strengthened 
standard. In other words, credibility of these standards will be proportional to the 
support they receive in the domestic sphere. It is in this sense that Vogel‟s concept of 
„Baptist-bootlegger‟ takes relevance as the domestic support can increase the 
likelihood of the California effect. However, there is the opposite view that such 
support can only reinforce exporting actors‟ opinions about protectionist measures. 
Such suspicions can subsequently reduce any willingness to adopt stricter standards, 
thus hampering the appearance of the California effect (Princen, 2004: 129, 139). 
There is another perspective that needs to be taken into account. Besides credibility 
and protectionist measures, there are domestic preferences that can be perceived to 
serve a non-economic value rather than protectionist interests. The arguments 
provided for taking such a decision can, thus, have a great impact on the acceptance 
of adopting the strict standard. If the argument used for setting the domestic strict 
standards tie in with the preferences of the importing nation-state‟s actors, or they are 
perceived as genuine, the California effect can take place. Ideally, strengthening 
standards should go hand in hand with values and perceived problems of domestic 
actors of the exporting nation-state. This way, an important support for stricter 
standards, racing to the top, can be gained (Princen, 2004: 139). 
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Besides moving to the top or to the bottom, Radaelli (2004: 7, 9) proposes to consider 
that policies can move „sideways‟. This third view refers to policy transfer, which 
allows governments to imitate, translate, transfer, draw lessons, and „model‟ each 
other. In fact, based on Braithwaite and Drahos‟ work (2000), he argues that such 
„modelling‟44 has been the most important mechanism in global business regulation. 
However, transferring policies means an upward or downward movement (or top and 
bottom, stricter or laxer) from the original position of the policy in the receiving 
country. 
 
4.3. Causal mechanisms of policy convergence 
 
General literature on convergence presents a wide range of causal factors that assist in 
explaining the similarity of policies across nation-states and time. They have been 
segmented in two groups: causal mechanisms prompting convergent policy changes 
and facilitating factors that affect the effectiveness of these mechanisms (Knill, 2005: 
769). 
Regarding the former, different contributors have listed a series of mechanisms. 
Bennett (1991: 220 – 9) considers that convergence might arise from four processes: 
emulation, implying that policies are copied from elsewhere; elite networking, which 
results from transnational policy communities; harmonisation through international 
regimes; and penetration by external actors and interests. Drezner (2005: 841) claims 
that, through policy coordination, convergence can take place either in the form of 
international harmonisation or competition. Holzinger and Knill (2005: 779 – 86) 
widen Drezner‟s scope by adding imposition, independent problem-solving, and 
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 Modelling is understood as an action that can constitute a process of displaying, symbolically 
interpreting, and copying conceptions of action and the process itself (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 
581). 
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transnational communication. For being the most complete, it is their classification of 
mechanisms that becomes the object of my analysis.  
First come convergence through imposition, which Holzinger and Knill (2005: 781) 
define as occurring whenever an external political actor forces a government to adopt 
a certain policy. This mechanism can be related to that of Bennett‟s convergence by 
penetration, which appears when nation-states are forced to conform to actions taken 
elsewhere by external actors (1991: 227). In both imposition and penetration, there is 
the assumption of asymmetry of power from the policy provider. There are two cases 
in this regard, the unilateral imposition of a policy on a nation-state from another 
nation-state, and the conditionality by an international institution. Generally, the 
adoption of the policy is exchanged for economic resources.   
Transnational communication is another mechanism. It compiles a wider set of 
mechanisms: lesson drawing, transnational problem solving, emulation of policies, 
and international policy promotion (Holzinger and Knill, 2005: 783 – 5). All of them 
share an important feature presupposing nothing but information exchange and 
communication with other nation-states. Lesson drawing refers to policy transfer in 
which national governments apply policies used previously somewhere else. 
Transnational problem-solving happens within transnational elite networks that 
consider joint development of common problems and solutions, and their consequent 
adoption at domestic level. Emulation merely implies the simple copying of policies 
adopted elsewhere. Lastly, international policy promotion appears when international 
institutions promote the spread of policy approaches they consider promising or 
relevant.   
The third mechanism is independent problem-solving. In this type, it is claimed that 
convergence can appear as the result of similar but independent responses of political 
actors to parallel problem pressures (Hoberg, 2001: 127; Holzinger and Knill, 2005: 
786). This thus implies that there is no communication between each other nation-
states, since under this mechanism nation-states do not behave in response to each 
other‟s actions. 
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Listed as the fourth causal mechanism, international harmonisation leads to 
convergence when nation-states comply with the legal obligations established in 
international and supranational law. But for these common policies to appear, 
interdependencies or externalities that push national governments to work together 
should exist. Knill (2005: 770) suggests that harmonisation is an outcome of 
international cooperation, where nation-states find it compulsory to adopt common 
policies as part of their commitment as members of international institutions. 
Therefore, cooperation within an international institutional framework results in 
reshaping national policies, which in turn implies the sacrifice of some independence. 
That is, once constructed, institutions constrain and shape behaviour, even as they are 
constantly challenged and reformed by their member nation-states (Martin and 
Simmons, 1998: 743). 
Lastly, regulatory competition is regarded as another important factor that drives the 
mutual adjustment of policies across nation-states. It develops when nation-states face 
competitive pressure to mutually adjust their policies in order to avoid regulatory 
burdens restricting competitiveness of national industries. Such pressure has been 
explained as either leading to a race to the bottom (Hoberg, 2005: 127 – 30; 
Holzinger and Knill, 2005: 782), or by developing stricter policies (Vogel, 1997: 
556). Irrespective of the outcome, this causal mechanism refers to the adjustment of 
trade-related policies, such as product or process standards. 
 
4.3.1. Policy change 
 
Whichever the causal mechanism that could take place when policies are converged, 
there are facilitating factors that affect their effectiveness. They have been presented 
as the second group of causal factors of policy convergence and they are formed by 
the characteristics of the underlying policies: the type of policy and the policy 
dimensions. On one side, the type of policy can influence the chances of convergence 
being successful. This issue relates to the extent to which policies are distributional. 
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Holzinger and Knill (2005: 770 – 1) comment that „policies involving high 
distributional conflicts between domestic actor coalitions will diffuse and hence 
converge to a lesser extent than regulatory policies with comparatively small 
redistributional consequences.‟ On the other side, different policy dimensions infer in 
the manner in which convergence can take place. Hall (1993: 278) suggests that there 
are three variables that need to be considered: the overarching goal that guides policy 
in a particular field, the techniques or policy instruments used to attain those goals, 
and the precise settings of these instruments. From all three, it is suggested that 
techniques and settings can be adjusted easier than the ideas/goals, which are 
embedded according to the dominant beliefs of the actors involved. Hence, 
convergence on the manner, rather than on the reason, is more likely to occur. 
 
Another view about the facilitating factors of policy convergence is the one provided 
by Howlett and Cashore (2007), who claim that both type and dimension can be 
compiled within policy change. They suggest that this concept can be classified into 
three types according to different rates and different consequences (2007: 6). There is 
a first order of change when „calibrations‟ of policy instruments take place within 
existing institutional structures. The second order of change refers to „alterations to 
dominant types of policy instruments‟ used within an existing policy regime. And the 
third order of change involves „shifts in overall policy goals‟. These classifications 
refer to first and second orders being the result of activities endogenous to an existing 
policy. The third order refers to a different feature: the exogenous element, which 
denotes the existence of a „paradigmatic policy change process.‟45 
For change to happen, it is clear that a number of factors need to be present in order 
to bring about changes in the way in which policies had been previously developed. 
These are the policy problems that establish the need for change, the policy legacies 
that may or may not relate to proposed policy solutions, the policy preferences that 
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 Paradigmatic change exists when there is a fundamental realignment of most aspects of the policy 
development. It is also understood to occur when policy institutions themselves are transformed 
(Howlett and Cashore, 2007: 4). 
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may or may not change in the light of the problems and proposed solutions, the 
political-institutional capacity of actors to respond to the problems through new 
policy initiatives, and the discourse that serves to enhance capacity by altering 
perceptions of problems and legacies and by influencing preferences (Schmidt and 
Radaelli, 2004: 186).  
 
With respect to policy problems, it is argued that they might come from the 
international, regional and/or local environments, and may have an effect at regional, 
national and local levels. In the international arena, global challenges in technological 
change and economic competition, trade negotiations, and the like, can lead to 
competition aimed at creating or strengthening markets. Consequently, problems may 
arise due to discrepancies between neighbouring nation-states or trading partners. 
Furthermore, there is the possibility of problems arising from crises internal to the 
nation-states, which may originate from diverse causes. Policy problems tend to 
become greater when they demand major changes in national policies, which may be 
the result of a sudden event or disaster. It is important to notice, however, that issues 
can be considered as problems according to different perspectives. So, what may be 
deemed as a problem in a region or nation-state may be considered an opportunity to 
redirect any given policy to fulfil either public or private demands for change. Such 
readjustments may mean that problems should be dealt with gradually via sensible 
decisions, rather than through grand designs with long range outcomes (Braybrooke 
and Lindblom, 1963: 119 – 121).  
Solving policy problems depends upon the „goodness of fit‟ between a proposed 
regional policy and long-standing national policy legacies, which constitutes the 
second factor inducing policy change (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 187). Policy 
legacies influence policy change proportionately to the similarity of national policies: 
the better the „fit‟ of national policies with regional policies, the more likely it is for a 
nation-state to have fewer problems absorbing the regional policy; the worse the „fit‟, 
the greater the need for a transformation in national policies. Such appropriateness 
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can be politically constructed, so it is up to political agencies at both regional and 
national levels to determine what constitutes a good „fit‟. This means that there are 
„adaptational pressures‟ coming from different sources (Radaelli and Schmidt, 2004: 
377).  
The possibility of change in policies may depend on how readily involved actors are 
able to tolerate reforms in cases where regional policy opposes national policy 
legacies. If preference is given to national policies, then regional policies may end up 
blocked. However, it can be the other way round, as when regional policies are 
preferred at the local level and undermine national policies that are not viewed 
positively. Irrespective of the direction that preferences can take, it is obvious that 
they evolve considerably and constantly, thus refuting the usual misconception that 
preferences are static (Van den Hoven, 2004: 256). Preferences may change in the 
course of negotiations (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 187 – 8), and can transform the 
manner in which policies have been carried out up to a specific moment in those 
negotiations.  
If preferences and legacies remain opposed to the policy change agreed at the 
regional level, policy change can occur anyway due to the fourth factor, that of 
political-institutional capacity. In this concept are encompassed the political 
interactions that can happen within a nation-state – party politics, elections, interest 
coalitions, etc – since they can have problem-solving capacities while interacting in 
different institutional settings. Such settings include single-actor systems, where the 
executive has the capacity to impose a decision, and multi-actor systems, in which the 
executive does not have the power to impose and therefore must negotiate with a 
wide range of other involved policy actors (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004: 188). It is 
necessary, in this context, to consider the characteristics of bureaucracy and the 
bureaucratic structures that surround any given executive power. The political-
institutional capacity implies agreement between – and within – governmental actors 
and interest groups, which relates to bargaining activities designed to achieve, if not 
consensus, at least a majority in the making of the decision. 
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The fifth and last mediating factor affecting policy change is the discourse, regarded 
as a set of policy ideas and values that focuses on policy formulation. It is considered 
a crucial part when analysing public policy and understanding policy change 
(Fouilleux, 2004: 236), because it involves knowledge, policy analysis, information 
about problems, actors and resources, and a more normative activity of assessing and 
judging reality, which refers to the world of norms, values and principles (Radaelli 
and Schmidt, 2004: 364). However, there is the question as to whether, and how, 
discourse affects the scope and substance of policies (Skogstad, 2000: 826).  
 
The interactions between these factors do not mean that all of them need to coexist so 
as to induce policy change. A specific factor may be irrelevant or unworthy to 
consider when inducing policy change according to the context in which the other 
factors appear.  This can be the case of policy problems, which may be deemed as 
such within a certain nation-state/region, while within another nation-state/region the 
same issue may not be considered as problematic at all. This can be the result of own 
policy preferences and discourses, for citing an example. Thus, the five factors 
identified in this study merely list the possible circumstances that may drive a 
specific policy to change in a given direction.  
 
In addition, it appears that there is a process of policy learning implicit in the 
development of policy change that directs the convergence of policy. In fact, policy 
learning is defined as a change in the behaviour of political actors rooted in altered 
beliefs and attitudes:  
 
In addition, learning can be based on historical experiences and/or experiences in 
other countries; change can also refer to goals, tools and instruments, institutions, 
ideologies, and so on. Learning is more likely to occur in policy areas in which 
uncertainty about outcomes of decisions and contested normative values have a 
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great influence, because they require higher adaptation to new knowledge or 
criteria (Abels, 2005: 340). 
 
The policy change caused by policy learning may influence a change in policy styles, 
which vary among nation-states and which refer to distinct standard operating 
procedures in policy-making and implementation that may differ between nation-
states. Here, a number of factors influence the decision of governments such as their 
approach to problem-solving, the nature of interactions between state and society, the 
formality of rule-making, administrative cultures, the de-/politicisation of issues, or 
the willingness to consider public input (Abels, 2005: 341). All these procedures refer 
to procedural aspects of regulatory policy-making that in turn develop into 
convergent policies in specific territories.  
Differences in policy style, causing policy problems, respond to the political culture 
of each nation-state because culture shapes the politics of science and technology. 
Political culture implies that certain actions and the positions adopted by nation-
states‟ governments are taken „almost by default‟ due to cultural commitments to 
forms of legitimisation that conform to the routines of what is thought of as normal 
politics (Jasanoff, 2005: 21 – 2). But this does not mean that culture is resistant to 
change. Instead, as it has been observed with policy change, policy learning, and 
policy style, political culture can be redirected, constructed, and subjected to renewal, 
and this may well lead towards a policy convergence that could be reached at regional 
level.  
 
4.4. Policy convergence and links to broader IR theories 
 
The literature on policy convergence relates to broader theories of International 
Relations. This refers to the relevance and involvement of nation-states and 
regional/international institutions when setting up international agreements. In this 
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sense, three traditions have provided different views on the problems and politics of 
international cooperation. One is that of realists and neo-realists, who suggest that 
international relations are based on attitudes towards each other under an anarchical 
system and international conflicts (Waltz, 1979: 102). Another is the neoliberal 
institutional tradition, which sees international cooperation succeeding when nation-
states work together to realise joint gains, and when institutions are set up to monitor 
compliance, increase transparency, reduce transaction costs of cooperation, and 
prevent cheating (Keohane and Nye, 2001). The third approach is cognitivism or 
constructivism, which examines how states respond to, and how international 
cooperation is shaped by, the introduction of new information or ideas, or by 
international norms (O‟Neill, 2009: 11). 
From all three traditions, neoliberal institutionalism is the one better equipped to 
address issues not only of international cooperation, but also of „trading up.‟ This 
refers to the common trend to establish organisations and agreements for the correct 
supervision of the cooperation. In practice, international cooperation consists of 
negotiations of international regimes
46
 by nation-states. This in turn implies the 
creation of organisations to govern those agreements, as well as the establishment of 
decision-making processes for future negotiations on the same or related issue. To be 
able to follow these steps, the formation of an international regime involves the 
participation of different factors. Interests and preferences, relative bargaining 
leverage of state representatives, role of domestic and transnational actors, and the 
context surrounding the issue in question, like crises, can all influence the outcome of 
the regime achieved. 
The process of regime construction, which includes bargaining, negotiation and 
compromise (O‟Neill, 2009: 81) can relate to Moravcsik‟s work known as liberal 
intergovernmentalism. He aims to explain why sovereign governments have chosen 
repeatedly to coordinate their core economic policies and surrender sovereign 
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 Regimes are classically defined as „sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors‟ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations (Krasner, 1983: 2). 
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prerogatives within an international institution (Moravcsik, 1998: 1). Using a 
tripartite framework, he asserts that the first step is to formulate national preferences 
– economic or geopolitical – that take into account endogenous features to the nation-
states, which in turn mirror the concerns of domestic interests (Putnam, 1998: 434). 
However, this assumption does not establish if the most affected groups, or those 
lobbying the most, are the ones that outline the national preference (Dimitrakopoulos 
and Kassim, 2004: 247). The second step refers to nation-states engaging in 
bargaining so as to select the best collective choice. Moravcsik claims that 
governments reach agreement through a system of unanimous voting, although 
nation-states may differ in terms of power and influence. Once the choice is made, 
the third step takes place. It refers to governments aiming to establish an institutional 
framework that can be selected either by pooling or delegating sovereignty.
47
 
 It is in this last step where liberal intergovernmentalism relates to international 
regime and to international cooperation. Theories of international regimes and 
institution-building can help to understand the conditions that make international 
cooperation possible, and the ways in which institutional design can help to overcome 
divergent national interests and collective action problems (O‟Neill, 2009: 200). 
 
A rather different view of international cooperation is the one proposed by Botcheva 
and Martin (2001: 2), who claim that studies of patterns of convergence and 
divergence can supplement studies of international cooperation. Their assumption is 
based on the argument that convergence will occur when the cooperation problem 
states are trying to solve involves substantial externalities to state behaviour and 
when the institutions that states craft have adequate mechanisms to overcome 
collective dilemmas. One way to observe this is when a coordination problem 
involves high positive externalities, which means that states benefit from choosing 
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 Pooling sovereignty happens when national governments agree to decide future matters by voting 
procedures other than by unanimity. Delegating sovereignty means that a supranational actor is 
allowed to take specific autonomous decision without an intervening interstate vote (Moravcsik, 1998: 
67)  
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the same course of action. Another is through punishment within a highly 
interdependent nature of state choices. This is, choosing to cooperate is contingent on 
the other state‟s ongoing cooperation. Thus, if deflection exists, it would lead to a 
punitive strategy that will lead the defector to return to a cooperative strategy. In this 
regard, the functions that institutions perform to assist in overcoming coordination 
problems differ between both cases. In the case of coordination, institutions would 
effectively provide for an effective solution by providing information on the action to 
take. On the other hand, if potential deflection exists, then institutions would need to 
have strong monitoring capacities in order to allow member nation-states to 
implement enforcement strategies.  
 
4.5. Observations 
 
There has been consensus on the manner in which policy convergence should be 
conceptualised, which has included clarifications about confusions that may arise 
with respect to concepts such as policy transfer and policy diffusion.  
The manner in which policy convergence can be examined varies according to 
different perspectives, implying the accomplishment of different results. This is 
therefore why it is necessary to define the type of policy convergence that is assessed 
in this study: σ-convergence. From this regard, it is noticeable that the three 
indicators need to be taken into account if one is to get a complete view on the 
manner in which policy convergence has been attained. In this sense, the core 
examination is found around the degree and the direction of convergence. On one 
side, the degree can offer the possibility to define whether convergence has indeed 
been achieved. On the other side, the direction of the convergence can show a deep 
insight into the manner in which convergence is achieved. This is, by observing the 
direction of convergence is possible to define whether a „race to the bottom‟ or 
„trading up‟ has taken place in the convergence of policies. By focusing on the latter, 
the assumptions derived from the potential findings thus allow for further enquiries 
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on the way such direction has followed. Whether as opportunities for market 
accesses, through international agreements, or due to informal mechanisms; it is 
observable that „trading up‟ establishes parameters that allow relating this concept 
with others such as international harmonisation and international cooperation. In both 
cases, policy changes take place as normal drivers and outcomes; hence, setting 
parameters inducing the reader to suggest that policy convergence and „trading up‟ 
have strong links with a wider literature on International Relations theories. In fact, it 
is such linkage what recognizes that institutions created for convergence purposes 
play a great role in defining the extent of the convergence. Nevertheless, nation-
states, through their governments, remain the core actors in establishing the degree 
and the direction of the policy to converge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
CHAPTER 5: GM MAIZE LABELLING POLICY IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
 
This chapter presents, in chronological order, the legal measures developed to deal 
with the labelling of GMOs present in food, as well as those related to the labelling of 
GM maize.  
There are different types of legislation that have set up the legal framework for GMO 
labelling. They have dealt with issues on biotechnology, labelling, and different type 
of products, like food, feed, seeds, and crops. Despite of them being briefly assessed 
in this chapter, emphasis is made in the procedure and the outcome reached with 
Regulation 1830/2003, which is the latest legal measure taken by the EU in terms of 
labelling of GMF, and which includes issues pertaining to the labelling of GM maize. 
Further to this, analysis is provided on the two reports that the Commission issued in 
2006 and 2008 assessing details pertaining the implementation of Regulation 
1830/2003.  
 
To begin with, legislation about food labelling started to take form with Council 
Directive 79/112/EEC,
48
 which aimed at approximating laws on labelling among 
member nation-states. Such law contributed to the smooth functioning of the common 
market, while covering the need to inform and protect consumers. By 1997, Directive 
79/112/EEC was amended by Directive 97/4/EC.
49
 However, Directive 79/112/EEC 
remained the basis for subsequent legislation on labelling, influencing directly the 
creation of GMO and GMF labelling legal framework. 
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On the topic of GMOs, the first legal measure to appear was Directive 90/220/EEC,
50
 
which would deal with the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment. This 
directive appeared as a response to a number of member nation-states already moving 
to adopt a range of national measures, threatening to disrupt the single market. In this 
sense, the respective proposal led the Commission to note a huge diversity of existing 
national regulations across different member nation-states. Examples of this were (a) 
a ban on deliberate release in Denmark and Germany; (b) a case-by-case approach to 
the release of individual GMOs in the UK, France, Belgium, Netherlands and 
Luxembourg; and (c) an absence of legislation in Ireland, Greece, Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal  (Pollack and Schaffer, 2009: 60). At the end, the Commission‟s proposal 
focused on a regulatory scheme that would provide for case-by-case assessment and 
authorisation of release of GM varieties into the environment. Nevertheless, other 
perspectives were taken into account. For example, the primary model for this 
directive was Denmark‟s Gene Technology Act,51 which relied on production 
techniques and genetic modification, rather than on safety, quality, and efficacy of a 
specific product (Patterson, 2000: 321). Also, this primary model considered that the 
Minister of Environment would be heavily involved in this policy area. Subsequently, 
Directive 90/220/EEC considered different national viewpoints and approaches. 
 
Also, Directive 90/220/EEC stated a number of substantial and procedural rules for 
pre-market authorisation and experimental release based on risk assessment and on a 
precautionary approach. This would take place within the nation-state where the GM 
product was intended to be placed on the market for the first time. In this context, 
member nation-states would be responsible for assessing the notifications submitted 
by anyone intending to release GMOs. Such notifications would include self-
proposals for labelling. Subsequently, an analysis of the same notification would 
follow at the regional level. In case of disagreement between member nation-states, 
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 OJ L 117, 8.5.1990, p.15. 
51
 Gene Technology Act was adopted in Jun 1986. Denmark became the first country to adopt a 
specific Act regulating biotechnology (Jelsoe et al, 1998: 31). 
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the Commission would take a decision, which would be agreed in accordance with a 
committee of representatives of nation-states. If agreement could not be reached, the 
Commission would have to submit a proposal for GMO release to the Council, who 
would act through QMV. Once the notification was authorised, all member nation-
states would be bound to comply with the Directive. Nonetheless, there was the 
proposal of a safeguard procedure whereby a member nation-state could provisionally 
restrict or prohibit the use or sale of an approved GM product on its territory, when 
considered necessary according to evidence of serious risk to people or the 
environment. This thus denoted the unwillingness of member nation-states to accept 
each other‟s risk assessments, and became a significant barrier to a peaceful 
authorisation process. The resulting disagreement meant that the more complicated 
and time-consuming „Community‟ procedure had become the norm for decision-
making (Law, 2008: 66, 72). 
 
From the mid-1990s, food safety became a salient issue in the EU: food scandals such 
as dioxin-contaminated feed, foot-and-mouth disease, the cross-pollination of GM 
oilseed rape with non-GM varieties in the UK, and, most of all, the BSE crisis (also 
known as „mad cow disease‟) stirred public outrage. In some countries, citizens 
started to distrust their governments and the Commission‟s actions, which had a great 
effect on the GM debate (Abels, 2005: 344). However, other countries‟ governments 
got citizen support for their national policies on GMF as well as labelling.  
For example, Denmark had a restrictive GMF policy that was a parameter of what 
could be called a „GMO-cautious majority‟ in Parliament (Toft, 2004). Among its 
features, labelling appeared as a key policy issue by 1997 (Grabner et al, 2001: 24; 
Jelsoe et al, 2001: 158). The argument was that labels allowed choice in cases where 
consumers regarded the safety of GM products as uncertain.  
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Labelling has traditionally been a major point in former Danish debates on food 
issues from the principle that positive labelling prevails (meaning that products 
containing something should be labelled) and negative labelling is problematic (if 
a product contains too many negative appraisals) (Toft, 2004). 
 
Austria was another case were population supported governmental actions on 
biotechnology. After an enquiry in 1992,
52
 there was broad consensus on the 
government‟s proposed recommendations, which included mandatory labelling of 
GM products (Grabner et al, 2001: 24). Of course, conflicts arose within 
conservatives, the industry, and scientists, who preferred to maintain the status quo 
that allowed for self-regulation. Nevertheless, public opposition to GM products 
increased by the time of release proposals; mainly because GM crops were seen as a 
threat to Austria‟s organic agriculture, to the environment, as well as because of low 
acceptance and low factual knowledge
53
 (Wagner et al, 1998: 17). 
 
Finland exemplifies another case where citizens supported their government. This 
happened with a pro-biotech approach though, since Finnish people usually have had 
a pragmatic and optimistic perception of biotechnology
54
 (Rusanen et al, 1998: 44). 
In fact, the Finnish biotechnology industry was the sixth largest in Europe (Rusanen 
et al, 2001: 172). This has been the result of official bodies encouraging the 
participation of institutions and organisations in the preparation of laws; rather than 
them being actively seeking to participate. Irrespective of the wide range of peer 
contributions, the 1995 Finnish Gene Technology Act was, in general, slightly more 
restrictive than the minimum level defined in the EU directive. It should be pointed 
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 For a deep explanation on Austrian attitudes see Wagner, W., Torgersen, H., Seifert, F., Grabner, P., 
and Lehner, S. (1998), „Austria,‟ in Durant, J., Bauer, M. W., and Gaskell, G. (eds.) Biotechnology in 
the public sphere: a European sourcebook; Cromwell Press; 15 – 28. 
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 This relates to research activities being presented generally in a positive tone in the media. 
Biotechnology has been presented as a series of breakthroughs and achievements that would improve 
living standards. This results in relatively little criticism towards the legislative process in 
biotechnology (Rusanen et al, 1998: 46). 
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out, however, that no major GM crops have been cultivated in Finland. Hence, no 
calls for special legislation were voiced and Finland aligned to EU law development, 
including regarding the position on labels. 
 
France represents a different case in that her government changed views about 
biotechnology. This depended according to the political environment at the time. To 
begin with, France has had a long-standing involvement in this area because of its 
tradition of research and the importance of its agriculture.
55
 Authorities set up a 
partnership with industry and research to control GMOs on a self-regulatory basis. 
Nonetheless, France has experienced a decrease of biotechnology firms over time.
56
 
Different actors have been taken into account according to the role they play in what 
De Cheveigné et al (1998: 54) describe as an „opportunistic‟ approach. This, they 
claim, has resulted from the perceived lack of real political stakes in this policy area. 
With respect to maize, Boy and De Cheveigné (2001: 182) comment that on February 
1997 the then right-wing government decided not to authorise its growth in the 
country in application of the precautionary principle. In turn, in November of the 
same year the new left-wing government authorised the planting of GM maize. 
However, no new varieties were authorised afterwards. Hence, the hesitation 
surrounding GM maize in France has illustrated the uncertainty of official positions 
on the matter. Moreover, trade unions have not appeared to have played a major role 
in initiating or implementing public policy in biotechnology; while consumer 
associations have slowly increased their participation once GM products appeared in 
the market. This in turn has resulted in them affecting and encouraging a stringent 
labelling policy. With this, France became one of the countries most opposed to 
transgenic food in Europe (Grabner et al, 2001: 25). 
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al, 1998: 51). 
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Germany has been known for its biotechnological research, although it has been 
decreasing.
57
 This aspect mirrored the experimental release of crops, which situated 
Germany well below other member nation-states. Up until 1995, there were 49 
experimental releases in Germany, compared to 113 in the Netherlands, 133 in the 
UK, and 253 in France (Hampel et al 1998: 64). However, public debate of issues 
happening elsewhere in Europe had a profound effect on German views about 
biotechnology. Because of this, mandatory labelling became an issue with the Novel 
Foods prescription, while laboratories detecting GMF emerged. After tracing them, 
producing companies removed them from the market. Subsequently, almost no 
products labelled as GM were available despite no official withdrawal of GMF from 
German markets (Hampel et al, 2001: 192). 
 
Greece exemplifies an interesting case. Her citizens have been regarded as the less 
informed across Europe and with the lowest objective knowledge (Marouda-
Chatjoulis et al, 1998: 80 – 1). This aspect has related to media coverage on the topic, 
which has been minimal. Until 1996, Greece had stood out as one of the most 
supportive countries of biotechnology. But a dramatic shift in 1999 led Greece to 
become one of the most critical countries in Europe (Grabner et al, 2001: 25). 
Subsequently, Greeks have tended to be pessimistic and distrustful when it comes to 
biotechnology and its regulation. Jointly with this, Greece has been second only to 
Austria in terms of the percentage of people who believe that only traditional 
breeding and cultivating methods should be used. Hence, they have been regarded as 
very wary of GMF. This has related to labelling. For example, by 1997, 8 out of 10 
people wanted to see labels on these foods in the market place. 
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The Netherlands has been another case where biotechnology has found relative 
support. To begin with, because of its characteristics in terms of size and level of 
industrialisation, this member nation-state has strongly invested in the development 
of biotechnology. This science-based perspective has implied consensus conferences, 
a wide range of publications, and public bodies‟ recommendations, among others. In 
fact, when the first GM products approached the market in early 1997, the Ministry of 
Health issued, within the framework of Food Law, a labelling directive on the use of 
GM soya and maize imported from the USA in 1996. However, such directive was 
rejected by Dutch courts because Food Law could not be used to differentiate 
between products (Midden et al, 1998: 103 – 8).58 This, nevertheless, has not 
influenced consumers‟ views about biotechnology, which seem to have been driven 
by media covering mainly positive aspects; hence, the Netherlands has experienced 
little polarisation.  
 
The UK represents a unique case. This member nation-state has combined 
governmental support for biotechnology with its respective consumer rejection. On 
the one side, the UK has been a prominent player in the field of biotechnology and 
with a history of policy-making in this policy area. This was to the point of 
considering concerns not based on scientific evidence as irrational, ignorant or at best 
irrelevant (Lee, 2008: 49). Furthermore, a perception that the national regulatory 
environment of this policy area initially advanced as response to developments 
happening at European level has also existed.
59
 Besides, the UK has regarded itself at 
the forefront of efforts to persuade the Commission to adopt a product-based 
approach to regulation (Bauer et al, 1998: 164). In fact, food companies were able to 
introduce GMF in the UK market.
60
 Nonetheless, issues on segregation and labelling 
became contentious and public debates sensitised stakeholders to the importance of 
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preserving consumer confidence in new foods. Food
61
 and research
62
 scandals and 
happened in the UK. Subsequently, the government appeared committed to public 
consultation. By March 1999, all foods, additives, and flavourings that entered the 
market since September 1, 1998 and that contained more than 1 percent GM content 
were labelled. In April 2000, the Food Safety Agency extended such provision to all 
GMF, additives, and flavourings, including those on the market before 1998. There 
were also required labels for restaurant meals with GMF. Furthermore, the UK 
empowered local authorities to enforce the system and adopted a range of financial 
penalties for mislabelling of products (Phillips and McNeill, 2000: 222). This, 
however, has resulted in polarised views about GMF,
63
 which have been joined by a 
series of food scandals
64
 and controversial previously unpublished experiments.
65
 In 
turn, this led the government to establish a new Food Standards Agency and to 
overhaul the entire advisory system on biotechnology (Grabner et al, 2001: 25). 
 
Despite all these differing national views, a pattern supporting the implementation of 
GMF labels has been observable in a number of member nation-states. Indeed, France 
and Greece changed perspectives over time, which in turn confirmed that the majority 
of member nation-states aimed at a similar policy. These views related to citizens‟ 
perspectives on the topic. A study from Bauer et al (1998: 262) indicates that, from 
the then existing 15 member nation-states, there was a mean of 74.9 percent 
respondents supporting putting labels on GMF, while only 16.4 percent disagreed 
with this issue.
66
 Nevertheless, from the member nation-states that adopted or 
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announced plans to implement mandatory labelling systems, only the UK formally 
implemented labelling rules
67
 (Phillips and McNeill, 2000: 220).  
 
At the regional level, there was a general agreement that all products based on 
genetically engineered processes should be labelled individually on the product 
packaging. Also, some ministers of Environment and Agriculture in charge of this 
policy in their respective countries, called for documentation and labelling of GM 
crops, as well as clear labels on seeds.  Hence, it is in this context that governments 
attempted to influence the regulation of GMF in the EU (Jelsoe et al, 1998: 32). 
 
Under these circumstances, and despite objections from most member nation-states 
where public annoyance was apparent, the Commission issued the Decision 
97/98/EC,
68
 which would allow the placing of Bt-176 maize on the European market 
without any label beyond indicating the „new characteristics‟ of the crop. This 
Decision stated that labels should indicate that maize protected itself against corn 
borer and that it had increased tolerance to a specific herbicide. The „GM status‟ of 
the crop was not required. This Decision shows that the Commission concluded that 
there was no reason to believe that the introduction of GMOs into maize would have 
any adverse effects on human health or the environment. Consequently, the 
Commission decided that there were no safety grounds for mentioning on the label 
that the product was obtained through GM techniques.  
 
This action was parallel to the mobilisation of consumers boycotting GM producers 
and retailers, activists uprooting GM plants, and the christening of this type of 
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product as „Frankenfoods‟ in, for example, the UK. The EP overwhelmingly 
denounced the Commission‟s decision, and a number of ENGOs cast GM crops as a 
threat to sustainable agriculture. In addition, food suppliers decided to exclude GM 
ingredients from their own brand products. The EU was lacking a straightforward 
way to accommodate the protest originated from the combination of these reactions. 
 
[…] member states imposed their own bans or restrictions on GM crops. 
Commercial cultivation required national approval […]. Using this procedure, 
France and Spain granted a time-limited approval, requiring companies to monitor 
fields for all risks which were cited in the public debate. Bt maize was banned at 
various times by Austria, Italy and Germany (Levidow and Murphy, 2003: 63 – 
4). 
 
Commercial blockage and political protest led to more cautious regulations in the EU. 
Amid public hostility, extra demands and restrictions tended to circulate among 
member nation-states and labelling became a key topic. This was apparent when the 
EP and the Council issued Regulation 258/97/EC
69
 concerning novel foods and their 
ingredients. In this, general concerns, raised previously in Directive 90/220/EEC 
when referring to the harmonious functioning of the internal market, were taken into 
account. Furthermore, issues on public health, the environment and consumer 
information were addressed. It was also established that products containing GMOs 
must be labelled when they could no longer be considered substantially equivalent to 
their conventional counterpart. For this, two types of information became compulsory 
on the labels. Firstly, labelling should state clearly when it was apparent that the 
product contained GMOs. Secondly, labels should state when there was the 
possibility of GMOs being present in the product. This refers to „contain‟ and „may 
contain‟ phrasing labels. A third, voluntary option, was considered. It would refer to 
consumers being informed that the product was GM free (NERA, 2001: 2 – 5). 
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However, despite the relevance of this regulation in setting the labelling requirements 
of GMOs, the list of GM products was too wide and maize was not specified even 
when Bt-176 maize was already authorised for marketing. 
As this GM maize variety was not covered by the EP and Council Regulation 
258/97/EC, some member nation-states started to adopt safeguard measures. This was 
the case with Austria and Luxembourg, who prohibited the sale of Bt-176 maize on 
their territories soon after the Commission authorised the crop for commercialisation. 
The argument for such an action was that possible risks were very hard to assess and 
therefore should be avoided while scientific discussions were taking place (WTO 
Panel, 2006: 885). Furthermore, for Austria, the controversy started because a GMO 
field trial had got out of hand and created in the public a reaction against 
biotechnology. In this context, and in order to avoid any potential escalation of the 
conflict to the regional level, the Commission issued Regulation 1813/97,
70
 which 
clearly emphasised the establishment of labelling rules for the GM maize variety 
authorised under Decision 97/98/EC across member nation-states.  Significantly, 
though, this regulation also emphasised that there were no safety grounds to label and 
that the regulation was designed to ensure that consumers were informed of the 
presence of GMOs in foodstuffs, that they were told of any health concerns 
(allergenic), and that ethical issues were considered.  
 
Despite efforts to appease concerns, Regulation (EC) 1813/97 appeared too late. The 
controversy of marketing maize without labelling its GM status had an effect 
throughout Europe. Debates on biotechnology became constant throughout 1997 and 
1999 in Greece, Ireland, Italy, the UK, France, Denmark, and the Netherlands (Franz, 
2006: 5 – 7). Regardless of such national disquiet, the Commission issued Decision 
98/292/EC
71
 and Decision 98/294/EC
72
 dealing with the placing on the market of Bt-
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11 maize and MON810 maize respectively. The Decisions listed the labelling 
requirements stated in the Commission Regulation 1813/97.  
Soon afterwards, the Council issued Regulation (EC) 1139/98,
73
 which amended 
Commission Regulation 1813/97. It provided for the compulsory labelling of GM 
maize and GM soybeans when transgenic DNA could be found in the final food 
products. This was the result of the Council considering urgent action to lay down 
detailed uniform Community labelling rules, specifying the manner in which phrases 
detailing the existence of GMOs should be written.
74
 This was at the time when 
Austria exerted more pressure on the EU policy framework by banning the second 
GM maize variety (MON810) from entering its territory (WTO Panel, 2006: 893).  
 
Furthermore, no applications for authorisation of GMOs reached the end of the 
decision-making process between 1998 and 2004, and a number of member nation-
states introduced measures barring national market access to GMOs that had already 
been authorised. This was most immediately prompted by two declarations from 
twelve of the then fifteen member nation-states stating that they were opposed to 
further authorisations of GMOs. One declaration was issued by the Danish, Greek, 
French, Italian and Luxembourg Delegations. The other declaration included the 
views of the Austrian, Belgian, Finnish, German, Dutch, Spanish and Swedish 
Delegations
75
 (Lee, 2008: 3). With slightly different emphases, both declarations 
stated the need to impose a moratorium and the intention of member nation-states to 
block the authorisation of GMOs in the Council of Ministers pending the adoption of 
a new and stricter regulatory system that would ensure labelling and traceability of 
GMOs and GMO-derived products (Pollack and Shaffer, 2009: 67 – 8).  
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Ireland, Portugal and the UK did not join either declaration. Nevertheless, despite not 
taking part in the decisions, they did not push ahead with GMO authorisations 
because the nature of the concern was sufficiently profound, and with sufficient 
impact on the commercial prospects of agricultural biotechnology (Law, 2008: 222). 
 
Two years later, Regulation (EC) 1139/98 was amended by Commission Regulation 
49/2000,
76
 which established that labelling was necessary if a maximum threshold of 
1 percent tolerance level for presence of GM-material in a non-GM background was 
surpassed. However, the amending regulation was criticized by the EP in two 
manners. Firstly, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer 
Policy (CEPHCP) called the Commission to propose that co-decision should apply to 
the adoption of the measures suggested
77
 (European Parliament, 1999/a). The reason 
behind this was that the EP had no chance to propose amendments on what they 
considered a confused approach to GMF. That is, this legislation was considered as 
another part of a jigsaw, which led the EP to perceive that consumers could be 
puzzled about what exactly the EU was proposing and how it would impact on them, 
on the food they eat, and on the labels they read.
78
 Secondly, the CEPHCP was 
heavily concerned about the maximum 1 percent content level. MEPs had different 
views about such threshold, with the majority of them being against the percentage 
proposed. For example, some MEPs
79
 argued that the threshold could be lower as 
supermarket chains around the EU, they claimed, were confirming that 0.1 percent 
content level was feasible. Other MEPs
80
 wanted further clarification of the meaning 
of the percentage. That is, the manner by which accidental GMO presence should be 
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permitted or not. On the opposite hand, another MEP
81
 claimed that the threshold was 
too strict for the industry to accomplish it. His argument was that this could end up 
labelling everything as potentially containing GMOs (European Parliament, 1999/b). 
Despite the views of the CEPHCP, the Commission maintained the 1 percent 
threshold. Subsequently, the Commission‟s attempts to calm down some member 
nation-states‟ unease proved fruitless. Austria prohibited T25 maize, while Germany 
did the same with Bt-176 maize during the same year. Italy went even further by 
suspending the entrance of T25 maize, MON810 maize, MON809 maize, and Bt11 
maize from its national market
82
 (WTO Panel, 2006: 876, 912, 925). 
 
These prohibitions placed the Commission under great pressure to come to terms with 
the revision of Directive 90/220/EEC (Abels, 2005: 345). The result was a proposal 
that would in turn become the EP and Council Directive 2001/18/EC.
83
 This directive 
established that both traceability and labelling would be interlinked as the latter 
would become a means to reach the former. This is, labelling GMOs or products 
containing them would assist in tracing GMOs. In addition, unique codes relating to 
each GMO would need to be set up, which would include requirements to specify the 
identity of the GMOs, as is foreseen under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
Member nation-states were required to take the relevant measures to ensure that 
labelling of GMOs would take place at all stages of their placing on the market.
84
  
However, Directive 2001/18/EC did not appear smoothly. While the majority of the 
EP supported tighter regulations, member nation-states had mixed views. While some 
appeared to do whatever possible to ensure that no GM crops would be grown in their 
territories, like Austria and Luxembourg; others were torn between demands of GM 
opponents and those of the biotech industry, as in the case of Germany and the UK.  
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A conciliation committee drafted the final text, which was characterised by a 
ratcheting-up of regulatory requirements for GMOs in order to assuage GM-sceptical 
member governments and MEPs. Despite this effort, Directive 2001/18/EC did not 
satisfy Denmark, Austria, France, Greece, Luxembourg and Italy. All of them were 
insisting on continuing with the moratorium (Pollack and Shaffer, 2009: 239). 
 
Seeking to remove national bans and to overcome the impasse on approvals, the 
Commission developed proposals in order to improve the legislative framework. For 
this reason, provisions on the marketing of GMOs were replaced by two new 
regulations: The EP and Council Regulation 1829/2003
85
 on genetically modified 
food and feedstock and the EP and Council Regulation 1830/2003/EC
86
 relating to 
the traceability and labelling of GMOs and GMF, both of which established the level 
of harmonisation on the policy concerned. Also, these regulations were intended to 
operate in tandem and rely on each other for certain requirements. Notably, 
Regulation 1830/2003 provides traceability requirements for all food and feed 
products that fall under the scope of Regulation 1829/2003.  
 
As with other stages on the development of these policies, some member nation-
states expressed their particular views on labelling. Because of its consummated 
opposition to GMOs, Austria is used as an example. It is true that Austrian consumers 
have been wary of these products; however, organic farming has been the sector that 
has most perceived the threat that GM crops can pose for its development. In fact, 
Austrians have been, on average, the most critical of modern biotechnology in Europe 
(Wagner et al, 1998: 17, 19). They still think that existing regulations are insufficient 
to protect people from any risks derived from genetic modification. In this sense, it 
appears that labels become an irrelevant aspect of GMF. In other words, Austrians 
have not trusted this technology; hence labels stating that GM processes have 
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occurred can be regarded as non-sense. However, the Austrian delegation 
participating in drafting Regulation 1829/2003 encouraged the establishment of 
labelling requirements by proposing the inclusion of declarations in notifications as to 
when and in which way products would be labelled (European Commission, 2004). 
 
In Regulation 1829/2003, labelling was understood to be a procedure that would 
prevent consumers from being mislead about methods of production and enable them 
to make informed choices. For this, Regulation 1829/2003 laid down the different 
contexts in which labelling should take place; that is, when foods contain or consist 
of GMOs, or are produced from or contain ingredients produced from GMOs. In this 
sense, clear labelling was stated for genetic modification resulting in the final 
product. It was also stated that the adventitious GMO traces in conventional food 
would not be subject to labels. For this, a threshold for technically unavoidable traces 
was established. Jointly with the confirmation that labelling should be provided at all 
stages of placing on the market, such threshold was included in both Regulation 
1829/2003 and Regulation 1830/2003.
87
 Although both of them deal with similar 
issues in their contents, as it is the case of delimiting the threshold and the type of 
food subject of labelling, there are reasons behind developing two pieces of 
legislation. According to the Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection
88
 the 
difference relies in that Regulation 1830/2003 „is a horizontal piece of legislation as 
is Directive 2001/18. In Directive 2001/18 it was envisaged that there would be 
sectoral legislation, brought forward in due course.‟ That is the piece of legislation 
[Regulation 1829/2003] he was promoting and that was required when Directive 
2001/18 was voted for.
89
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5.1 Regulation 1830/2003 – The main legislation for GMF 
labelling 
 
Regulation 1830/2003
90
 was developed out of a Commission proposal
91
 intending to 
strengthen the position on traceability and labelling of GMF that the EU reached with 
Directive 2001/18/EC.  
At this point, the UK was opposing EU-wide labelling rules (FOE, 2002),
92
 while 
also pushing for lifting the moratorium imposed on licensing new GMF and crops, 
and calling instead for a „GM-free‟ label. This came despite the UK being already 
enforcing EU rules.
93
 However, other countries were already keen on establishing 
labels. This was the case of the Netherlands, being one of the first member nation-
states to enact mandatory labelling since the late 1990s (Kalaitzandonakes et al, 2007: 
113).
94
 Another case was France, where the approach towards GMF and their labels 
shifted over time. As previously told, GM technology was largely viewed at the 
beginning as a matter of progress and competitiveness.
95
 However, after having 
supported the approval of one type of Bt corn, France banned the same corn by 
blocking it from being listed in France‟s national seed catalogue. After a couple of 
shifts on this policy in 1997, the French government became one of the backers of the 
moratorium on new approvals and legislation being adopted. It also imposed national 
safeguards against two varieties that received EU approval (Pollack and Shaffer, 
2009: 74). 
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With the aim to harmonise national laws, the proposal for this regulation focused on 
two issues. Firstly, it properly defined the concept and objectives of traceability. 
Secondly, labelling of GMOs was extended from GMF to products produced from 
GMOs. In addition, this proposal considered as sufficient information to label pre-
packaged GMO products only with the words „This product contains genetically 
modified organisms‟. This aspect presupposes that labelling should be provided in the 
first stage of market placement, with its subsequent inclusion in all types of packages 
until reaching the final consumer. This, in turn, would enable producers and 
consumers to exercise their freedom of choice. However, a key, controversial, aspect 
of this proposal was that the Commission suggested that if GMO traces were 
technically unavoidable or adventitious, labelling and traceability would not be 
necessary.  
With this proposal, the Council consulted the European Economic and Social 
Committee (EESC). The Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the 
Environment adopted its opinion on a number of issues.
96
 Overall, the EESC 
welcomed such a proposal as it considered that legislation existing at the time was 
„inconsistent and incomplete‟. In this regard, the committee suggested that 
traceability of GMOs and GMF should be identical to the traceability rules 
established on the general principles of food law. Furthermore, the committee 
commented that traceability requirements should be strengthened by including a 
series of additional checks and inspections by producers, retailers and supervisory 
authorities. On labelling, the EESC requested clarification on the liability for 
adventitious contamination on organic farming. In addition, the EESC considered 
fraud and unfair practice if a product was not labelled in cases when GMOs were 
used but were not present in the final product. 
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The Committee of the Regions was another body that also expressed a supportive 
opinion on the Commission proposal,
97
 reaffirming that all purchasers – be they 
intermediate users or final consumers – should be enabled to exercise freedom of 
choice. The Committee, however, suggested that the Commission should also be 
authorised to seek to harmonise assessment procedures for GMOs and GMF, as well 
as to seek to align EU traceability measures with those applicable at the international 
level, like the ones set out in the Cartagena Protocol. 
 
As the proposed regulation would be achieved through the co-decision procedure, the 
Commission proposal was sent to the EP for its first reading. Within it, the 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy (CEPHCP) 
would be responsible for presenting the EP´s position, while the Committee on 
Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy (CIETRE) and the Committee on 
Agriculture and Rural Development (CARD) would only issue their respective 
opinions.  
The debate held within the EP, and at which the Commissioner for Environment
98
 
and the Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection
99
 assisted, showed the 
different perspectives that MEPs had with respect to the proposed policies.
100
 Every 
MEP that participated in the debate agreed to provide information through labels. The 
idea behind this was to ensure the internal market would operate efficiently while 
consumers could be better informed (European Parliament, 2002/a). However, there 
were strong disagreements across the diverse political groups in two areas: the 
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products to be labelled and the threshold percentage to be used.
101
 Referring to the 
products to be labelled, the majority of the political groups
102
 converged on the idea 
of labelling not only GM products, but also products derived from GM food and feed. 
The argument was that consumers should be informed as to whether a product 
consists of, contains, or has been made of GMOs. That is, to be informed both about 
the content of the food and the methods used to produce them. With this, rules on 
labelling and traceability would also become relevant because effective control could 
be carried out so that products could be withdrawn from the market if unforeseen 
damage to consumers‟ health or the environment should occur.103 On the opposite 
view were the members of the European People‟s Party (EPP).104 They all argued that 
labelling should be product-based, instead of process-based. Their argument was that 
truthful information could be achieved if only products that really contain GMOs 
were labelled as such, with the need for scientific proof as a prime requirement. 
Besides, they commented that if labels were extended to products which have come 
into contact with GMOs, without proving genetic modification in the end product, it 
would lead to the majority of products in the market to be labelled as containing 
GMOs.
105
 The EPP was supported by some members of the ELDR, who wondered 
whether they would be helping consumers if labels were process-based.
106
 
                                                          
101
 The first disagreement was related to the Commission proposal that would become Regulation 
1830/2003, while the second disagreement was related to the Commission proposal that became 
Regulation 1829/2003. 
102
 Except for the EPP; PSE, ELDR, Greens/EFA, GUE/NGL, UEN, and Independent MEPs were 
supporting this view. 
103
 Comment made by Mr. Torben Lund (PSE, DA) during the debate held on 2 July 2002 in 
Strasbourg (European Parliament, 2002/a). A similar position was adopted by Mr. Jonas Sjöstedt 
(GUE/NGL, SV), Mrs. Hiltrud Breyer (Greens, EFA), Mrs. Nicole Thomas-Mauro (NI, FR), Mr. Chris 
Davies (ELDR, UK), Mrs. Jillian Evans (Greens/EFA, UK), Mr. Guido Sacconi (PSE, IT), Mr. Karl 
Erik Olsson (ELDR, SV), Mr. Liam Hyland (UEN, IR), Mrs. Danielle Auroi (Greens/EFA, FR), and 
Mrs. Catherine Stihler (PSE, UK). 
104
 EPP members participating in the debate were Mr. Trakatellis (EL), Mrs. Redondo Jiménez (ES), 
Mrs. Sommer (DE), Mrs. Grossetête (FR), Mrs. Oomen Ruijten (NL), Mr. Purvis (UK), Mrs. Doyle 
(IR), Mrs. Müller (DE), Mrs. Keppelhoff-Wiechert (DE), Mr. Fiori (IT), Mrs. Flemming (DE), and 
Mrs. Klass (DE).  
105
 Comments made by Mrs. Renate Sommer (EPP – DE, DE) during the debate held on 2 July 2002 in 
Strasbourg (European Parliament, 2002/a). 
106
 Mr. Dirk Steckx (ELDR, NL) views were expressed during the same debate (European Parliament, 
2002/a). 
104 
 
With respect to the other disagreement, that of the threshold percentage to be used for 
labelling, MEPs again expressed differing views. Overall, there were diverse 
thresholds proposed: 0 percent, 0.1 percent, 0.5 percent, and 1 percent. Except for the 
EPP, whose MEPs claimed that that setting a limit lower than 1 percent would be a 
blocking, unrealistic and political value that would have no scientific basis;
107
 the rest 
of the political groups were supportive of a threshold of less than 1 percent.
108
 There 
were various comments on the reasons why they were proposing such diverse range 
of percentages. For example, 0 percent was considered to be the necessary measure 
by the strictest MEPs. The argument behind this was that no GMF should be allowed 
to reach the market;
109
 otherwise any type of threshold would turn food legislation on 
its head.
110
 Other MEPs had similar stringent views in that they supported a threshold 
of 0.1 percent. They based their arguments on comments from the scientific 
community affirming that such threshold could be observed.
111
 The slight majority of 
MEPs viewed a 0.5 percent as the most adequate threshold,
112
 although some of them 
would have preferred it to be lower.
113
  
The position of the two Commissioners involved in the debate was not totally 
convergent with the EP‟s views. They agreed that consumers‟ health, the 
environment, and freedom of choice should be protected. However, they disagreed in 
some issues. The Commissioner for Environment made it clear that labelling products 
manufactured from GM feed would be impossible to implement and would not be in 
keeping with Community law; although she did so without explaining the reasons 
behind her position. On threshold values, the Commissioner´s argument was that 
traces of GMOs in imported food was practically unavoidable due to the increasing 
cultivation of GM crops around the world. In a more conciliatory stance was the 
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Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection, who proposed to expand 
labelling requirements to food ingredients produced from GMO, even when modified 
DNA was not detectable. However, he wanted to emphasises this was not due to 
safety reasons. Instead, labelling would serve the purpose of informing consumers 
and allowing them to exercise choice. On labelling thresholds, he explained that it 
would not be feasible if the proposal did not provide for tolerance for small traces of 
GMOs in food. This was because it was technically unavoidable using GMOs during 
cultivation, harvest, transport and processing. Thus, he supported the 1 percent limit 
of GM material, which was the threshold established in previous legislation
114
 that 
take into account technological and scientific progress. 
 
Besides the debate where each MEP was able to express his or her position, the 
committees of involved areas were requested to suggest amendments to the 
Commission proposal. The CEPHCP suggested including references to the 
precautionary principle and to the traceability requirements not only for GMF but 
also for animal products derived from animals fed with GM feed (Amendment 2). On 
the Commission‟s position about dispensing with labelling requirements in case of 
adventitious or technically unavoidable GMO traces, the CEPHCP disagreed, 
counter-proposing that a GMO threshold should be set below which such products 
would not have to be labelled (0.5 percent). In addition, the CEPHCP suggested that 
the threshold values should be revised and adjusted according to scientific, socio-
economic, health and environmental analyses of GMO effects in the short, medium, 
and long terms (Amendment 5). Another aspect was the emphasis on stating that the 
regulation would provide a framework to ensure giving consumers the right of free 
and independent choice (Amendment 6). In addition, the CEPHCP proposed to 
double the time necessary for keeping traceability records for GMOs. This was 
because the Commission proposed five years, but the CEPHCP considered that ten 
years should be the absolute minimum timeframe necessary, as health and other 
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problems may take time to become evident (Amendment 22). An amendment was 
suggested to encourage member nation-states to draw up guides segregating GMOs 
and GMF from conventional products, so as to avoid the risks of adventitious or 
technically unavoidable contamination (Amendment 27).  
 
From the side of the CIETRE there was a claim that traceability and labelling 
requirements were complex, costly, and could cause trade disputes. Instead, they were 
proposing „GM free‟ labelling since it would provide clear and accurate information 
to the consumer without adding what they considered „unjustifiable costs and 
disputes‟ on industry (Amendment 2). Furthermore, the CIETRE considered that 
seeds containing adventitious or technically unavoidable traces of GMOs and highly 
processed food in which GMOs were not verifiable should be exempt from labelling 
requirements (Amendments 4 and 5). 
The CARD was expressing concerns over the adoption of the Commission‟s proposal 
as it could lead to international trade conflicts, since the measures put forward were 
construed by some external nation-states as barriers to trade. In this regard, they were 
supportive of incorporating into the proposal CPB provisions, which could minimise 
the risk of trade conflicts (Amendments 10 and 15). Nevertheless, they pointed out 
that labelling was no guarantee of safety thereof. Hence, reliable checking and 
authorisation schemes should be designed. In this regard, they supported a maximum 
of 0.9 percent threshold of adventitious presence of GMOs in food (Amendment 14). 
 
The legislative resolution adopted by the EP on the first reading
115
 (2002/b), ended up 
including views from the CEPHCP, which was the Committee in charge of drafting 
the EP‟s stance. Amendments referred to the need to ensure consumers could receive 
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information, through labels, where GMO products were produced from (Art.4). The 
precautionary principle would need to be addressed (Art. 1), while thresholds 
allowance would need to be stated. In addition, keeping records of GMO transactions 
was suggested to be of ten years (Art. 5). 
The amendments proposed by the EP were partially accepted by the Commission, 
who made the pertinent corrections to an amended proposal for the Regulation. On 
amendments about labelling, the Commission would rephrase the proposed wording 
in order to indicate in labels the name of the GMO used, instead of merely stating that 
the product contained GMO. On the other hand, the Commission rejected the 
proposal to establish the detailed history and origin of each individual GMO, through 
a traceability system. In addition, there was a rejection towards including the 
precautionary principle in the Regulation. The Commissioner for Environment 
emphasised that such a principle can be applied on the authorisation based on risk 
assessment, but not on the implementation of traceability and labelling systems.
116
 In 
addition, the Commissioner commented that there were no practical reasons for 
extending the information to be kept with purposes on traceability from five to ten 
years.  
 
These and other remarks were sent to the Council, where the Ministers for 
Environment of the member nation-states agreed to request the Permanent 
Representatives Committee to follow up on the issue.
117
 One of the most contested 
issues about this was the proposed threshold. An initial compromise by the Danish 
Presidency, backed by the UK and 7 other member nation-states, set a figure of 1 
percent, but it was not accepted by Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and Portugal. All of them recommended limits of between 0.1 percent 
(Austria) and 0.5% (most of the others). To wrench an agreement out of the 15 
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ministers, the Council‟s Presidency proposed a threshold of 0.9 percent. Such view 
would end up being supported by the Commission, thus shifting the balance towards 
this percentage (European Report, 2002). 
After this, the Council presented a common position,
118
 accepting to label products as 
proposed by the EP and to ensure consumers‟ freedom of choice. However, the 
Council was keen to support the Commission by omitting to phrase „risk assessment‟, 
stating that effective inspection and control would constitute risk assessment 
measures. Furthermore, the Council supported the proposal to establish an operational 
traceability system for specific GMOs to be released into the environment. 
Nonetheless, they rejected the idea of establishing this system for GMOs intended for 
food, feed or processing where, they would claim, any potential environmental risk 
was extremely limited. EP‟s suggestions on extending traceability information from 
five to ten years also faced strong opposition within the Council, stating that the 
benefits of the gathered information would be minimal and would have no practical 
value. Instead, such action would impose an unnecessary burden on traders and 
inspection authorities.  
 
Following the co-decision procedure and leading to express its opinion through the 
second reading, the EP held a debate
119
 on the amended proposal. In it, there was 
disbelief by some MEPs with respect to the threshold raised from 0.5 percent that the 
EP proposed at the first reading, to 0.9 percent proposed by the Council.
120
 For other 
MEPs, there was satisfaction with this threshold.
121
 This of course was related to the 
position that each MEP expressed during the debate of the first reading, as well as to 
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the political group they belonged to. Despite these continuing differences, there were 
requests to vote for a text as closed as possible to the Council´s position.
122
 
The resulting report (European Parliament, 2003/a) would consequently become their 
second reading
123
 (EP, 2003/b). In such, the EP proposed that the Commission should 
report to the EP and the Council on the implementation and effectiveness of rules of 
traceability and labelling (Amendment 3). Mentioning the precautionary principle to 
facilitate accurate labelling, as well as comment on providing consumers with the 
right of free and independent choice, were also included (Amendment 5). 
Furthermore, the EP reinforced intentions to keep traceability records for ten years, as 
opposed to the five years proposed by the Commission (Amendment 8), as well as 
those related to coexistence measures (Amendment 16). 
In contrast to the first reading, it should be noted that changes proposed by the EP on 
the second reading did not attempt to change the substance of the provisions of the 
Council‟s common position. This action was pre-emptively made taking into account 
the experience of the final voting of the first reading; that is, when there were 
different opinions as to whether to vote for or against certain amendments, which 
resulted in a weak majority (Trakatellis, 2003).
124
 Following this, the Commission 
gave an opinion on the second reading (2003), stating that the proposal for the 
regulation would be amended according to the EP‟s and Council‟s views. 
Subsequently, the final legislative act was set up.
125
 
Since then, Regulation 1830/2003 appears as the cornerstone for labelling GMOs and 
GMF, where maize is also included. Nonetheless, despite setting rules on traceability 
and labelling, persistent divisions among member governments continued in related 
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areas, such as the standards to apply to the scientific evaluation of new products. This 
was the case of NK603 GM maize, which was approved by the Commission in July 
2004 after the Council of Environment Ministers failed to reach agreement on the 
issue: nine members, including four of the new members
126
, reportedly voted against, 
nine in favour, while seven abstained. Other GM crops experienced the same fate.
127
  
These features denoted that the new member nation-states would not serve to the 
biotech industry purposes, as it was initially expected
128
 (Inglis, 2003). Instead, the 
ambivalence towards agricultural biotechnology in „old‟ Europe has been shared in 
the public opinion and governmental positions of EU‟s new members as well.129 
Hence, support from a majority of member nation-states when it comes to 
implementation, specifically the adoption of decisions on specific products, has 
proven difficult. Despite this, the legislation itself, including labelling, has not been 
contested.  
 
5.2 National views on the implementation of Regulation 
1830/2003 and further developments 
 
It was established that Regulation 1830/2003 would request the Commission to 
submit a report to the Council and to the EP on the implementation and on the 
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effectiveness of the rules on traceability and labelling. In this sense, the Commission 
has drafted not one, but two reports, which were drawn from information obtained 
from different sources. Authorities from member nation-states, stakeholders from 
involved sectors, like members and associations of food, feed and seed industries, 
trading partners, and NGOs
130
 provided feedback on other questions about 
traceability, labelling, exemptions, inspections and control measures. 
The first report dates back to 2006.
131
 In this, the Commission presented to the 
Council
132
 the results of a questionnaire submitted to different actors. Such has been 
the relevance of GM maize that one of the listed questions required comments on the 
control measures taken in a specific case involving the adventitious presence of an 
unauthorised variety of GM maize in an authorised GM maize variety batch.
133
 
According to this report, the Commission affirmed that only a limited number of 
GMF was marketed and GM material was not used in food products to a great extent. 
This was the result of the industry responding to consumers‟ demands of non-GM 
products.
134
 In addition, the Commission acknowledged that trading partners were 
affected by this regulation, which they claimed included onerous and costly 
mandatory traceability requirements. Specifically, this was attributed to the 0.9 
percent threshold for adventitious presence. In particular, the US government was 
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listed as urging the Commission to join with trading partners to work towards 
harmonisation and some form of mutual recognition on the trade of GM products.  
The Commission also confirmed that cultivation of GMOs was not practised in the 
vast majority of member nation-states, although approximately 60.000 hectares of Bt-
maize were commercially grown in Spain. In addition, France, Germany, the Czech 
Republic, and Portugal were also growing other maize varieties on a much smaller 
scale. The harvested product of this crop was largely used for animal feed, as well as 
for processing via the starch industry.  
Overall, the report concluded that no difficulties were found in implementing the 
regulation. In fact, requirements of documentation of transactions and labelling of 
GM varieties seem to have been implemented as a standard business practice. The 
majority of member nation-states regarded the regulation as having a positive effect 
on the provision of relevant information and consumer choice. NGOs shared views 
on these aspects. Nevertheless, national authorities considered that there was not 
sufficient period of time to gather relevant experience and information concerning the 
implementation of the regulation. A further issue was that some national authorities 
were experiencing difficulties in sampling and testing so as to detect the adventitious 
presence of GMOs.
135
 To overcome this, there was a general consensus among 
national governments to harmonise procedures, either through further legislation, an 
operating manual, or the exchange of more information and experience. A 
harmonised format for documentation to assist operators and national authorities was 
also suggested by some member nation-states. 
 
While information for the report was being gathered, some member nation-states 
attempted to further toughen their own national policies on GMOs. One case was 
when Cyprus tried to notify a measure requiring supermarkets to keep GMF on 
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shelves separate from non-GMF on consumer protections grounds.
136
 Another was 
when Hungary proposed coexistence measures by requiring crops produced in a 
„refuge zone‟137 to be labelled as „plants modified by gene technology,‟ regardless of 
how much GM material was present.
138
 Nevertheless, these attempts went without 
success thanks to the Commission‟s reluctance to support such actions. 
 
The second report was issued in 2008
139
 with input submitted by 23 member nation-
states as well as EuropaBio and the American Soybean Association. The 
questionnaire used showed that no new patterns appeared. Retailing industries 
remained resistant to marketing GMF, while the majority of GM products placed in 
the market were still destined for animal feed and originated from imported 
commodities, mainly soybean and maize. There was only one GM crop cultivated: 
MON810 maize. Spain, Germany, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
France increased their cultivated area from 60.000 hectares to 110.000 hectares in a 
year. 
 
In detail, feedback provided by stakeholders in both 2006 and 2008 reports showed 
common patterns among respondents. There was the thought that the „may contain 
GMO‟ labelling was unclear. There was also acceptance towards labelling GM-free 
products, as it would assist consumers with correct information. Furthermore, the 
implementation of the 0.9 threshold was considered as having no practical purpose if 
GMOs were authorised. 
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Little knowledge about processes was a common pattern among stakeholders 
answering the questionnaires provided by the Commission. For example, some 
respondents
140
 were not aware about whether any meal was a mixture or only one 
kind of GMOs. Other examples referred to operators not obtaining documents with 
the required GMO data from suppliers,
141
 and to some local control services asking 
for a self declaration from importers, stating that the imported material contained 
GMOs in case of labels specifying that the product „may contain‟ GMOs.142 
A further type of confusion consisted in the wrong interpretation regarding the 
threshold. Up to 0.9 percent GMO allowance was falsely interpreted as GMO free or 
non-GMO at all.
143
 In other cases, there were comments that such threshold was too 
low in practice,
144
 or that it was difficult to set it up due to measurement uncertainties 
between laboratories.
145
 
Other cases stated that it was not possible to control traceability and labelling, since 
hardly any foodstuff in the market contained GMOs. This was the result of operators 
intentionally avoiding importing and using GMOs in the production of food. 
However, there was the possibility of over-the-limit threshold GMOs appearing 
included in imports from third countries that did not label their bulk consignments. In 
these cases, traceability was difficult to achieve.
146
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Legal views were also expressed. These exemplified how Regulation 1830/2003 
provided parameters to avoid GM crops entering the EU.
147
 However, there were 
other views considering the existence of legal loopholes in its application.
148
 
 
Furthermore, there were proposals on prescribing a compulsory size of characters for 
the indication appearing on the label,
149
 and on establishing a common GMO sign to 
be added on labels.
150
  This action would in turn homogenise the manner in which 
information could be presented to consumers across the whole EU. Besides, labelling 
properly would assist in solving problems concerning traceability and enforcement 
that have been present with products from third countries.
151
 Furthermore, there were 
suggestions that labels should take place if companies did not take adequate 
precautionary measures in order to avoid contamination.
152
  
 
There were also comments on the need to establish thresholds for the presence of 
GMOs in seeds. This opinion resulted from the practical difficulties of analysing a 
mixture of grains, flours, or processed products, as they might contain different 
ingredients produced from the same raw material, like starch and flour from maize.
153
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In the broad sense, the reports showed that the experience of GMOs in the food sector 
remained modest, mainly due to the limited number of GMF and derived products 
being marketed in the EU. The industrial sector also continued to argue that 
Regulation 1830/2003 introduced excessive administrative burdens and that labelling 
thresholds were arbitrary choices. However, the Commission considered that the 
requirements for labelling aimed at delivering free choice for traders and consumers, 
and should not be considered as an obstacle to marketing authorised GM products.  
 
5.2.1. Further developments on GMF labelling rules 
 
Once Regulation 1830/2003 set up the labelling rules for food produced from GMOs, 
legislation on seeds labelling have become the next step. Since 2004, the Commission 
has attempted to deal with this issue. However, deep divisions from within this 
institution have not allowed new plans to come forward. At that time, the 
Commissioner for Environment
154
 and the Commissioner for Agriculture
155
 were 
proposing to require maize seeds to be labelled in cases where 0.3 percent or more of 
their DNA was GM. This proposal would exempt labels when traces were technically 
unavoidable. But the Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection, the 
Commissioner for Trade and the Commissioner for Science and Research strongly 
opposed the 0.3 percent threshold requirement. They said this was too costly for the 
seed industry (European Voice, 2004). The result was that talks stalled and no 
proposal was developed.  
The EP retook the issue in 2006. It suggested establishing a labelling approach in the 
seed legislation as regards to GM adventitious presence. This was considered to be in 
line with the existing seed legislation, which foresees no labelling of presence of 
other varieties present below a certain level in a given variety sold to the farmer 
(European Parliament, 2006). In this case, seeds thresholds should be the same 
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threshold as food labelling threshold. Following this pattern, any seed lot containing 
GM seeds authorized for the cultivation in the EU would have to be labelled as 
containing GMOs. The Council of Ministers on Environment supported the EP‟s 
views and, by 2008, was welcoming the completion of the Commission impact 
studies on the establishment of seed thresholds, which should be set at the lowest 
practicable, proportionate and functional levels for all economic operators.
156
 In 
addition, comments reinforcing the need to ensure freedom of choice to producers 
and consumers of conventional, organic and GM products were made. Despite the 
Commission not being able to provide a timeframe to finalise its impact 
assessment,
157
 there have been comments that the Commission is considering a scale 
that stretches from 0.1 percent up to 0.9 percent adventitious presence.
158
 That is, the 
same threshold used for labelled GM food and feed would be used for GM seed.   
Besides this, the Council of Ministers has encouraged the Commission to further 
improve harmonisation of member nation-states‟ assessment practices. The basis of 
this harmonisation would be established by the findings of a report with information 
provided by member nation-states by June 2010 (Council of the European Union, 
2008). In such, the involvement of national authorities, to which environmental risk 
assessment is delegated, should be clearly pointed out. This should be made because 
member nation-states‟ position varies; some of them consistently follow the advice of 
their own scientific bodies, which sometimes diverge from the EFSA assessments. In 
turn, EFSA risk assessment procedures are perceived by national governments as 
non-transparent, uncooperative, closed to input from EU member governments, and 
biased in favour of the biotech industry. Furthermore, most member nation-states 
appear to vote consistently for or against approval of any GMO, thus reducing any 
chance for their national representatives to change their national positions on the 
basis of information presented in the Council (Pollack and Shaffer, 2009: 248 – 51).  
Austria, Italy, Luxembourg, Greece and Hungary exemplify this regard as they 
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remain firm opponents of GMF by taking critical positions about any legal 
development on the matter. Nevertheless, other member nation-states change their 
approaches towards GMF according to the political context in which they are found at 
a given moment and to the political party in power. Ireland experienced a radical shift 
in the Council of Ministers after the 2007 elections; when the Green Party leader 
became the Minister for Environment and publicly backed Austria‟s anti-GMO 
position and looked for a GM-free Ireland. France has also experimented swifts in 
approach towards GMOs.
159
 While voting against new approvals, it has also 
increased four-fold cultivation of GM maize. At the time of its EU Presidency, France 
issued a paper proposing, among others, labelling thresholds for GM seeds. 
  
Parallel to developments leading to legislation on labelling for GM food, feed and, 
potentially, seed; there have been features aimed at conferring powers to the 
Commission. In Regulation 298/2008,
160
 which amends Regulation 1829/2003, 
certain explanations about these new powers are specified. The Commission is now 
able to define whether a type of food or feed falls within the scope of Regulation 
1829/2003, to adopt measures on labelling and information requirements incumbent 
on operators, and to lower the thresholds on labelling of adventitious and technically 
unavoidable GMOs in food and feed.  
It is important to remark that Regulation 298/2008 passed without any problems after 
a first reading from the EP, which was the same text that the Council adopted. Thus, 
as no issues were raised in reaching agreement regarding this legislation, it is 
observed that EU institutions have allowed the Commission to increase its 
participation in decision-making in this sector. 
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There are legislation proposals worth mentioning since they corroborate that a 
constant approach towards thresholds and labels is happening in the EU. They refer to 
allowances of a certain GMO threshold on organic products. This aspect became 
controversial as the high majority of MEPs involved in the respective debate
161
 were 
outraged at the possibility of allowing a 0.9 percent threshold of GMOs in organic 
products. With this position, the Commissioner
162
 drafting the proposal agreed to 
amend it. This issue was solved with Regulation 834/2007
163
 by establishing that if a 
product requires labelling due to the admixture of GMOs, it cannot be marketed as an 
organic product. However, one issue should be pointed out. The Commission 
proposal intended to increase participation of GM crops in the food chain, regardless 
of the context in which food production takes place. 
 
5.3 Observations 
 
The legislative regulatory framework for labelling GM maize has developed out of 
different sources. From directives detailing the rules for general food labelling, to 
regulations specifically concerned with GM maize labelling. In addition, the present 
law on GMF labelling has been linked to related topics, such as the release into the 
environment, consumers‟ choice, placing on the market, and traceability. The 
relationship that labelling has attained with these areas demonstrates that it has been 
deeply intertwined with the manner in which legislation on GMF has evolved. 
Nonetheless, such a relationship was not as strong at the beginning as it is now. By 
observing the development of the regulatory framework, it is noticeable that the 
establishment of labels at EU level has been gradual. It has related to concerns from 
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the citizenry and governments of some nation-states, which developed from a series 
of problems that they experienced. The resulting consumers‟ rejection and 
governments‟ refusal to grant easy access to GMOs signified the establishment of 
compulsory labels with the purpose to strengthen consumers‟ right to be informed on 
the ingredients and origins of the products they buy. With time, and in order to avoid 
potential obstacles to trade in this area; EU bodies decided to toughen the legislative 
framework on labels despite opposition of certain groups. In this regard, environment 
and consumer friendly governmental instances have driven the manner in which 
legislation has been built. Examples of these are observable. To begin with, national 
laws advocating the implementation of labels have influenced the context in which 
regional developments have taken place. Another example refers to the EP‟s position 
on the first and second readings that led to the creation of Regulation 1830/2003. 
Such position was the one expressed by the Committee on the Environment, Public 
Health and Consumer Policy (CEPHCP). A second example refers to the 
Commission‟s reports to the Council and the EP on two different updates about the 
implementation of Regulation 1830/2003, which was issued by the DG on 
Environment. Nevertheless, these examples do not mean that the legislative 
framework has been one sided, or biased. The legislative procedure that led to the 
present regulation has entailed discussions and debates between opposing groups 
within the EP and outside it, also between governments of member nation-states with 
opposed views. Besides stating that regulations on GMF labelling have been 
developed in a consumer and environment friendly direction, the implementation of 
GMO legislation aimed at improving scientific consistency and transparency for 
decisions on GMOs and at developing consensus between all interested parties is 
observable. 
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CHAPTER 6: GM MAIZE LABELLING POLICY IN THE 
REGION OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT 
 
This chapter presents developments carried out at both national and regional levels. 
This is the result of policies on GMF and its respective labelling being treated in a 
slightly different manner among the three nation-states. Nevertheless, certain 
agreements have been reached within a regional framework that has evolved 
intertwined with the maturity of the NAFTA. 
 
6.1. The American perspective 
 
The American framework for regulating biotechnology was established in 1986. 
Known as the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, its main 
argument was the principle of „the substantial equivalence of products developed 
using biotechnology and those produced by traditional means‟. Thus, GMF was not 
considered different from conventional food (Young, 2003: 462). This in turn has 
implied that there is no need for special regulatory mechanisms. 
 
By 1992, the USFDA issued a „Statement of Policy for Foods Derived from New 
Plant Varieties‟164 in 1992.  It was stated that the aim was to ensure that relevant 
scientific, safety, and regulatory issues were resolved prior to the introduction of GM 
products into the market. Emphasis was placed on the type of scientific information 
necessary to satisfy the USFDA requirements. In addition, comments on social or 
environmental concerns were contemplated in a guideline allowing the development 
of performance trials on new GM crop varieties before introducing them into 
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agricultural practice. A major feature of the Statement was that it considered GMF 
and conventional foods as equals as far as an assessment of safety according to their 
characteristics was concerned, but not equal in terms of new methods employed.  In 
this regard, scientific issues relevant to public health such as unexpected effects, 
nutrients, new substances, antibiotic resistance and possible allergic reactions, were 
addressed. It was in the latter that labelling was recommended because GMF could 
contain potential allergens, of which consumers would need to be informed. Another 
reason for labelling was established in cases where new GMF differed significantly 
from their traditional counterparts to the point that the traditional name could no 
longer be applied.  Thus, the USFDA established that labelling was required for the 
product, and not the process. 
 
[US]FDA believes that the new techniques are extensions at the molecular level of 
traditional methods and will be used to achieve the same goals as pursued with 
traditional plant breeding (USFDA, 1992: 22991). 
 
At the time, it was clearly stated that there was no intention of creating a new 
regulatory obligation for GM crop producers. The 1992 Statement was brought about 
to describe safety and nutritional concerns, rather than performance characteristics for 
which the GM crops had been developed. 
 
This type of assessment excluded consumer opinions. By July 1999, the USDA 
realised that consumers were showing resistance and great cynicism toward 
biotechnology.
165
 Therefore, consumer acceptance should be of importance. For this, 
a role could exist for information labelling, but this labelling should not undermine 
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trade and this „promising new technology‟.166 This issue would be overcome by 
focusing on strong public education showing the benefits of GM products, where 
responsibility of the private industry would not be at its own expense. American 
consumers had trust and confidence in food safety efforts of the USDA, the USFDA, 
and the EPA because these agencies were considered competent and independent 
from the industries they were regulating (Glickman, 1999).  
In November of the same year, the USFDA conducted three public hearings in which 
the results showed very limited awareness and understanding of GMF. Nonetheless, 
some of the public were not convinced that the USFDA‟s regulatory approach was 
adequate, while opinion was divided over whether GMF should be labelled (Young, 
2003: 471). Subsequently, in 2000 the USFDA conducted a series of consumer „focus 
group‟ meetings to help better understand how American consumers thought about 
this issue. The final report from these groups showed that there was very limited 
consumer knowledge, and that this was related to the fact that some of them were 
aware that Europe did not want to import this type of food, although most of these 
consumers were, in fact, uncertain about the reason behind the decision (USFDA, 
2000/a). There was also concern about unknown long term health effects and the 
realisation that these were not possible to prove under the current scientific research 
being undertaken: 
  
Some participants complained consumers [were] used as “guinea pigs” and many 
were doubtful that government regulators and scientists have the ability to 
counteract the powerful profit motives of industry and producers (USFDA, 
2000/a). 
 
However, according to USFDA‟s own findings, the main issue at stake was the 
linguistic evaluation of terms because of the lack of knowledge on the part of 
consumers. The possibility of using words such as „genetically engineered‟, 
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„genetically modified‟, or „bioengineered‟ was considered by USFDA as 
inappropriate since most people were unfamiliar with the terminology, and that such 
labelling would imply that GMF were different or contained different organisms. In 
fact, according to USFDA, people thought these labels were inaccurate and 
unappealing. Irrespective of this, USFDA acknowledged that consumers preferred 
GMF to be labelled so they could tell whether a given food was a product of the new 
technology. They wanted labels to provide information about how the food was 
produced, rather than the compositional effect of the process on food.  
 
The study conducted by USFDA showed that consumer groups wanted to be 
informed through labels not just on any specific health and safety concerns about the 
product, but also on concerns about unknown long-term consequences. This would 
imply there was the right to choose between GMF and non-GMF. However, there 
were other consumers concerned about the practicality of such labelling, questioning 
whether it might be too wordy or too complicated for the average consumer to 
understand. The information obtained through the consumer focus groups revealed 
very strongly held but divergent views as to whether or not GMF should be required 
to bear special labelling. It seemed that consumers who participated in these groups 
were divided about the manner in which labelling should be approached. Irrespective 
of these divergences, consumers were mainly disturbed by the lack of public 
information and public input. Some went even further by claiming that this was 
„evidence of a conspiracy to keep consumers in the dark, that is, the rationale for not 
informing the public must be that there is something to hide‟ (USFDA, 2000/a). 
 
The findings of the 2000 Report on consumer focus groups led to the creation of the 
„Guidance for Industry,‟167 which represented USFDA‟s views proposing voluntary 
labelling indicating whether foods were genetically modified or not. The argument 
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that prevailed was that labelling could be misleading if it failed to reveal facts that 
were stated on labels, and that concerns about labelling were mere expressions of 
unease about the unknown (USFDA, 2001/a). In addition, labelling could be required 
only when labels contained information about consequences that may result from the 
use of food. About this, there was the perception that there were institutional 
impediments to change labelling requirements (Young, 2003: 472). In fact, there also 
seemed to be constitutional obstacles to require labelling of GMF.
168
 
 
Subsequently, USFDA reaffirmed its decision not to require special labelling of 
GMF; instead, labelling requirements would be those applying to all foods. But if 
producers wished to voluntarily label their foods to inform consumers and respond to 
their wishes, then they should follow the Guidance for Industry guidelines to help 
ensure that labelling would be truthful and not misleading. 
A further element recognised in the Guidance for Industry was the possibility of 
labelling the other way round; that is, to use the term „GMO-free‟ to indicate an 
absence of bioengineering processes. However, USFDA claimed that this would be 
inaccurate since it did not have information with which to establish a threshold level 
of GM ingredients for using such a definitive label. The conclusion was that GM-free 
labels could be misleading as they would imply that this type of food was superior to 
foods not labelled as such (USFDA, 2001/b).  
 
Besides this, there have been law proposals introduced in the House of 
Representatives and in the Senate during 1999 and 2000, calling for mandatory 
labelling and instructing the USFDA „to treat genetic modification as a food additive‟ 
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(Young, 2003: 473). However, politics were considered as the reason for this not 
happening.
169
 
The American labelling approach to GMOs and GMF has been that of trying to avoid 
confusing consumers with wording that may result too complex for them to 
understand, or that may deviate their thoughts towards the perception that GMOs and 
GMF can pose substantial threats to human health and the environment. 
This has allowed the elimination of potential labels, although producers can do 
otherwise if they feel advantages could be gained for their product by giving 
consumers information.  While these aspects are generalised and ostensibly apply to 
GMOs and GMF, it is understood that they are applicable to GM maize, as there is no 
specificity about the crop in the Statement, the Report, or in the Guidance for 
Industry. 
 
The labelling approach in the USA has developed from features within the country. 
However, there have been external aspects that have influenced the manner in which 
biotechnology developments are dealt with. This is the case of the reduced number of 
GM crops approved in the EU. American agricultural producers have attempted to 
alleviate this policy by two means. The first one is by keeping non-EU approved GM 
varieties separate from the rest of the crops. About this, Young (2003: 468) 
comments that American maize refiners have been establishing identity-preservation 
systems that enable them to reassure their European customers that they use only EU-
approved maize varieties. Also, there is a program that assists maize producers by 
informing them on the selection of GM maize varieties approved for EU export,
170
 so 
they can optimize resources in finding the best option for the sale of their products. 
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The second aspect refers to maize producers giving all consumers what the most 
demanding accept (Young, 2003: 468). In this sense, the National Corn Growers 
Association (NCGA) has affirmed its support for the commercial release of GM 
maize only when it has received full approval by American and Japanese regulatory 
agencies. Once approved, the product registrant is „aggressively pursuing approval in 
every country or bloc that requires approval prior to importation‟ (NCGA, 2010/b). 
Furthermore, the NCGA is requiring the seed industry to label and identify the 
approval status of all events through a communications program targeting customers, 
while voluntary labelling is supported for indicating whether food have been 
developed using biotechnology. 
Besides maize producers, certain major food companies
171
 also communicated that 
their products would be GM free due to American consumers‟ concerns and pressure 
from activist groups (Pollack and Shaffer, 2001: 168). These concerns took form 
when the main US consumer organisations joined with their European counterparts 
on a Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD).
172
 After the TACD was created, it 
put mandatory labelling of GMF throughout the entire production, processing and 
distribution chain, at the top of its list of recommendations.
173
 Soon afterwards, some 
agricultural producers started to look for regulatory changes. Young (2003: 478 – 9) 
comments that some producers were intending to limit their exposure to conflicting 
approvals, others were aiming at bolstering consumer confidence at home and abroad, 
while others began to support mandatory premarket notifications to the USFDA. 
However, the issue of labelling remained the same. That is, support continued to be 
on voluntary labelling. In fact, most producers have remained opposed or silent on 
the issue. This reluctance to establish labels develops from the increase in marketing 
costs of advertising and promoting GMOs and GMF. Besides, such reluctance may 
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relate to a potential backfiring strategy. That is, consumers may stop buying these 
products after being aware of the origin of these products.  
 
6.2 The Canadian perspective 
 
Canada has developed an approach similar to that of the USA by giving GMF equal 
treatment with conventional products, and it has formulated a series of guidelines on 
the matter, which were drawn up after consultations with a wide range of interested 
agencies.  According to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), the 
information gathered in these consultations reflected a general consensus which 
supported a set of requirements for mandatory labelling when there were health and 
safety concerns. Where this was not the case, voluntary positive and negative 
labelling
174
 could be allowed only if the claims were factual and not misleading. Thus 
it was implied that consumer choice could be accommodated through Canadian 
legislation (CFIA, 2006). 
 
The first consultation took place in November 1993 at a workshop on „Regulating 
Agricultural Products of Biotechnology‟, in which a range of viewpoints were 
expressed. Consensus was reached about the need to label GM products based on 
health and safety grounds, although it was realised that further consultation among 
interested parties was necessary. Consequently, a year later, all governmental 
departments responsible for the labelling of food in Canada convened a technical 
workshop on the „Labelling of Novel Foods Derived through Genetic Engineering‟, 
in which producers, consumer groups, ENGOs, universities, and provincial 
governments also participated. By December 1995, a communiqué on „Labelling of 
Novel Foods Derived through Genetic Engineering‟175 was published. Its purpose 
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was to make known the guidelines based on public consultations. The rationale of 
labels emphasised that the provision of information was to protect consumers and to 
allow them to choose between products. The responsibility for the regulation of labels 
was accepted by different governmental bodies according to safety and non-safety 
labelling policies and their requirements. The former were to be regulated by Health 
Canada, while the latter were to be established by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 
(AAFC).  Subsequently, labelling for health and safety purposes, as in the case of the 
presence of allergens and when a significant change in food composition is 
detectable, became mandatory. 
Consumers‟ right to information was also specified, but there were disagreements as 
to the extent to which information should be provided.  Some concerned parties 
asserted that only full disclosure of all ingredients on labels, GM or not, would satisfy 
the right to know. Opponents, however, observed that providing such information on 
the label could be highly impractical (CFIA, 1995). They claimed that labels should 
be generally reserved for identifying health and safety concerns, and that there should 
be other means to provide non-safety additional information (i.e. internet, mass 
media, and centralised databases). CFIA argued that labelling the GM status of a 
product would eventually result in the majority of food labels bearing a statement 
about the GM origins of all ingredients, which in turn could result in health and safety 
information being overlooked. 
Voluntary labelling was briefly mentioned as an option and it was deemed acceptable 
if it was truthful and if it focused only on giving information about the process used 
to obtain changes in food products. In addition, all these proposed mandatory and 
voluntary guidelines would need to conform to international standards, such as the 
Codex Alimentarius, and would also be required to achieve consistency with 
Canada‟s major trading partners. 
 
In 1998, another conference addressed questions of consumer interpretation and 
understanding of voluntary labels as they could apply to GMF. The results found that 
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consumers indeed wanted to be informed about the origins of the products they 
acquire. However, it was observable that the wording of labelling phrases 
considerably affected the level of understanding and that, subsequently, consumers 
tended to react negatively to unknown scientific terminology. It was assumed, 
therefore, that it was better to avoid words such as „genetically‟ or „biotechnology‟, 
because participant consumers saw no reason for the provision of this type of 
information as it offered only ambiguous information.  It was further recognised that 
there were  implications in competition terms since labelling by a producer was 
viewed as „putting down competitors‟ (as in the case of stating the lack of GMOs) or 
as being „incompetent‟ for not knowing their own products better (as in the case of 
labelling through the „may contain‟ phrase). Consequently, decisions taken on 
voluntary labelling seemed to obey market-based developments, where it was 
observed that consumers did not care about labels unless there were dramatic changes 
in a product‟s features.  It was also noted that attempts to satisfy consumer choice 
could be granted by voluntary labelling and in any case, the level of awareness about 
the existence and implications of GMF was low. The general conclusion was that 
labelling was seen as important but not as a „panacea‟ solution (CFIA, 1999), and that 
Canadians believed their government exercised control over this area in a fairly strict 
fashion. In fact, Canada‟s market approval procedures of GMF were considered 
superior to most others in the world (CFIA, 1999). 
 
All the information gathered from these series of consultations led to the 
development, in 2004, of a „National Standard on Voluntary Labelling and 
Advertising of Food‟; that is to say, labelling guidelines for foods that were or were 
not, products of genetic engineering.
176
 This was the achievement of discussions 
undertaken by a committee formed by representatives of diverse interest groups such 
as biotechnology companies, national and regional agricultural producers 
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associations, governmental ministries and agencies, consumer groups, health 
associations, academics and universities.  
Thus, a regulatory framework for food and an environmental safety assessment of 
GMF was officially put in place, in which it was reiterated that there was the need for 
mandatory labelling for GMF with substantial nutritional and/or compositional 
changes. According to the Canadian General Standards Board (CGSB),
177
 this 
national standard was aimed at providing consumer choice and information, although 
there were views that regarded this action as a design to divert attention away from 
GM regulators on the labelling issue (Andrée, 2007: 56). Then, the outcome was to 
focus on voluntary labelling.  However, producers would not be able to voluntarily 
label their products until an acceptable verification process, which was underway at 
the time, was fully developed. The National Standard on voluntary labelling provided 
for an adventitious presence of less than 5 percent when claiming that food was not 
genetically engineered. This threshold was established because it was the lowest 
percentage that was achievable and verifiable.
178
 Nevertheless, it was stated that 
foods derived from GM crops, like maize, might contain virtually undetectable 
amounts of GM material (CGSB, 2004); consequently it could be difficult to conform 
to the specified threshold level and, subsequently, to label this type of food.   
Once voluntarily labelling of GMF became allowable, it would need to comply with 
additional required information that should be related to the method of producing 
genetic change, give details of why a particular method was used, and it would also 
have to provide further information and explanatory statements on GM ingredients. 
Furthermore, a verification process was created, which relied on the provision of 
detailed descriptions of the management system used to maintain the identity of the 
GM ingredient. Testing methods would have to be chosen for verification purposes, 
complicating even further the wish to voluntarily label GMF. 
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6.3 The Mexican perspective 
 
The inclusion of maize in the NAFTA is the result of many critical situations that 
Mexico was experiencing prior to signing the agreement. Due to the debt crisis of 
1982, the Mexican government began a liberalisation strategy in an attempt to get 
mostly needed new sources of capital and investment. Crucial to this was reaching 
agreements with the IMF, the USA, and with the WTO, encouraging exports through 
plants on the US border, and amending investment rules (O‟Brien, 1995: 707). All 
these went through jointly with a series of measures to liberalise Mexico‟s foreign 
economic relations. From then on, an agenda aimed at a series of liberalisations in 
Mexico was set up. As provided by the USA-Mexico Framework Agreement,
179
 an 
acceleration of import liberalisation took place. In addition, the publication of 
Mexico‟s Foreign Investment Regulations,180 allowing majority foreign ownership of 
companies, resulted in foreign capital moving to Mexico at a rapid rate in the form of 
loans, rather than direct investment. Under these circumstances it was that the 
Mexican government started to seek a free trade deal with the USA and Canada. In 
fact, Mexicans were well aware of the accomplishments of the Canada-USA Free 
Trade Agreement of 1989 and wanted to emulate a similar success. Nevertheless, the 
primary Mexican concern in NAFTA negotiations was not on trade matters; instead it 
was to create an institutional structure that would bolster investor confidence.  
 
Mexico desperately needed the return of capital to its country to maintain 
economic growth. Investors had to be assured that if they bought Mexican bonds, 
the peso [Mexican currency] would not be devalued and that if they bought 
Mexican assets, they would not lose value. NAFTA would cement the 
liberalisation process, reassuring investors that any future government would 
find it difficult to return to protectionist policies (O‟Brien, 1995: 710). 
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Thus, it looked like gaining access to the American market would foster investment 
in Mexico. At the end, investment was included in the NAFTA under the heading of 
Chapter 11.  
 
All these liberal ideas and strategies were proposed by US-educated technocrats in 
the bureaucracy, which meant that the adoption of liberal economic principles was 
primarily state-led. This thus meant low participation of civil society in this type of 
decisions. Nevertheless, the society was aware of the proposals for a NAFTA, and 
they were initially resistant to this deal due, mainly, to the 1982 crisis and 
disenchantment on politicians. But it was the selling of the NAFTA as a chance to 
join the „first world‟ when the agreement found popular resonance. This thus left the 
Mexican government with room to manoeuvre the free trade deal. However, civil 
society was not aware of the whole range of sectors to be included in the agreement. 
Sensitive crops, like maize, were negotiated carefully, as expressed below, while 
biotechnology or GMF were not even referred to in the agreement, perhaps as the 
implicit result of the consideration of equivalence between GMF and non-GMF as 
agreed under WTO rules, or because GM crops were not much of an issue in the early 
1990s.  
 
Prior to the NAFTA, policies on maize were dealt with carefully due to its cultural 
and social inferences. As this crop is an essential staple food for the country, on 
which the low-income stratum depends heavily,
181
 the government was increasing its 
production for local consumption since 1970. In this regard, the commercialisation of 
maize was considered a strategic activity for the government: it embraced a network 
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 Prior to the drafting of the NAFTA, around 75 percent of the population was getting a large part of 
its caloric and nutritional needs from maize (Guerrero Andrade, 2005: 20). Besides which, roughly a 
third of the population lived in rural areas, from which up to 60 percent of workers were engaged in 
agriculture, and maize production accounted for the largest workforce (Levy and Van Wijnbergen, 
1992: 15 – 17). 
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of different important social groups that had numerous members
182
 (Guerrero 
Andrade, 2005: 33). The government adopted a policy directed to reduce and 
maintain low maize prices by increasing subsidies as a response to free market 
activities boosting prices worldwide (Brambila-Paz, 1987: 78). In order to achieve 
this, governmental agencies like CONASUPO, had to control an important share of 
the maize market.
183
 This became extremely costly for the government, which argued 
that subsidisation was reaching not just the needy classes, but society as a whole. To 
complicate matters, Mexico was having difficulties paying its external debt and could 
no longer afford to allocate huge consumer subsidies to maize, particularly in an era 
of globalisation that was seeking liberalisation in a number of areas.
184
  To cope with 
the situation, a series of short-term policies were implemented,
185
 and these were 
followed until NAFTA negotiations began.   
 
The subsequent adoption of a similar regulatory framework to that of North American 
trading partners, in terms of maize liberalisation, would result in a change in policy 
direction.  Such a move would not pose a problem for Mexico, though, as the USA 
was selling 72 percent of its maize worldwide and could easily meet Mexican 
demands (Appendini, 2001: 218). 
 
In spite of the vast economic disparity between Mexico and the United States and the 
relative size of their productive areas, contrary to what many people thought, Mexico 
did not have to take a subordinate role to the United States when negotiating terms.  
                                                          
182
 Guerrero Andrade lists agricultural peasants, farmers with deficit production, and urban workers as 
those whose alimentation is based on maize. Around 15 to 18 million Mexicans depend on maize 
production for their sustenance (2005: 33). 
183
 For example, CONASUPO increased its share in 1970 from 15 to 33 percent, reaching 50 percent in 
1980 (Brambila-Paz, 1987: 80, 211). 
184
 At the time, the state-regulated maize market was co-existing with other agricultural crops already    
liberalised (Guerrero Andrade, 2005: 34). 
185
 Examples are subsidised water for maize producers, guaranteed prices, subsidised credits, and the 
creation of a replacement for the traditional maize input. 
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Indeed, these inequalities were to favour Mexico.
186
 However, the agricultural chapter 
proved to be one of the most polemic aspects with which to deal because the 
American agricultural sector was characterised by transnational companies producing 
big-scale processed food, as opposed to the Mexican sector, in which small-scale 
farmers were the main feature. This would presuppose that Mexico would be eager to 
protect its agricultural status quo. However, the Mexican government praised 
otherwise with the purpose to provide arguments to the American Congress on its 
viability by giving concessions to the American agricultural private sector. Such 
action was seen as an incentive to discourage the imposition of politically 
unacceptable conditions on Mexico (Lasana Blanco, 2003: 63 – 64). Despite Mexican 
eagerness to include maize in NAFTA,
187
 the USA was expressing concerns about the 
issue due to potential social and political consequences. One of the worries of the 
American drafters was that their Congress would not accept inclusion since this might 
result in a reduction in the wages of American workers if a cheap Mexican labour 
force were to illegally migrate to the USA and take up employment (Weintraub, 
1992: 46). The initial belief had been that the FTA would guarantee Mexico‟s 
economic growth while reducing illegal migration (White House, 1992). In this 
context, Mexican negotiators were questioned as to their intentions and their answer 
was that Mexican farmers would need to cultivate more profitable products
188
 (Von 
Bertrab, 1997: 55).  So the decision to include maize trade in the agreements was 
taken independently by Mexico. Trade barriers associated with maize would be 
completely eliminated, although grain would be dealt with in the category of „sensible 
products‟.189  On a reciprocal basis, Mexico would request access to vegetables, 
fruits, and, mainly, sugar. This in turn would necessitate negotiations for a wider 
                                                          
186
 Indeed, Mexico was „forced‟ to cede in many aspects of the agreement. However, this was not the 
case with maize, as has been explained. 
187
 It is noticeable that the Mexican officials who pushed for the inclusion of maize and dealt with the 
agricultural chapter of the NAFTA were not officials of the Ministry of Agriculture, but came from the 
Ministry of Commerce (Lasana Blanco, 203: 67). 
188
 The liberalisation of maize crops in Mexico started before NAFTA negotiations took place. It dates 
back to the late 1980s, and was aimed at reducing price subsidisation of the crop.  
189
 The NAFTA has gradually eliminated tariffs over different periods of time: immediately it came 
into force, and then in periods of five, ten, and fourteen years. Agriculture is included in the latter 
period. 
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agricultural agreement, considered risky by the American delegation since it would 
go against the interests of influential American farmers lobbying the American 
Congress. 
 
The inclusion of maize in NAFTA allowed the then Mexican government to reduce 
the political costs of liberalising the agricultural sector (Domínguez, 1998: 30). By 
arguing that it was a sacrifice imposed from the outside but that it would return 
benefits in medium and long terms, the government would gain greater 
manoeuvrability when reforming broader agricultural policies.
190
  However, there was 
dissent from within the Mexican negotiating team. The argument was that linking 
maize to NAFTA would not just increase food dependency on the USA, but would 
also reduce governmental control over transnational companies controlling grain 
markets which were starting to operate in the country. In spite of these disagreements 
within the government, the final position was that maize was soon going to be 
included in the agreement and that full advantage should be taken out of it. (Lasana 
Blanco, 2003: 86, 89). 
With the inclusion of maize in NAFTA, control over maize imports was transferred 
from the governmental sphere to a reduced number of companies that had nexuses 
with the administration of the time.
191
  Some of them were working towards a 
transnational environment with biotechnology as its main purpose, and were also 
acquiring Mexican-owned factories producing maize flour.
192
  This would mean that 
imported maize used to produce maize flour could contain GM maize. However, as 
                                                          
190
 The reforms comprised the reduction and cancellation of subsidies, the modification to the legal 
basis of land ownership and property, the approximation of national prices with international prices, 
credit selection and privatisation (Lasana Blanco, 2003: 79). 
191
 Some of the companies that were importing maize were transnational like Anderson Clayton, 
Continental, Pilgrim‟s Pride, Purina, and Cargill. Subsequently (1998), the latter formed an association 
with Monsanto. 
192
 For example, the company Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), which has links with Novartis, 
acquired 22 per cent of Maseca shares in 1994, Maseca being one of the two main maize flour 
producers in the country (Lasana Blanco, 2003: 96). 
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GM products were considered equal with others in the USA, there was no label to 
identify when, where, and how GM maize was being introduced into the country.  
 
The Mexican government argued that maize needed to be liberalised due to its 
inefficient production in Mexico compared with that of the USA
193
 and because of the 
comparative advantages Mexico had when cultivating other crops. At the same time, 
there was a counter-argument stating that maize imports were the result of a financial 
arrangement rather than as a strategy to level down maize prices or to counter 
reduced production
194
 (De Ita, 2007). If the latter was the real reason behind opening 
up the sector, then it would be possible to speak of a business-influenced agricultural 
agreement instead of a competitive approach as used in the government rhetoric, 
stating, effectively, that competitiveness would be encouraged only for big companies 
working with industrialised maize. This was because the governmental elite gave 
priority to the interests of national and foreign companies, which would benefit from 
secured access to American corn, rather than to the interests of small farmers (Nadal, 
2004: 156). However, as Lasana Blanco (2003: 126) points out, the inclusion of 
maize in FTA was also the result of the lack of organisation by small farmers when 
articulating their demands and trying to exert pressure.
195
 As a consequence, there 
was no opposition to the consensus taken among the governmental elite and in 
influential businesses. 
 
                                                          
193
 Historically, production in Mexico reaches 2 tons per hectare, while production in the USA reaches 
an average of 11 tons per hectare, although the Mexican government did not relate such a disparity to 
the fact that American farmers use capital-based methods, sustained with heavy machinery, agro-
chemical resources, and transgenic seeds (Nadal, 2004: 158 – 9). In addition, environmental conditions 
suitable for the cultivation of the crop are ideal in the American mid-west, as opposed to those in 
Mexico, where maize has mutated to adapt to diverse geographical conditions which have, in fact, 
become an advantage for Mexican farmers. 
194
 The USA supports agricultural exports through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) through 
which maize importers get credits with long-term payments (De Ita, 2007). 
195
 The lack of organisation of small farmers was related to the political situation that Mexico was 
having at the time: the government was subsidising production and was promising to keep so doing in 
order to make it possible for the farmers to compete with their American counterparts (Appendini, 
2001: 225). 
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It can be argued that a mix of technological disadvantages in Mexican farming and 
the financial interest of big companies were the determining factors in opening maize 
trade in Mexico. There is a common aspect here which relates to the specific features 
of Mexican maize.  By deciding that it was better to import maize rather than to 
produce it, the Mexican government not only gave transnational companies control 
over the maize market, it also empowered the emerging biotech industry in the 
country because liberalisation would not only allow GM maize to access the Mexican 
market but also allow the possibility of taking over control of national maize 
production due to small farmers moving to urban centres.
196
 The interest of the 
biotech industry in Mexican maize was stimulated by the maize‟s genetic 
characteristics,
197
 which could offer new scientific insights for the development of 
new and different GM maize varieties.  
 
Perhaps with an aim to ease concerns inherited from the previous Mexican 
administration,
198
 the following one
199
 launched two public programmes to support 
small farmers who wished to continue to produce maize, so that they could 
compensate for the American subsidies to the sector and to prepare them for the time 
when maize would be completely liberalised.
200
 Running counter to this, and in the 
view of Guerrero Andrade (2005: 170, 182), governmental intervention was not 
aimed at improving small farmers‟ competitiveness,201 but at administrating their 
exclusion from the market by negotiating the longest possible period for tariff 
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 Making small farmers move to cities was part of the strategy of liberalising the agricultural sector. 
Mexican officials thought this action could reduce rural poverty. 
197
 Mexican maize has developed in several naturally-achieved genetic varieties that can overcome a 
number of agro-ecological obstacles posed by diverse regions, weather, altitudes, and soil 
characteristics (Naval, 2004: 159). This is the result of traditional farmers continually experimenting 
with their maize landraces, crossing them with other maize varieties to see if they can improve the 
quality of their maize crop (CIMMYT, 2002: 2). 
198
 The NAFTA was conceived, drafted, and signed during the administration of former president 
Carlos Salinas (1988 – 1994).  
199
 The administration of former president Ernesto Zedillo was in operation from 1994 to 2000. 
200
 Programa de Apoyos Directos al Campo and the Alianza para el Campo (1994). 
201
 He makes this point because there was a absence of support for research, technical assistance, and 
other types of aid needed to develop the maize industry. 
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reduction. The transition period, during which such tariffs and quotas would be 
completely phased out, would end by January 2008 (Morales-Moreno, 2004).  
 
6.3.1 Position of the Mexican Government: Legal framework 
 
When commercial GM maize was first released in the USA in 1995 (that is, a year 
after NAFTA was brought into force), the Mexican government took action on the 
matter. The Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and 
Alimentation (SAGARPA) published a proposal
202
 for an official norm
203
 that would 
eventually enter into force the following year. Official norm NOM-056-FITO-1995 
established the phytosanitary requirements for the handling, import, and experimental 
cultivation of GMOs at a time when, according to SAGARPA, no other regulation or 
international recommendation existed. It was commented in such norm that one of the 
requirements was that any person, institution or company aiming to release into the 
environment or to import a transgenic product would need to hand in a phytosanitary 
certificate. Moreover, any move of the GM product from within Mexico would entail 
notifying in writing to the General Direction for Vegetal Health.
204
 Certificate 
information had to include the scientific name and the commercial name so as to 
identify the organisms modified in a given product. In addition, the packing methods, 
travelling routes and location maps, reasons for importing and moving the GM 
product, destruction process, description of biotechnology process to use, and impact 
assessments were compulsory issues to include in the certificate. With respect to 
labelling, the official norm stated that the GM product to be released, moved, and/or 
imported should be identified with visible labels containing information related to the 
nature and quantity of the product, country of origin, contact details of importer, 
                                                          
202
 The proposal for an official norm was published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación on 20 
November 1995.  
203
 An official norm is the name of each of a series of official, compulsory standards and regulations 
for diverse activities. 
204
 The General Direction for Vegetal Health is part of the structure of the Ministry for Agriculture, 
Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Alimentation (SAGARPA). 
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transporter, and receiver, and phytosanitary certificate number. Therefore, it is 
assumed that by filling in and handing in this certificate the product in question was 
of GM origin. In fact, additional information, in the form of a document stating the 
phytosanitary requirements covered and biosecurity measures taken for the import of 
transgenic products into the compilation of documents, was compulsorily adjoined to 
the certificate.  
  
In 1997, the General Law on Health was amended with the addition of a Chapter 
regulating biotechnology products.
205
 In such, there was the need to inform the 
Ministry of Health about these products when destined for human consumption. 
Labelling was contemplated as according to official norm NOM-056-FITO-1995. 
This action was agreed as stated in the Regulation of the General Law of Health with 
respect to Marketing,
206
 which contains specific legal outlooks on the marketing of 
GMOs in its Chapter 10. In reference to this, it was stated that GM products cannot 
be advertised under three assumptions: firstly, as having attributes different to those 
for which they were evaluated; secondly, as being indispensable for human life; or 
thirdly, as being of a quality higher than conventional products (Art. 70). Moreover, 
this Regulation allowed the Ministry of Health to determine the cases when it was 
deemed necessary to advertise precautionary or warning messages that a given GM 
product recipient may need to contain (Art. 71). 
 
There are other laws that also relate to biotechnology, although they cover the issue 
from different perspectives. About this, the Federal Law on Vegetal Health
207
 
establishes that the use of GM material for experimental purposes is subject to a 
                                                          
205
 Ley General de Salud, published on 5 January, 2009 in the Diario Oficial de la Federación. 
206
 Reglamento de la Ley General de Salud en materia de Publicidad, published on 31 May 2009 in the 
Diario Oficial de la Federación. 
207
 Ley Federal de Sanidad Vegetal, published on 26 July 2007 in the Diario Oficial de la Federación. 
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phytosanitary certificate. The Law on Production, Certification and Trade of Seeds
208
 
states the duty to request authorisation for researching GM material, the requirements 
for importing seeds, and the respective verification methods. The General Law on 
Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection
209
 is another legislation that 
contains multiple references to GM material under the scope of „genetic resource‟, 
and sets the general legislative framework with respect to environmental regulation. 
The Federal Law of Vegetal Varieties
210
 focuses on the intellectual properties of 
vegetal GMOs. The Regulation on Health Control of Products and Services
211
 points 
at regulating foods, ingredients, and additives derived from any biotechnology 
method. This is done with the aim of ensuring health and stability of such products.  
 
Despite these legislations, doubts resided on the quantities of GM maize being 
introduced to Mexico, rather than on whether it was introduced.  
 
Sources at the US Department of Agriculture report that 34% of the US maize area 
was planted to transgenic maize in 2002, and it is quite possible that some of the 
maize imported into Mexico was transgenic (CIMMYT, 2002: 2). 
 
Despite this report being from 2002, a previous statement explained that GM maize 
was potentially being imported to Mexico, although the quantities have been 
unknown. Information from previous years corroborates this by stating that Cargill 
was importing around 40 percent of maize to Mexico in 1999 (Guerrero Andrade, 
2005: 195). 
                                                          
208
 Ley sobre Producción, Certificación y Comercio de Semillas, published on 15 June 2007 in the 
Diario Oficial de la Federación. 
209
 Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente, published on 16 May 2008 in 
the Diario Oficial de la Federación. 
210
 Ley Federal de Variedades Vegetales, published on 25 October 1996 in the Diario Oficial de la 
Federación. 
211
 Reglamento de Control Sanitario de Productos y Servicios, published on 10 January 1988 in the 
Diario Oficial de la Federación. 
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With regard to research, there have been funds allocated on plant biotechnology, 
which would come from both public and private resources (CIMMYT, 2004). This 
has been the case of CIMMYT, which considers the development of GM maize and 
GM wheat varieties as essential contributors to its main goals (CIMMYT, 2004). 
Importantly however, public funding has been reduced, and private funds have been 
adjusted according to the situation pertaining at the time and according to expected 
future market conditions (Matus Gardea et al, 1990: 44). Despite this, interest in the 
GMF sector has been increasing due to the vast natural resources and varieties of 
maize that Mexico possesses. Thus, despite the late approach to GMF in terms of 
research in the country, developments parallel to the founding and implementation of 
NAFTA resulted in an increasing number of scientific assessments in biotechnology, 
which either support or oppose GMF. One example about this was the assessment of 
potential effects on the diversity of maize. Biologists discovered in 2001 that 
transgenic DNA had been discovered in native maize (Quist and Chapela, 2001). 
Almost simultaneously to this development, in 1998, the Mexican government was 
decreeing a moratorium
212
 on the introduction of GM maize seed into the country
213
 
(Ostroff, 2004). This was made with the argument of Mexico being the centre of 
maize diversity, and that the introduction of GM seeds would exacerbate losing such 
diversity. Another argument was the concern that at least 30 percent of maize 
imported from the USA by 1998 would be transgenic, of which a great chance existed 
of being used for cultivation in open areas (SAGARPA, 2005).  
 
                                                          
212
 The moratorium was the result of a study made by the National Council of Science and Technology 
(CONACYT), and was suggested to SAGARPA by the National Committee on Agricultural 
Biosecurity. The General Direction of Vegetal Health established the moratorium through an official 
document sent to people interested in requesting authorisation for experimental release of GM maize 
under the scope of official norm NOM-056-FITO-1995 (SAGARPA, 2005). 
213
 Between 1993 and 1998, 22 trials were permitted under conditions of extreme environmental 
security, but from 1999 no other request was granted. This was because phytosanitary certificates were 
temporarily suspended (SAGARPA, 2005). 
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By January 2002, the Mexican government further reported higher percentages of 
GM maize in communities where the crop had been found previously, as well as in 
Diconsa stores, the government‟s food distribution agency, where 37 percent of the 
grains were found to be transgenic (ENS, 2004). In this context, the CIBIOGEM
214
 
considered adequate lifting the moratorium as it was posing limits to scientific 
research, and thus stopping biotechnology benefits from offering substantial 
improvement in the cultivation of maize.
215
 Thus, lifting the moratorium would imply 
to admit new requests for environmental release of GM maize with research 
purposes
216
 (CIBIOGEM, 2004). However, the Commission for Agriculture and 
Livestock of the Mexican Congress exhorted the Executive Government to instruct 
the Ministries conforming CIBIOGEM to preserve the moratorium status on the 
experimental cultivation of maize until a federal law was set up (Senado de la 
República, 2004/d). 
 
In this context, three legislative initiatives to deal with GMF were presented to the 
Mexican Congress but did not become law because the congressmen who proposed 
them failed to raise enough support from their parties or the rest of Congress to 
discuss such initiatives. The first one dates back to 4 April 2001, and it relates to the 
inclusion of a paragraph in Article 282 of the General Law on Health to make 
compulsory the labelling of all GM products destined for human consumption. Also 
without success was the initiative suggested for a law on the production, distribution, 
commercialisation, control and encouragement of GM products proposed on 2 
October of the same year. Finally, by 23 October, 2001, three articles were proposed 
for inclusion in the Federal Law of Consumer Protection, which sought to inform 
consumers on the existence and characteristics of GM products. 
 
                                                          
214
 CIBIOGEM is the Inter-Ministry Commission of Biosecurity of Genetically Modified Organisms. It 
is formed by SAGARPA, SEMARNAT, Health, Education, Treasury, and Economy. 
215
 Agreement 06.02.03, Meeting 02.03 of CIBIOGEM, dated 13 August 2003. 
216
 Comments made by Dr. Víctor Villalobos Arámbula, who was Executive Secretary of CIBIOGEM 
at the time. Retrieved from CIBIOGEM (2004). 
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It was not until March, 2005, that a Law on Bio-security and Genetically Modified 
Organisms (LBOGM)
217
 was established. Its main purpose has been to regulate the 
research and commercial activities of GMOs with an aim to prevent, avoid and 
reduce potential risks to human health, to the environment, and to biodiversity 
(LBOGM, 2005). To achieve this, it established the role that the following Ministries 
would have in the applicability of the law: the Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, 
Rural Development, Fisheries and Alimentation (SAGARPA); the Ministry of Health 
(SSA), and the Ministry for the Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT). 
The latter would participate in case of potential release of GMOs into the 
environment. Furthermore, it established the National System of Information on 
Biodiversity, and the National Registry of Biodiversity of GMOs. The general public, 
the private and social sectors, as well as the producers, would be consulted when 
releasing GMOs into the environment. Security measures would be based on 
technical and scientific grounds, with the lack of scientific evidence not considered an 
indicator of a potential risk or its absence. This was because LBOGM would focus 
clearly on the experimental release into the environment as well as on research with 
educational, scientific, commercial and industrial purposes. 
 
A key development of LBOGM was the protection of certain territories against 
scientific research and the release of GMOs since they were considered centres of 
origin and biodiversity for specific crops. This was the case with maize, for which 
warranties were provided after genetically modified DNA was found in those centres 
of origin. This aspect was developed from the position on the moratorium that was 
issued in 1998. 
 
With regard to labelling, the LBOGM listed two articles. The first Article (101) states 
that GMF should be labelled without prejudice to the usual labelling requirements 
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 The abbreviation LBOGM responds to the Spanish name of the law. Published in the Diario Oficial 
de la Federación on 18 March 2005. 
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issued by SSA, when its characteristics are significantly different from those of 
conventional food.  This was not the case in seeds destined for agricultural 
production, for which a compulsory labelling system indicating the features of the 
genetic modification and their implications for cultivation was established. The 
requirements for this type of labelling would be agreed upon following national 
standards and international treaties of which Mexico was a signatory. The second 
Article (102) established that labels should state the reason behind using any GM 
seed. 
 
After the LBOGM was issued, on 30 October 2006, there was another proposal from 
within the Senate calling for an amendment to the General Law on Health.
218
  This 
law already considered the existence of GM products (Art. 282 bis), as well as the 
necessary notifications when these products were destined for human consumption 
(Art. 282 bis 1). However, in order to improve settings of this law, the initiative 
aimed at labelling all GM products and respective derivatives. This was due to what 
the legislator proposing it considered as a handicap for world agriculture. The Senate 
ruled that, despite GMF being controversial and that there could be long term 
consequences, there was no need to rule on the matter. The reason for this ruling was 
that the issue was already contemplated in the LBOGM, in which it is stated that 
GMF should be labelled according to the official norms issued by the Ministry of 
Health, informing of the GM status only if the characteristics of the products were 
significantly different to those of conventional products. 
 
Three years after the LBOGM was published, additional regulations supporting the 
LBOGM were set up (RLBOGM).
219
 In such, detailed steps of the processes to 
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 Proposal amending Article 282 bis 3 of the General Law of Health. It was sent by Senator Mr. 
Manuel Velasco Coello, from the Green Party, to the Joint Commission for Health and Legislative 
Studies of the Mexican Senate. 
219
 Reglamento de la Ley de Bioseguridad de Organismos Genéticamente Modificados was published 
on 19 March 2008 in the Diario Oficial de la Federación. 
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follow, jointly with the required documentation, were included for cases when 
importing GMOs and releasing them with either agricultural or commercial purposes. 
License requests for environmental release, monitoring measures for GMO 
cultivation and human protection, equivalence studies in case of consumption, as well 
as legal assurances that the GMO in question has already been released in the country 
of origin were also set up. However, no explicit mention was granted for labels as 
they would be established by official norms.
220
 Overall, RLBOGM became 
controversial among NGOs and civil society because they established the possibility 
to cultivate and import GM maize, although this would be granted on a case by case 
basis and under strict assessment procedures (CIBIOGEM, 2010). For this, 
authorisation requests for releasing GM maize into the environment would be 
evaluated, once they fulfil the appropriate law requirements to be developed by 
SAGARPA and SEMARNAT in the future.  
 
By 2009, official norm NOM-056-FITO-1995, which set up the requirements to 
which GM products should adhere to was cancelled.
221
 The argument behind this 
decision was that the LBOGM was of a higher hierarchical level,
222
 and that its 
additional regulations foresaw the elaboration of newer official norms. This was 
necessary so as to adequate new norms to the issues that prevail in the LBOGM.
223
 
Further to cancelling official norm NOM-056-FITO-1995, the moratorium on GM 
maize was lifted by September of 2009. In this respect, CIBIOGEM (2010) 
commented that the conditions in which Mexico was a decade earlier were very 
different to those at the time of issuing the RLBOGM. This was because the 
moratorium was established at a time when Mexico was not part of an international 
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 Referred to official norm NOM-056-FITO-1995. 
221
 Cancellation announcement (Aviso de cancelación de la Norma Oficial Mexicana NOM-056-FITO-
1995, por la que se establecen los requisitos fitosanitarios para la movilización nacional, importación, 
y establecimiento de pruebas de campo de organismos manipulados mediante la aplicación de 
ingeniería genética) was made on 22 June 2009 in the Diario Oficial de la Federación.  
222
 While LBOGM is a law, NOM-056-FITO-1995 is merely a norm. 
223
 At present, no new official norms have been issued to replace NOM-056-FITO-1995 (SENASICA, 
2010). 
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agreement regulating cross-boundary transfer of GMOs, and did not have a national 
law regulating them. But the LBOGM and its respective RLBOGM were now 
providing legal instruments that assured appropriate and secure use of biotechnology 
methods. Thus, lifting the moratorium would allow generating information that would 
assist in answering scientific questions on the transgenic sequences of maize, while 
assuring the protection of centres of origin and of genetic diversity. Weeks after, 
SAGARPA and SEMARNAT granted 15 approvals for experimental cultivation in 
some regions of the country.
224
  
 
6.4 Development of the NAFTA’s regulatory framework on GM 
maize labelling 
 
By analysing the GMO context of each NAFTA nation-state, some observations are 
drawn. First, labelling is compulsory when indicating potential health risks, like the 
presence of allergens, and not for indicating GM status. Secondly, labelling is an 
option in Canada and the USA if producers want their GM product to be labelled, 
whereas Mexican law does not provide for voluntary labelling. Thirdly, Mexico 
requires compulsory labelling for all maize seeds due to specific internal features.  
 
Despite not being explicitly included in the NAFTA, biotechnological production and 
commercialisation of maize has been handled through two bilateral agreements in 
which the USA appears as the signatory on both. The first one dates from 4 
December 1998, and is a „Comprehension Action Plan‟ between Canada and the USA 
regarding areas of agricultural trade. This mainly reaffirmed American and Canadian 
commitments to market-oriented agricultural policies, which could be achieved by 
encouraging their industry associations to work together, as long as it would be 
consistent with international trade agreements. They also pledged to use a science-
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 Of the 15 approvals, 9 were granted to Monsanto, while Dow AgroScience obtained 6. 
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based approach to regulate biotechnology products, including GM maize, where the 
regulation related to the product itself, and not to the process used to develop it. 
Following a 1998 „Technical Agreement on the Regulatory Requirements for the 
Assessment of Specific Aspects of Transgenic Plants‟, both nation-states committed 
themselves to compare and conjoin, where possible, their regulatory review 
processes. In addition, they made a commitment to discuss and prioritise future areas 
of cooperation and information exchange, which would facilitate the safe 
incorporation of GM crops into agricultural production and trade (USFDA, 1998). To 
achieve this, they would need to consider their international contractual obligations 
and the 1998 Technical Agreement therefore complied with the UN Biosafety 
Protocol. It also meant that both the USA and Canada shared common views on 
biotechnology in the context of the SPS and TBT Agreements. These aspects would 
in turn be observed in the context of OECD, the Codex Alimentarius and APEC, in 
which the use of a science-based approach would be encouraged. Labelling issues 
were also included in the Comprehension Action Plan, although focus was related to 
that of „country of origin‟ requirements as stated under NAFTA and WTO, and not 
on the potential GM status of any given product, given the method of product 
homologation regardless of the process employed. In fact, there was a statement 
rejecting the unjustified use of measures as barriers to legitimate trade. Among 
others, labels may have been considered as such measures. 
 
Within the bilateral context, the USA also signed a „Cooperative Agreement‟ with 
Mexico in 2001 to enhance activities of mutual interest on the safety of foods for 
human consumption. Such an agreement would include the involvement of the 
Agriculture and Health Ministries of both nations. It would also commend the 
participation of non-governmental actors such as consumer groups, industry 
representatives, and academia. In the Agreement, it was „affirmed‟ that the intention 
was to strengthen scientific and public health protection activities, including 
biotechnology and labelling. By exchanging information and developing joint 
programmes, the identification of regulatory and scientific standards was proposed 
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wherever there was potential for immediate and future harmonisation (USDA, 2001). 
In addition, emphasis was placed on a commitment to confidentiality on the 
information they would exchange, but which would need to take into account the 
information that should be accessible to the public. 
 
These two bilateral agreements have allowed the setting up of a regulatory framework 
that has had implications in the context of NAFTA, despite the FTA not implicitly 
mentioning matters on biotechnology. For example, environmental concerns on the 
development of GM maize in the USA and Mexico have led interest groups to direct 
their efforts towards a regional institution created in the context of NAFTA through 
an auxiliary environmental agreement. This is the case with Mexican farmers and 
ENGOs, who, supported by more than ninety organisations and institutions within the 
three nation-states, filed a legal request in April 2002 to the North American 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC)
225
 for an investigation into the 
reasons and implications of transgenics found in conventional maize varieties (ENS, 
2004). 
 
Pursuant to Article 13 of the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation (NAAEC), which authorises CEC to conduct studies on environmental-
related matters affecting North America, CEC submitted a report on issues related to 
the protection of plant genetic diversity for maize, in which the assessment of both 
risks and benefits would constitute the greater part.  Following standard procedures, 
an advisory group, formed by experts on ecology, biotechnology, law, economics and 
public policy was designated to compile the report, which had to include an input 
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 The role of the CEC has been that of ensuring the enforcement of environmental laws in the three 
nation-states, while addressing environmental challenges and opportunities presented by continent-
wide free trade. Nevertheless, it enjoys only limited enforcement power, as it is an intergovernmental 
institution established by an auxiliary environmental agreement with the NAFTA, the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC).  
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from international and national groups and organisations, the private sector, interested 
members of the public, as well as from the governments of the three nations (CEC, 
2002). 
 
The CEC report issued a series of recommendations starting with the preservation and 
enforcement of the 1998 moratorium on maize seeds imports. To begin with, it 
advised the labelling of all maize imported from the USA as either containing GM 
maize or else certified as GM-free. This would not include Canada, though, as she did 
not export bulk maize to Mexico. In case American or Canadian maize was not 
certified as GM-free, it was suggested that it should be milled into flour at the 
American border so as to prevent transgenic seeds from being planted in Mexico. 
Another recommendation was that the Mexican government should notify local 
farmers that maize distributed by Diconsa was likely to contain GM maize and that 
grain bags should be labelled accordingly.  This stipulation was based on the 
argument that the introgression of traditional maize could not be considered simply a 
national problem because the effect on the genetic biodiversity of Mexican maize 
could have direct repercussions on the biodiversity of maize and ecosystems in all of 
North America (ENS, 2004). For this purpose, it was suggested that the assessment 
and management of bio-safety risks should be approached through greater 
coordination of research and regulatory policies in all three countries, such as 
proposed under the North American Biotechnology Initiative (NABI). This would 
entail that proponents of GM products would have to make coordinated applications 
for regulatory reviews in all three markets, although the commercial release of a GM 
product simultaneously in all markets was a matter of concern. 
 
To ensure complete regulatory oversight, there should be greater information 
exchange among regulators in the three countries in order that no products are 
released without the knowledge of all three governments. Ideally, harmonisation 
151 
 
should address risks both specific to individual countries and those common to one 
or more of the countries (CEC, 2004: 31). 
 
There were other aspects that CEC brought into focus which were related to the 
exclusion of GM maize from Mexican territory.  Listed among them were 
programmes with the aim of educating farmers in the avoidance of planting 
transgenic seeds and even of not planting American seeds at all. 
 
The report provoked strong protests from the USA and Canada. Their governments 
claimed that the report was fundamentally flawed and unscientific (CEC, 2004), 
because key recommendations were not based on sound science and were 
contradicted by the report‟s own scientific findings. They contended that the report 
failed to consider the potential benefits of biotechnology.  They complained, too, that 
the report lacked economic analysis, while too much emphasis was placed on socio-
cultural considerations. In this regard, USA officials, through the EPA 
(Environmental Protection Agency) and the USTR (U.S. Trade Representative), 
considered that following the report‟s recommendations would cause economic harm 
to farmers and consumers across the three NAFTA nations and restrict international 
trade because of the portrayed equivalence between GM and conventional products. 
Canada encouraged the development of a Mexican regulatory framework to deal with 
this matter with Environment Canada, the agency in charge of commenting on the 
report, arguing that the level of protection should be consistent with Mexico‟s 
international obligations.  The Canadian representative considered that 
recommendations should take full account of commitments reached under the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity 
(CPB), NAFTA, and WTO guidelines such as the SPS Agreement and the TBT 
Agreement. Emphasis was placed on the latter two, since Environment Canada 
considered that risk assessment and the regulation of GM products should be science-
based and no more trade restrictive than necessary. In case there was insufficient 
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information upon which to take a protective decision, there was the possibility of 
adopting provisional measures within a reasonable period of time.  Even so, 
Environment Canada stated that such measures should be adopted according to 
relevant international standards. 
 
The proposal by the CEC to rely on the work and objectives of NABI was welcomed 
by the national governments. In March 2005, it was formally established under the 
Prosperity Agenda of the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North 
America. The necessity for increased cooperation between each nation‟s regulatory 
policy on agricultural biotechnology was observed. This would partially achieve the 
aim of maintaining high standards of health and safety for North American citizens, 
while enhancing the competitive position of North American industries throughout 
the world. A proposal was tabled for the elimination of „redundant testing and 
certification requirements‟ (White House, 2005).  To cope with these duties a Food 
and Agriculture Regulatory Systems Working Group (FARS) was created, and three 
initiatives were put into place. The first was designed to support NABI in the 
initiation, coordination and prioritisation of various biotech activities: it was proposed 
that by March 2006, Mexican regulators would be included in the technical regulatory 
exchanges between Canada and the USA, leading to the formalisation of trilateral 
regulatory exchanges. The second initiative, working towards developing common 
approaches for regulatory policies, was realised by establishing training workshops in 
Mexico for risk assessors, also in March 2006. The third initiative would place its 
emphasis on the cooperation and sharing of information on international 
biotechnology activities.  A proposal for a NABI intercessional conference to discuss 
biotechnology issues in international organisations, such as Codex, OECD, and CBD, 
was submitted for March 2007 (FAITC, 2005). According to data from SSP, in 2006 
the first initiative was in operation and on an ongoing basis; the second was delayed 
until August of 2006, and the third initiative was considered to be fulfilling its brief. 
To date, little is known about the progress of NABI and the efforts of FARS to realise 
the initiatives because this information is for official use only and not open to the 
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public.
226
  Therefore, it could be understood that the ministries with access to this 
confidential information are CFIA and AAFC from Canada; SAGARPA, SSA, and 
SECON from Mexico; and USDA, USFDA and EPA from the USA. 
Beyond its biotechnological involvement, the FARS Working Group is concerned 
with pursuing a standardised guideline for food safety and labelling, although this is 
undertaken outside its biotechnology remit.  By so doing it is reinforcing the criteria 
adopted by the three nation-states in their wish to avoid linking GMF and labels. 
There is also the prospect of coordination between the respective laboratories to build 
confidence regarding testing procedures and results. 
 
6.4.1 GMF developments outside the remit of the NAFTA text 
 
Besides these issues obtained through the NAFTA – CEC context, there have been 
aspects about labelling agreed at the trilateral level. In this sense, the Agreement 
establishing the Documentation Requirements for Living Modified Organisms for 
Food, Feed, or Processing
227
 basically envisaged that documentation for living GMOs 
(may contain) was only triggered in transboundary movements of living GMOs that 
were authorised in or sold from an exporting nation-state. The exception would be 
when an exporter or importer would have contractually defined, in accordance with 
the regulatory requirements of the importing nation-state, that a shipment of 95 
percent of non-GMO content was a non-GMO shipment (Lin and Ching, 2004). That 
is, only shipments that contain over 5 percent of GMOs need to be labelled as „may 
contain GMOs‟. And as long as adventitious presence is unintentional, labelling is 
unnecessary. Thus, this trilateral agreement between the USA, Canada, and Mexico 
spelt out its own terms for labelling transboundary GM shipments intended for food, 
feed, and processing.  
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 According to an international trade specialist from the Office of Scientific and Technical Affairs, 
Foreign Agricultural Service, the NABI only develops an internal website as a vehicle for information 
exchange among the three nation-states.  
227
 This trilateral agreement was signed on 29 October 2003. 
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Furthermore, it was agreed that information on shipments containing GMOs should 
be stated in commercial invoices, rather than on „stand-alone documents‟228, since 
Customs officials would be the people most likely to view the papers. In this sense, 
monitoring or enforcement of the trilateral agreement would be left to commercial 
buyers and sellers.  
 
The trilateral agreement was seen as an American strategy by American officials. 
According to John Pitchford (USDA, 2003), the USA would develop a „bilateral 
agreement‟ template, consult with fellow exporters to reach a consensus approach, 
hold bilateral consultations with key markets, and influence others as they gain 
implementation experience. The arrangements were designed to provide clear 
definitions of when documentation was needed, clarify exporter versus importer 
obligations, and not to affect any party‟s liability to develop its own policies based on 
risk assessments.  
  
With regard to the Mexican side, this trilateral agreement raised concerns within the 
Congress. Ten months after its signing, the Senate called the Mexican official who 
signed the agreement on behalf of the country to appear before them.
229
 The reasons 
for this were that the signing was done under the auspices of no legislative body, and 
that Mexico had already signed the CPB.
230
 The official‟s appearance did little to 
appease the Senate‟s concerns. Instead, there were more doubts and questions 
regarding the juridical nature of the agreement, its aims, its functioning, as well as its 
operational matters (Senado de la República, 2004/a). In addition, the Senate called 
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 In CPB discussions, the stand-alone document was opposed by commodity traders because of 
worries it could stigmatise those shipments (Andreé, 2007: 260). 
229
 The Mexican Senate called up Dr. Víctor Villalobos Arámbula to appear before it on 11 August 
2004 (Senado de la República, 2004). 
230
 According to Article 133 of the Mexican Federal Constitution, an international agreement that is 
signed by the Executive Government and ratified by the Senate becomes a national law with the 
highest hierarchical level. The CPB was signed by Mexico on 29 January 2000, and ratified by the 
Senate on 30 April 2002. It entered into force on 11 September 2003. 
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the Minister of SAGARPA
231
 to explain the reasons and conditions by which the 
trilateral agreement was signed. In his appearance, he affirmed that the CPB allowed 
for bilateral or multilateral agreements on the transboundary movement of living 
GMOs to take place. These would include non-signatories of such protocol, like the 
cases of the USA and Canada. In this context, he commented that CIBIOGEM 
worked on defining guidelines to suppress unnecessary trade barriers with NAFTA 
partners (Senado de la República, 2004/b). In fact, he added, the outcome was an 
inter-institutional arrangement among the three North American nation-states, which 
included a working plan to comply with the CPB and to have access to American and 
Canadian information. 
In the views of Congressmen from  the left-wing party,
232
 his appearance before the 
Senate merely showed the lack of knowledge that the Minister of SAGARPA had 
over the nature of the trilateral agreement, calling it „arrangement‟, „inter-institutional 
document‟, and „working plan‟ (Senado de la República, 2004/b). Resulting from 
this, left-wing Congressmen proposed to the Senate to promote a Constitutional 
controversy before the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice against the Mexican 
Executive Government for signing the trilateral agreement, which was regarded to 
violate the Mexican Federal Constitution (Senado de la República, 2004/c). The 
arguments behind this were many. Firstly, an official from SAGARPA is not legally 
permitted to sustain an international agreement that oblige all citizens from the 
country. He/she can do so only on administrative matters of the ministry in question. 
Secondly, the trilateral agreement should have been registered in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs,
233
 so it could have „agreement‟ status under international law. 
Nonetheless, this was never done. Thirdly, the trilateral agreement contravened the 
Federal Constitution because the former was directly affecting basic interests such as 
health, alimentation, and the assurance of a healthy environment. Fourthly, the 
trilateral agreement was regarded as illicit because it was infringing citizens‟ rights 
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 Mr. Javier Usabiaga Arroyo was the Minister of SAGARPA at the time. 
232
 Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), led by Mr. Omar Ortega Álvarez. 
233
 As established in the Law on Treaty Signing (Ley sobre la Celebración de Tratados) signed on 2 
January 1992. 
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by obliging them to include a „may contain‟ label in the invoice of the imported / 
exported product (Cámara de Diputados, 2004/a: 222 – 6; Senado de la República, 
2004/b). Despite these arguments and the insistence of the left-wing party, the 
proposal for the Constitutional controversy was postponed,
234
 with no update at 
present. 
 
Then, it is observable that the context, in which the Mexican approach to the trilateral 
agreement was made, implied merely the Executive Government point of view, 
without taking into account the legislative body‟s perspective. Assessing each other‟s 
opinion confirms this, as both executive and legislative institutions disagreed on the 
existence of the trilateral agreement. 
 
6.5 Observations 
 
The USA, Canada, and Mexico have developed their own national approaches to 
GMF and labelling. By examining the evolution of their legislations on GMF 
labelling, it is observable that they developed their own initial views on the issue. 
Although similar between Canada and the USA in terms of voluntary labelling, their 
legislations featured one key element in the form of the threshold allowed for a 
product deemed as GM or not. Mexico established a consistent strict approach to GM 
products, in which commercial labels were not mentioned. Nonetheless, compulsory 
documentation requiring the identification of the GM status of a given product when 
imported allows speaking of a type of label.  
With time, the three nation-states started to develop common approaches that would 
include not only labelling, but also biotechnology-related aspects like risk assessment 
and scientific measures. These took place via bilateral agreements and trilateral 
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 It was postponed as detailed in Session 10 of First Period of Ordinary Sessions, LIX Legislatura, 5, 
7 – 12 October 2004 (Cámara de Diputados, 2004/b) 
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initiatives, both relying on features established at the international level. With this, a 
regional approach to labels has arguably been reached. But this refers on food 
produced through biotechnology means. A different case has been GM seeds, which 
have been treated in a dissimilar manner by Mexico. Labelling of GM seeds comes as 
the result of specific environmental, consumption, societal, and legislative issues that 
characterise this nation-state with respect to its northern neighbours. Nonetheless, it is 
noticeable that Mexico has aligned its legislation on GMF labelling. Lifting the 
moratorium and establishing national laws that changed the approach followed 
previously have meant that Mexico has renounced to its own initial views on the 
matter. This could have been done for the sake of the regional market, thus making 
convergent policies at the regional level. In fact, Mexico is regarded to be so adjoined 
to American and Canadian views that, at present, the CEC is awaiting feedback from 
the Mexican government after it received a complaint submitted by different NGOs
235
 
claiming that the Mexican government has failed to effectively enforce its 
environmental law with regard to control, inspection, investigation, and risk 
assessment of transgenic maize in the north of the country
236
 (CEC, 2010). 
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 Concerned NGOs are from peasantry, agricultural, services, environmental, and human rights 
remits: Frente Democrático Campesino, Unión Nacional de Productores Agropecuarios, 
Comerciantes, Industriales, y prestadore de Servicios El Barzón, A.C., Centro de Derechos Humanos 
de las Mujeres, A.C., and Greenpeace Mexico, A.C. 
236
 Northern state of Chihuahua, Mexico. 
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CHAPTER 7: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF GM 
MAIZE LABELLING POLICIES BETWEEN THE EU AND THE 
NAFTA REGION 
 
The EU and the NAFTA region present features that show convergent features within 
them. They take the form of pieces of legislation that develop into different policies 
according to their policy legacies, policy problems, cultural approaches and, above 
all, the level of integration. However, it is due to these integrative processes, 
including features like institutional settings and legislative procedures, that striking 
differences are observed between them. 
The EU has been developing a wide range of labelling policies, ranging from 
products containing GMOs, to products produced from GMOs that may not be 
present once they are marketed, and to GMO seeds. Its institutions have been dealing 
constantly with different matters with the attempt to upgrade policies as they are 
developed. Labelling thresholds exemplify this regard. Products containing GMOs in 
the final product or under processes using GMOs have already an established limit of 
1 percent. However, there is the eagerness to reduce even further such threshold, as 
legislative debates demonstrate. A different case is that of seeds, which is being 
defined at present.  
North America has developed a series of much less complex policies. By establishing 
regional agreements, labelling policies have been kept at a minimum. National 
policies homologating GMF to conventional products simplify the approach that 
labelling policies have in this region. However, Mexico‟s position about labelling 
imported GM seeds casts doubts on a potentially strong convergence in North 
America.  
Maize is no exemption. In both the EU and the NAFTA region, this crop has been at 
the core of the regulatory processes. This is no surprise as maize is one of the most 
cultivated crops using biotechnology means, one of the crops with the most 
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authorization requests in the EU, and one of the most important food staples. In this 
sense, GM maize has experienced the same, if not more delicate, labelling rules as the 
rest of GMF. 
 
7.1 Participation of regional and national institutions 
 
The different levels of integration infer in the manner in which regional institutions 
participate in policy-making. In Chapter 2, the institutional structures of both the EU 
and the NAFTA were detailed. After assessing the development of GMF and GM 
maize labelling policies, it is observable that EU institutions have been at the core of 
policy evolution and upgrade. The EP, the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the 
ESC, and the CoR have all been involved in such developments according to their 
own positions and to the type of activities they were conferred to by EU treaties. On a 
different stance are NAFTA institutions, like the Free Trade Commission, Working 
Groups, and the NAFTA Secretariat, who do not appear to influence any 
development about GMF labelling. At best, the CEC exhorts member nation-states to 
label maize, as it was the case with the report the CEC published on finding GM 
maize in the Mexican environment. Nevertheless, the CEC‟s views were considered 
merely of an advisory character and no action resulted as a consequence.  
This thus leaves it to national governments to take a prominent role. In North 
America, American, Canadian, and Mexican positions on labelling GM maize have 
been developed according to their own national policy legacies, policy preferences, 
and cultural backgrounds. In the EU, member nation-states have also played a leading 
role in the developments of this policy area; as their own cultural backgrounds, 
legacies and preferences have set the direction to which policies are developed at the 
regional level. Their representation at EU level via the Council of Ministers confirms 
this from a liberal intergovernmental viewpoint. In both regions, individual actions 
from nation-states have affected the manner in which GMF labelling policies have 
evolved. Historical developments about policy-making explained in Chapter 5 detail 
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the context in which many member nation-states‟ policies were prior to the 
introduction of the current regional GMF labelling policies. An implicit consensus on 
the labelling issue was observable; this was regardless of whether national 
governments were for or against the use of biotechnology on food. That is, there were 
supportive views for biotech from the Netherlands and Finland; while opposing views 
coming from France, and Greece. Despite this difference, labels on GM products 
found support from both sides. Chapter 5 also exemplified Austria, Italy, and 
Germany, among others, as nation-states unilaterally banning the introduction of GM 
maize to their territories. Furthermore, information about France, Ireland, the UK, 
and Hungary has assisted in setting the context in which not only labels, but also 
national approaches towards GMOs in general, have developed. These comments in 
turn allow recognising the level of influence that national governments have in 
developments on this policy area at the regional level. Chapter 6 also exemplifies the 
relevance of national governments as it lists Mexico imposing restrictions to the 
import of GM maize seeds for cultivation purposes.  
Hence, the involvement of regional institutions and national governments vary 
according to the level of integration of the region in question. The more integrated a 
region is, like in the case of the EU, the greater the role that regional institutions play 
in policy-making. Nevertheless, nation-states remain at the core of policy-making 
across different stages. North America is a clear example of this aspect, while the EU 
offers an interesting insight about the manner in which member nation-states have 
dealt with labelling and related matters, such as bans on approvals of new GM 
products.
237
 However, doubts remain on whether national governments have acted 
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 Despite not being the area assessed in this study, bans on already authorised GM maize varieties 
and approvals of new ones also mirror the different positions that national governments have with 
respect to GMOs and labels. The majority of them have taken anti-GMO positions. One example dates 
back to a 2005 Council meeting, when, except for the UK, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and 
Sweden, 21 member nation-states sided with Austria when the Commission attempted to overturn two 
bans on GM maize. A similar outcome followed in 2007, when 22 member governments rallied around 
Hungary‟s right to retain bans on specific GM varieties. Only Finland, the UK, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden supported otherwise, while Romania abstained. Subsequent meetings denote an increase of 
member nation-states abstaining at the expense of anti-GMO views; while the UK, Sweden and the 
Netherlands remain as the only governments supportive of the Commission‟s proposals (Pollack and 
Shaffer, 2009: 259, 367). 
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either out of opposition to GMOs, or because of a belief that member nation-states‟ 
positions should be respected. 
On a different approach, the existence of trade agreements, like NAFTA, set national 
governments to remain as key actors, both individually and collectively through 
intergovernmental institutions created to oversee the implementation of the 
agreement. 
 
Regardless of whether regional institutions or national governments take the lead in 
GMF policy-making, certain similarities appear in each region with regard to area-
specific bodies. The process by which Regulation 1830/2003 was created shows that 
focus in the EU has been given to views on environment, health, and consumer 
information. The CEPHCP was responsible for presenting the EP‟s position on the 
proposal at first and second readings. The Commissioners for Environment and for 
Health and Consumer Protection were representing the Commission in the debates 
held with the EP. Also, the Council of Ministers involved in making this policy 
gathered those in charge of the Environment in their respective countries. A wider 
scope of national ministries has been taken into account, but only for assessing the 
implementation of regulation, as it was the case when the Commission requested 
information for issuing two reports in 2006 and 2008. 
As for North America, different bodies have participated in creating national policy 
frameworks of GMF labelling. The USFDA, the USDA, and the EPA have delimited 
the scientific grounds for which equivalence between GMF and its conventional 
counterpart has been taken for granted. In Canada, the CFIA, Health Canada, and the 
AAFC have driven the processes by which voluntary labelling has been established. 
However, the CGSB is the body responsible for publishing the latest standard on 
voluntary labelling. Mexico has followed a similar way in the sense of setting an 
official standard, although it refers to phytosanitary documentation requirements. In 
this regard, SAGARPA took the lead on this policy area. With time, other ministries 
became involved. The Ministry of Health and SEMARNAT have been heavily 
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involved in the evolution of Mexican legislation. Furthermore, the Ministries of 
Education, of Economy, and Treasury have been taken into account in the formation 
of CIBIOGEM. Hence, it is noticeable that food, agriculture, and environment have 
been the core areas considered for developing each of the North American national 
approaches. However, Mexico has encouraged the participation of a wider scope of 
ministries. This would suggest that Mexico has had a more complete perspective and 
assessment on GMF and the implications for labelling. Nonetheless, Mexican policy 
output has not differed greatly from the Canadian and the American ones.
238
  
 
In both the EU and the NAFTA region, policy-making of GMF labelling has been put 
in hands of environment and health related institutional bodies.
239
 Nevertheless, from 
this point there is a divergence as to which other institutional body is sharing policy-
making powers, or merely performing advisory roles. Consumer protection is an area 
that has been hugely involved in EU developments within both the EP and the 
Commission. This is not the case with North America. The USFDA and the CFIA 
consulted the opinion of the citizenry, who were regarded as consumers. Mexico 
shows a similar approach in that LBGOM states the potential consultation to the 
general public when GMOs are released into the environment. However, in none of 
the three countries an official approach to protect consumers‟ rights exists; at least, 
not in the way the EU does. This certainly relates to the equivalence of GM and 
conventional products taken for granted in North America. In turn, such equivalence 
allows speaking of agriculture as a relevant area for GMF policies in North America. 
The USDA has regarded biotechnology as a promising technology, and has been keen 
to show the benefits of these products. AAFC was also involved in labelling matters 
in Canada, while Mexico‟s SAGARPA would direct the policy approach to the point 
that a senior member of staff was in charge of representing Mexico when the 
Trilateral Agreement on Documentation Requirements for Living GMOs was signed. 
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 Depth on this thought is developed further in this chapter. 
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 This is regardless of whether they are classified as Ministries, Directorate General, Agencies, or 
Departments. 
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In spite of the European focus on consumer protection and the North American focus 
on agriculture, there is an interesting aspect regarding trade-related institutional 
bodies.  They seem to be absent in the development of regional (EU) and national 
(NAFTA) policy-making processes. At most, the EP relied on the CIETRE to merely 
express a position on policy proposals, which would not be definitive. In this absence, 
it is fair to mention that the trade sector has participated in two different ways. One 
refers to the lobbying efforts that transnational companies have made before 
agricultural and governmental bodies. The second is implicitly stated when producers 
have proven that GMF is safe for the environment and consumers‟ health; and have 
proven so to the point that GMF has been authorised for release and consumption. 
Examples of this are Commission Decisions 97/98/EC, 98/292/EC, and 98/294/EC 
authorising placing different GM maize varieties in the market 
Then, it could be assumed that each region‟s GMF labelling policy output develops 
from views of institutions in charge of commenting and deciding on environmental, 
health, consumer protection, and agricultural matters. Following this assumption, 
different policies could have been made if trade-related bodies would have been in 
charge of developing them, if consumers would have influenced North American 
developments, or if agriculture would have influenced EU policy outputs. 
 
Besides area specific institutional bodies influencing policy outputs, the stance that 
political parties have with regard to developments of GMF can also affect the 
approach to label them. Mexico represents a good case in this sense. The example of 
left-wing congressmen attempting to change the direction of legislation and to 
propose compulsory labels for GMF demonstrates this aspect. EU policy also shows 
instances of political parties‟ involvement both at the national and regional levels. 
With regard to the national level, some member nation-states have provided insights 
about the manner in which the party in power affected the development of national 
legislation prior to the establishment of the labelling regime, as well as with other 
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GMO-related issues.  Denmark and France have clearly exemplified this regard, as 
shown in Chapter 5. Regarding the regional level, negotiations from within the EP at 
first and second readings, when making Regulation 1830/2003, have shown the 
influence of political parties. In this case, parties on the left and on the centre of the 
political spectrum have tended to support issuing labels. Right-wing parties have also 
expressed their views by adopting industry-supportive approaches. In the EU, debates 
that led to Regulation 1830/2003 corroborate this. Nonetheless, this position is less 
clear in the NAFTA region. One example are the links made of members of the Bush 
Administration, coming from the Republican Party, participating and having high-
ranked positions within different biotechnology companies.
240
   
Then, when comparing policy outputs in each region, jointly with the position of 
political parties, two issues are recognisable. Firstly, the Left have influenced more in 
the EU than in North America. This could be attributed to the support they have 
received from the citizenry as the result of problems that the biotechnology sector has 
suffered in the past, like the BSE crisis and dioxin-contaminated feed. In fact, such 
problems led to the development of stringent laws for GMF. Secondly, right-wing 
support for industry and science has been the pattern followed in each of the North 
American nation-states. It has found less support in the EU not because of reliance on 
scientific grounds, but because what is perceived as the omission to consider social 
and consumer perspectives. Hence, a stronger cultural tradition in Europe of 
questioning claims of big corporations is observed. 
 
                                                          
240
 During a debate sustained at the EP on the 1
st 
 July 2003, Mr. Jean-Claude Martínez, an Independent 
MEP for France, exemplified this by mentioning that the senatorial campaign in Missouri of John 
Ashcroft, the then US Attorney General, was partly funded by Monsanto. Another example was 
Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defence, who also performed as the President of a laboratory that 
Monsanto bought in 1985. In addition, Ann Vaneman, former US Secretary of Agriculture, was 
member of the Board of Directors of Calgene, the multinational that created the first transgenic tomato. 
Linda Fisher, former Deputy Administrator of the EPA, was also responsible for the Monsanto 
lobbying bureau at Washington. Lastly, there is Clarence Thomas, a judge of the US Supreme Court, 
who used to be a lawyer at Monsanto (European Parliament, 2003/c). 
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7.2 Relevance of different policy processes 
 
Each region has shown different processes through which they develop GMF 
labelling policies. The EU has reached present policy outputs through co-decision, in 
which the EP and the Council of Ministers decide together. This aspect resembles that 
of a nation-state‟s legislative process, where legislative and executive bodies reach 
consensus on a given policy area. However, the existence of the Commission is a 
peculiar feature for the policy process. Its initiator role means that it can drive policy-
making in a particular direction. Nonetheless, the Commission is not the ultimate 
decider. Debates held between Commissioners and MEPs when discussing 
Regulation 1830/2003 thus were intended to only deal with aspects on proposals for 
legislation.  
The NAFTA region shows features of a different kind. Policies are adopted through 
contractual obligations that emphasise the application of policies adopted elsewhere 
through international agreements. This is the case of SPS measures, TBT measures, 
and national treatment to goods of another nation-state. The NAFTA text 
corroborates the relevance of these WTO agreements and precepts. In fact, such is the 
intergovernmental character of the NAFTA that it has created a dispute settlement 
panel, just as in the WTO context. Two bilateral agreements have been signed 
regarding scientific, public health, environmental, and labelling matters of GMF. 
Both agreements have relied on approaches observed in the Codex Alimentarius and 
the WTO. The trilateral agreement on documentation requirements for living GMOs 
slightly moves away from the common pattern of adopting international agreements. 
Actually, this trilateral agreement was created with the purpose of preventing CPB 
accords that would potentially harm international trade due to requirements to label.   
  
The EU‟s co-decision and NAFTA‟s international trade-related policies link with 
their respective levels of integration. As a political and monetary union, the EU has 
developed strong policy processes entailing the participation of different regional 
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institutions that develop strict and compulsory rules. This contrasts with the dominant 
intergovernmental character of the North American region, where policies are based 
according to developments made at the international level. Nonetheless, a 
qualification must be made that only one policy area has been analysed. 
 
7.3 Features on labelling GM maize  
 
This study has shown that different views on labelling exist. Voluntary and 
compulsory labelling of GM products, as well as GM-free labelling, were discussed 
by authorities when current policies took place. In the EU, the establishment of 
compulsory labels was the output of negotiations and debates that derived in issuing 
Regulation 1830/2003. North America shows two labelling approaches: one followed 
at the national level and another followed at the regional level. At the national level, 
Canada and the USA have developed a voluntary approach to labels based on the 
equivalence between GMF and its conventional counterpart. As with the case of 
Mexico, both of them deem labelling as necessary when characteristics of the 
modified product diverge to an extent that the name of the traditional product could 
no longer apply. Nonetheless, Mexico makes no comment on the option to voluntarily 
label. As a special case, Mexico requires compulsory labels for GM maize seeds due 
to specific features inner to its environment. At the regional level, the three countries 
have established that they require details on documentation of shipments that contain 
a specific percentage of GMOs. 
 
7.3.1 Labelling thresholds for GMF 
 
A threshold relates to how strict is a law with respect to the allowance of adventitious 
presence of GMOs in a given product. In this sense, the EU has developed stricter 
approaches to those of North America. Here, some issues need to be accounted for. 
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To begin with, the threshold established by the EU was the result of a series of 
discussions and debates both between and within the EP and the Commission. 
Different positions were expressed, but it was agreed that a threshold of 0.9 percent 
was adequate after the Council of Ministers reached a compromise in this matter. 
Despite this, there have been views regarding such a percentage as either too high or 
too low. There are expectations to move in either direction; although lowering the 
threshold seems more approachable, as Regulation 298/2008 allows the Commission 
to do so.  
 
With regard to the NAFTA region, a threshold of 5 percent has been established in 
case of cross-boundary shipments. This thus means that a shipment can contain grain 
that is 95 percent pure; that is, free of GMOs. And this can be defined as a non-GMO 
shipment. Therefore, a shipment need not be labelled, even if it has a large amount of 
GMO content, so long as it is unintentional adventitious presence.  
 
The percentage at which a threshold is established can pose queries about the manner 
in which a given threshold is calculated. However, the outcome in the EU relates 
more to a political agreement than to any scientific basis. Different reasons were 
provided when different thresholds were proposed: Market access, simplification of 
procedures, and scientific bases.
241
 At the end, the majority of MEPs voted according 
to the position presented by their respective political parties. Subsequently, the EPP, 
which was the only party against a low threshold, was outvoted despite it including a 
significant number of MEPs. The threshold adopted in the NAFTA region appears 
more as a response to the CPB than to own concerns about adventitious presence. The 
exemption has been the Mexican position about labelling GM maize seeds, which 
appears to have influenced the establishment of such a threshold. That is, the CPB 
and Mexican views would impose documentation requirements to GMOs. This thus 
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 Industry and research community affirmed that certain thresholds could be met. 
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would affect trade of non-signatories of the protocol; therefore, pre-emptive action 
was required.  
 
Another example refers to bulk products sold in containers. For example, a given 
consignment containing several tons of maize would mean that some tons of the 
crops are of GM origin according to the authorised adventitious presence. In this case, 
thresholds are needed for explanation. 
 
7.3.2 Regional and national laws on GM maize  
 
As observed in Chapters 5 and 6, different laws have been developed between the EU 
and the NAFTA region. On one side, the EU has developed specific legislation in a 
constant manner; to the point that, at present, legislation proposals have appeared 
with the aim of strengthening current regulations. GM maize is the main object of 
Regulation 1813/97, which establishes rules for labelling when this crop is 
commercialised. From then on, other Regulations have been developed with the aim 
of deepening the context of not only GM maize, but also general GM food and feed. 
Nonetheless, maize has continued to be at the core of the European approach to GMF 
labelling. The Commission‟s Decisions authorising the introduction of different GM 
maize varieties to the EU, despite some member nation-states‟ refusal, corroborates 
this. In fact, questionnaires from which information was retrieved to elaborate the two 
reports on the implementation of Regulation 1830/2003 asked governmental bodies 
their views on the adventitious presence of GMOs in commercialised maize. 
However, regulating GM products in the EU is still in process. For example, laws on 
labelling of GM seeds, where those of maize would be included, are on pending 
status. Moreover, further legislation may be required to address shortcomings 
observed when implementing existing Regulations. This is the case of documentation 
requirements, as it has been difficult for operators and competent authorities to track 
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GMOs that have been labelled because national documents differ from each other. 
The reason is that there is no Europe-wide standard document available. Nonetheless, 
as commented by stakeholders, existing labelling policy has helped member nation-
states in recognising any potential contamination of products sold within the EU. 
 
In the NAFTA region, there is no labelling of GM maize for trading purposes, as 
neither national policy requires it so. Hence, an implicit regional approach has been 
developed across the region. However, initial national views on labelling differed. 
This was because Mexico previously required listing the GM status of crops in 
documentation to provide to authorities prior to their introduction to the country. But, 
with time, this changed as the result of the introduction of LBOGM and its 
complementary regulations. In addition, the signing of the Trilateral Agreement on 
Documentation Requirements for Living GMOs further strengthened similarities 
across nation-states by finally establishing a procedure by which a certain threshold 
was delimited.  
However, there are signs that allow speaking of diverging developments with respect 
to maize. For example, Mexico‟s approach to compulsorily label GM seeds 
influences trade and cultivation parameters among the three countries. Furthermore, 
American maize producers have been keen on identifying and labelling their grains so 
as to obtain the approval status of the event they went through (NCGA, 2010/b). With 
this, they aim to satisfy EU requirements on the issue. Nonetheless, they support the 
American government‟s position in that it should be voluntary labelling the adequate 
option indicating whether food has been developed using biotechnology.  
 
Differences between the EU and North America with regard to labelling GMF refer to 
the use given to two concepts that have been approached oppositely: consumer 
information and sound science. On one side, consumer information has been at the 
core of GMF labelling policies in the EU. For this reason, labels were established 
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across the whole food chain, be it as food, feed and products derived from them. 
Labels would, in turn, not only provide information on the content of the product, but 
also on the methods used to produce them. This would impose a traceability system 
that would allow tracking products that could carry unforeseen damages to 
consumers‟ health and the environment. This position would assume that the 
precautionary principle is included in the legislation, despite it not being explicitly 
mentioned. Its exclusion from legislation was because the Commission and the 
Council of Ministers were eager to omit any wording related to risk assessment since 
scientific proof would corroborate labelled products were safe from the beginning, as 
stated in their respective positions and statements during negotiations that led to 
issuing Regulation 1830/2003. 
 
By contrast, sound science has been at the core of North American policy 
developments. Equivalence between GMF and conventional products is the proof 
about this. However, while this consideration has been made to traded products, 
products for cultivation purposes have experienced another fate. Mexico‟s 
requirement to label GM maize seeds and the 5 percent threshold established in the 
Trilateral Agreement on Documentation Requirements suggest that sound science is 
approached differently. Mexico requires labels because she considers that some of its 
territories are deemed as centres of origin for biodiversity and she wants to preserve 
them as such. The trilateral agreement suggests that the threshold established was 
aimed at relaxing CPB‟s measures on transboundary movement. The USA and 
Canada, as main GMO producers, would make this taking into account that the CPB 
is applicable to trade between signatories and non-signatories, that they were not 
members, that Mexico was already signatory, and that they could become members in 
the foreseeable future.  
 
North America established a threshold of 5 percent adventitious presence for the 
transboundary movement of GMOs with the firm purpose to gain access to markets 
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of signatory nation-states. The trilateral agreement was set up with the purpose to be 
used as a template for subsequent agreements under the same context (USDA, 2003). 
On the opposite hand, the USA and Canada have regarded the threshold of 0.9 
percent that the EU established as inadequate, unreachable, and imposing costs on 
producers. Hence, two different juxtaposed approaches to GMF labelling have been 
developed by, if not Mexico, the USA and Canada. Nevertheless, it is necessary to 
point out that the supported threshold only applies for transboundary movements and 
not for final product at marketplaces, which is the stage at which the EU is requiring 
GM products to be labelled. Subsequently, it can be concluded that the USA and 
Canada are eager to notify the potential existence of GMOs only in invoices, and not 
precisely on labels.  
 
 7.3.3 Views on the implementation of GM maize labelling policies 
 
The systems developed by each region have different tolerances, diverging 
application, and different levels of enforcement. This refers to different perceptions 
on the ways to label. One refers to the stage in which labels should be developed. In 
this regard, labels can take place across the whole process of production and 
commercialisation, or can appear only in the final product. 
Another perception relates to the appreciation of thresholds. In this sense, there were 
comments in the EU that an arbitrary threshold of 0.9 percent or lower would 
automatically lead to an obligation not to label a product as GMF. However, there 
were comments refuting this, stating that thresholds can only be applied provided that 
the detected presence of GM material is adventitious and technically unavoidable, 
and that the operator is in a position to supply evidence that this presence is 
adventitious and technically unavoidable.
 242
 For this, concepts such as „adventitious‟ 
and „technically unavoidable‟ should be clearly stated.  Still referring to thresholds, a 
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 Comments made by Mr. Peter Loosen, who was Head of the Brussels Office of the German 
Federation for Food Law and Food Science. 
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further issue refers to the documentation of shipments when it states that „this lot 
contains GM material under 0.9 percent.‟ Specifically, if larger lots were divided over 
and over again, and if GM material did not mix evenly through the lot, concentration 
of the GM material exceeding the threshold level in some sub-lots could happen.
243
 
 
A third perception refers to labels on feed. About this, conclusions that the 0.9 
threshold value should be based on the final product have been suggested. Also, that 
feed should be labelled either by listing GM feed material as an ingredient or by 
labelling the product collectively as containing GM material. If the latter was the 
case, additional labelling rules were recommended, since present legislation only 
prescribes labelling of GM ingredients.
244
  
The fourth perception relates to the operational way in which the threshold 
percentage should be calculated. That is, whether threshold calculation should be in 
weight percent or in DNA percent,
245
 or whether labels should refer to each 
independent GMO or to the total sum of a partial percentage of every detected 
GMO.
246
 
A fifth perception is that disagreements exist about the different contexts in which 
labels should take place. This refers on whether labels should take place with regard 
to the product intended for food, for feed, or even in the manner in which it is sold; 
that is, as either individually, or in bulk consignments. 
The last perception refers to different interpretations of the legislation adopted. For 
example, to specify what is the necessary „evidence to satisfy the competent 
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 Different contact people from Finland addressed this view: Mrs. Leena Mannonen (Ministry of 
Trade and Industry), Mrs.Sari Sippola, Mrs. Sanna Viljakainen, Mrs. Tiina Seppälä, and Mr. Erkki 
Vesanto (Finnish Food Safety Authority Evira), and Anna-Riita Savolainen (Cutoms Laboratory). 
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 Comments made by Mr. Gorm Lunn, from the Danish Plant Directorate, in the Ministry of Food, 
Agriculture and Fisheries. 
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 This refers only to the description of analytical testing, hence describing the result of qualitative 
analysis expressed as the percentage of GM. This comment was made by Mr. Lars Korsholm and Mrs. 
Hanne Boskov Hansen, of the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration. 
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 Views from Ms. Ana Fresno, of the Spanish Ministry of Environment. 
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authorities that [operators] have taken the appropriate steps to avoid the presence of 
[GM] material‟.247 
Besides suggestions from national authorities regarding the depth that GMO labelling 
legislation should reach, there have been views expressed from European authorities. 
For example, once labelling threshold for GM products has been set up at 0.9 percent, 
there have been requests from the Commission about assessing the possibility of 
meeting such threshold in the final product, when sowing conventional seeds with a 
GMO content of up to 0.3 percent for cross-pollinating species and 0.5 percent for 
self-pollinating species.
248
 
 
Thus, as it is observed, all these examples from the EU demonstrate that 
implementing regulation on GMF labelling has proven difficult despite legislation 
being adopted at the regional level. This thus suggests the need to further converge 
the policy in a manner that establishes a clear framework to adopt. When comparing 
this to North America‟s approach to label, it is understood that labels could be 
converged in the simplest possible way. 
 
With all the above, two comments need to be made. First, labelling can stigmatise 
GMF by leading consumers to conclude that food is unsafe. Therefore, if 
governments establish mandatory labelling requirements, they should provide 
standards, testing methods, certification, and enforcement. Second, labelling of 
complex, unclear information may be of little value and may not reduce information 
costs. In addition, labelling can act as an implicit market ban on GMF (Gruère, 2006: 
159). On the other hand, a simple label can quickly become ubiquitous and hence 
uninformative. However, if this is the case and GMF labels are everywhere and 
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 Mrs. María de Lourdes Camilo, of the Portuguese Directorate of Planning and Politics. 
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 In 2001, the Commission asked the Scientific Committee on Plants to assess this aspect. This 
Committee estimated levels of adventitious presence at different stages in the production cycle for 
maize, as well as oilseed rape and sugar beet. It concluded that it would be possible to meet the 0.9 
percent threshold for the final product (European Parliament, 2006). 
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become unnoticed, it will prove that products are effectively meeting consumers‟ 
expectations. 
 
North America has not received this type of perceptions. This is due to the level of 
integration that this region entails and the position it has about labelling GMF. With 
no labels, no perceptions arise on procedures to do so. The only issue that has arisen 
refers to clarifying responsibility on documentation requirements when shipments 
with over 5 percent of adventitious presence are imported. In this sense, it was 
controversial to regard the importer as the sole responsible for the requirements. That 
is, while shipments being introduced with a 5 percent threshold of GMO adventitious 
presence were documented in the invoice, it would be the importer who would be 
responsible for verifying the shipment and assessing whether the product fulfilled the 
needed requirements. 
 
7.4 Observations 
 
GMF labelling policies have been developed consistently in both the EU and in North 
America. Each region has followed a convergent approach from within its borders, 
which has resulted from different perspectives on biotechnology. Sound science and 
risk assessment have been at the core of policy developments. That is, any GMF to be 
authorised for human consumption or to be released into the environment have gone 
through risk assessment procedures that focus on obtaining scientific proof about the 
safety of GMF. From this perspective, labelling is not deemed necessary since 
authorised GMF in both regions have been under scientific scrutiny. Nevertheless, the 
EU has also focused its legislation on the right of consumers to be informed with 
respect to the content of a product and the process by which it was produced. This has 
entailed the appearance of a strict labelling approach that does not find enough 
support on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. However, irrespective of the policy 
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output, both regions have shown that convergent procedures within both regions have 
been developed. In fact, by observing comments from national institutions in the EU 
on the implementation of the policy output, it is noticeable that the policy on GMF 
labelling is in constant development. On the other hand, policy developments in 
North America seem stagnant. The explanation for this is that the aim, for which 
GMF labelling policies were established, has been reached despite Mexico‟s position 
with regard to seeds.  
The case of GM maize shows slightly different changes according to findings 
discovered in each region‟s legislation. The EU has deepened legislation with respect 
to GM maize in terms of legislation such as Regulations and Decisions. However, 
North American nation-states have held divergent views about this. Mexico becomes 
the country affecting the environment in which GM maize is developed in North 
America. Labelling GM seeds prior to import and the creation of the trilateral 
agreement have redirected a policy that has established the approximation of GMF 
and conventional products.  
 
Agreements reached on legislation thus demonstrate that nation-states remain at the 
core of policy developments. Because of the level of integration, this is more apparent 
in North America. But when assessing the manner in which co-decision is carried out, 
it is noticeable that the Council of Ministers remain at the core of EU policy-making, 
despite of the Commission and the EP being heavily involved. That is, the 
Commission initiates policy proposals, while the EP has increased its participation in 
policy-making under co-decision. Nonetheless, findings have proven that both 
institutions shaped their positions at the second reading according to views of the 
Council of Ministers. This was arranged so as to make Regulation 1830/2003 pass 
smoothly at the later stages of its making. 
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It is important to remember that the policy output responds to the perspective and 
aims that the institution in charge of developing it has. That is despite the fact that, in 
both regions the environmental and health sectors have been at the core of legislation. 
However, North America emphasises agriculture, as it refers to two of the greatest 
GM producers. And, if maize is cultivated by biotechnology means, the outcome is a 
type of maize that has similar or improved characteristics to maize grown under 
traditional circumstances. The EU focuses on consumer information, which in turn 
means that labels providing such information are deemed as necessary.  
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CHAPTER 8: OVERVIEW ON POLICY CONVERGENCE AND 
TRADING UP IN THE EU AND THE NAFTA REGION 
 
The analysis of the development of GM maize labelling policies in the two regions 
provides a deep insight about how policy convergence takes place. Each region‟s 
approach to this policy area has shown signs of convergence, although towards 
different directions, at different degrees and with different scopes.  
Reminding Knill‟s (2005: 768) concept of policy convergence, there should be an 
increase in the similarity between characteristics of a given policy at a specific 
political jurisdiction over a certain time period. With this in mind, this study has 
aimed at examining one policy area and at comparing it in two different regional 
settings. The time period of the policy assessment happens to be similar due to 
features existing at the international level at the time of developing such policies. 
Explanations about these issues have been given in Chapters 5 and 6. 
In the former, details about the EU developing policies not only on GM maize 
labelling, but also on general GM food, feed, and seeds suggest that convergence is 
taking place constantly. Since 1990, European legislation has evolved with the 
appearance of Directives and Regulations of compulsory application across the 
territories of member nation-states. During this time, specific legislation on labelling 
GM maize has been issued,
249
 amended twice, 
250
 and complemented;
251
 to the point 
of reaching its actual legislative framework,
252
 which has also been modified and 
complemented by recent developments.
253
 Further developments may appear in the 
time to come with respect to legislating on labelling GM seeds. Hence, an evolving 
regulatory framework allows us to speak of the development of a policy convergence. 
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 Directive 2001/18/EC. 
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 Regulation 1829/2003 and Regulation 1830/2003. 
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 Regulation 298/2008. 
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Chapter 6 has explained the context in which national policies on labelling GM 
products are found. Both American and Canadian policies on GMF have had close 
approaches from their beginnings
254
 by establishing voluntary labels based on 
equivalence of GM products. On the other side, Mexico has moved from its own 
national standard
255
 towards a homologating position on equivalence with its North 
American counterparts. To this point, convergence is observable. However, Mexico 
has implemented labelling requirements for GM maize seeds when entering her 
territory. This is an issue that does not match the others‟ views. At the regional level, 
NAFTA nation-states have reached consensus on identifying potential GMO 
adventitious presence in shipments when imported; thus reinforcing the notion that 
policy convergence has taken place. 
 
8.1 Assessment of indicators of policy convergence 
 
There is a decrease in variation of policies among nation-states in each region. Hence, 
following Holzinger and Knill‟s (2005) perception, the use of σ-convergence 
becomes relevant. In this regard, the degree, the scope, and the direction of 
convergence need to be pointed out. The degree of convergence is observed in the 
similarity of policy outputs and policy outcomes. For the EU, the creation of 
legislation at the regional level denotes not only similarity in policy outputs, but full 
convergence in areas covered in Regulations and Directives. As for policy outcomes, 
views of some national authorities on the implementation of Regulation 1830/2003 
denoted that, although convergence has been positive in that GMF and GM maize 
should be labelled, different formats have been used to express the inclusion of 
GMOs in such products. This in turn has posed difficulties among the interaction of 
member nation-states‟ authorities when interpreting information. As for North 
America, the idea of „similarity‟ applies adequately since no regional approach has 
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been developed on voluntarily GM maize labelling in the marketplace. Each of the 
national approaches has focused on the equivalence between GM maize and its 
conventional counterpart.  Nevertheless, this region has also reached convergence in 
the sense that a policy output; that is, the trilateral agreement, established the 
documentation requirement that they need to follow when importing shipments with 
potential adventitious presence of GMOs. 
 
The scope of convergence differs greatly between the two regions. It is acknowledged 
that the scope is greater in the EU due to the number of its member nation-states and 
the amount of issues covered in the policies developed.
256
 On a lesser scope is found 
the NAFTA region. This is because only three nation-states form it, the trilateral 
agreement focuses only on documentation requirements, and the approximation of 
national policies centre at the equivalence of products. Another factor needs to be 
taken into account. This study has proven that a deeper degree of convergence results 
from the commitment that nation-states acquire through international agreements, 
regardless of the number of participant members. In this view, EU legislation and the 
North American trilateral agreement prove a high degree of convergence in as much 
as they oblige their member nation-states to follow GMF labelling rules and 
documentation requirements. 
 
The most relevant way to assess σ-convergence in the present study, just as Holzinger 
and Knill (2005: 776) point out, is the direction of convergence. This is because a 
movement upward or downward of a converged policy assists in delimiting whether 
„trading up‟ takes place. In this sense, it is usually assumed that the extent of state 
intervention relates to the strictness of legislation adopted. If the resulting policies are 
lax or laissez-faire, they are identified with the bottom, while strict or interventionist 
standards with the top (Drezner, 2001: 59 – 64). Nevertheless, different value 
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judgements may exist about what the top and the bottom are in a policy (Botcheva 
and Martin, 2001: 4). This aspect becomes relevant when comparing the approaches 
to policy and the direction they have taken. Both the EU and the NAFTA region have 
their respective policies on GM maize labelling converged. However, this has been 
done towards dissimilar directions. This refers to the establishment of regional 
policies that delimit the type of labels that GMF and GM maize should receive. 
Europe-wide Regulations requiring labels on GMF and GM maize have been 
established with the aim to make the internal market in this area work efficiently, as 
different perceptions and approaches towards these products previously existed. The 
harmonised policy output has been regarded as tough in that GM producers have 
found it difficult to allocate their products in the European market. Therefore, the 
process by which GMF is introduced in the EU implies that policy convergence has 
been achieved by setting up strict rules.  
North American nation-states have also delimited their own national policies on GMF 
and labelling, with the aims of furthering free trade and getting rid of technical trade 
barriers. The direction of convergence has gone towards approximating national 
views on the equivalence of GM products to traditional counterparts. In addition, the 
trilateral approach has developed harmonised documentation requirements on 
shipments. However, North American policy outputs do not show signs of „trading 
up‟. Both approximation and harmonisation of policies merely affirm the position that 
each government has had from within their national boundaries. For this, the role of 
Mexico has been crucial. National laws were approximated at the regional level when 
Mexico changed the direction of its initial policy of requiring documentation stating 
the GM origin of imported products. Otherwise, only the USA and Canada would 
have kept their approach to equivalence and voluntary labelling. Whether Mexico 
was pressured to move in this direction remains to be seen; however, the existence of 
the North American integration process and Mexican aims to liberalise trade have 
facilitated a change of direction, which deepened with the introduction of the 
LBOGM. On an opposite stand was the development of the trilateral agreement. In 
this case, Mexico‟s membership to the CPB has forced its signing so as to overcome 
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the potential indication of the GM status of products imported to Mexican soil. The 
outcome was the establishment of a threshold that allows adventitious presence of 
GMOs.  
 
Analysis of degree, scope, and direction of σ-convergence has shown that the EU has 
achieved higher convergence than the NAFTA region. The harmonisation of rules, 
the number of participant member nation-states, and how upward policy outputs have 
taken place demonstrate that European developments on GMF and GM maize are in 
constant evolution that seeks to preserve the strictness of legislation. North America 
looks different. National approaches approximating GM products refer to a laxer 
view on green biotechnology, while the trilateral agreement imposes detailed 
requirements that set hurdles on a CPB‟s simplified process implementing the 
identification of any amount of GMOs. However, these actions do not include GM 
maize seeds, for which Mexico has established that labels are mandatory. Hence, 
convergence in North America has depended on Mexico‟s actions towards different 
contexts of biotechnology. 
 
8.2 Assessment of ‘trading up’ in the EU and in the NAFTA region 
 
As commented earlier, the direction of convergence relates to whether „trading up‟ or 
a „race to the bottom‟ takes place. Nation-states in the EU and in North America have 
agreed the extent and the direction to which their policies should be converged. To 
some extent, convergence has been achieved because they share views on the 
approaches to label GM maize at the regional level: To make it compulsory in the 
EU, and to consider it equivalent to conventional maize in the NAFTA region. With 
these outcomes and by considering initial positions on the issue, it is observable that 
„trading up‟ has taken place in the EU, while North America has preserved the status 
quo. The basis of these arguments lies on the level of strictness that each region has 
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developed. As time went by, the EU raised its standards by developing harmonised 
policies about labelling GMF and GM maize. On an opposite stance remains the 
NAFTA region, where the approximation of policies has implied no change towards a 
stricter common approach; instead, each national government has moved its own 
national policies at the regional level. In fact, Mexico‟s position on labelling GM 
maize seeds, and American and Canadian reluctance to label these products can 
corroborate this regard.  
 
Policy convergence can happen through different mechanisms (Bennett, 1991: 220 – 
9; Drezner, 2005: 841; Holzinger and Knill, 2005: 779 – 86). This study has shown 
two of them. It is through the mechanism of international agreement that policy 
convergence has taken place in the EU. This is confirmed with the scope of 
increasing Regulations and Directives that result in strengthened standards 
established by the EP and the Council of Ministers, and supervised in its 
implementation by the Commission. 
North America also portrays an international agreement as the mechanism through 
which the threshold on adventitious presence is converged. A regional institution may 
not exist to oversee the implementation; nonetheless, a legally binding standard has 
been set up. North America also denotes the terms of market access as the mechanism 
behind the approximation of national policies stating the equivalence of products. In 
this sense, equivalence appears after scientific assessments have proven GMF as safe. 
With this, in addition to the positive attributes that GMF entails, North American 
governments perceive to offer protective policies producing benefits for consumers. 
American and Canadian statements used when retrieving information on consumers‟ 
views through public hearings, besides the wording of the Mexican LBOGM, 
corroborate this aspect. 
The „trading up‟ mechanism that refers to terms of market access (Princen, 2004) 
seemed to appear in the relationship existing between both regions; specifically 
between the EU and the USA. Because there is no international agreement between 
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both of them when dealing with labelling on GM products, American producers have 
felt obliged to comply with EU legislation in an attempt to cover the necessary 
requirements to introduce and sell their GM products in the EU. However, these 
producers have been adamant to introduce labels other than voluntary. Hence, no 
further developments that might lead to think of „trading up‟ taking place have 
appeared so far. 
 
The existence of „trading up‟ in the EU implies that a change in policy has taken 
place. Here, the approach has meant that benefits have outweighed the costs of 
preserving the status quo. In this sense, perceptions on benefits and costs differ 
between this region and North America. The EU has established compulsory labelling 
requirements with the aim to provide consumers with information on the origin and 
ingredients of the products they buy. It seems that EU institutions were obliged to 
develop this approach due to the discontent that the citizenry had on how GM 
products were handled across Europe. Avoiding doing anything to overcome such 
displeasure may have had negative implications not only for the biotechnology 
industry, but also for general food industry. Then, the compulsory labelling approach 
appeared as an attempt to regain credibility and confidence of consumers after a 
series of food scandals. 
North America‟s approach on equivalent products has benefited producers, who also 
have the option to label their products. Nonetheless, some of them have been keen to 
adapt their businesses so as to enter the European market, where consumers have 
been wary about these products. However, no mandatory labels have been supported 
by these producers. Hence, no „trading up‟ appears beyond the mere intention to gain 
or preserve access to the European market. This comes in addition to producers 
trusting regulatory agencies in the field.
257
 Mexico shows a slightly different case in 
that it has adopted the approach on equivalence, perhaps as the result of trade 
pressures by her North American counterparts. However, it is more remarkable that 
                                                          
257
 For the cases of Canada and the USA. 
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no change was made on the approach to cultivate maize. In this sense, Mexico 
imposed a moratorium, which subsequently was lifted; but was changed for a policy 
stating the adoption of labels for GM maize seeds. Mexico‟s position affects the 
extent to which policy convergence takes place. 
 
8.3 Policy change and causes of convergence 
 
It is noticeable that labelling policies have evolved differently in the two regions. 
This is according to factors (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004) that are perceived 
differently in each region. For example, policy problems have influenced diversely on 
the policy output adopted. The EU experienced a greater set of troubles and crises 
derived from the unprecedented adoption of biotechnology-based products. In North 
America, troubles surrounded on finding GM maize unauthorised for cultivation 
within Mexico. Both problems drove policy outputs, although in different contexts 
and at different degrees. Resulting Europe-wide labels have focused on a wider set of 
applications, which includes trade, environment, and consumer information. North 
America, instead, has approached labels only on agricultural terms, while suffered 
problems do not seem to have influenced the adopted policy output, since Mexican 
views about the relevance of maize were kept regardless of GM maize findings.  
Consequently, the manner in which problems have been approached mirrors the 
policy preferences and policy legacies arisen in each region when developing 
problem solutions. In this sense, policies have converged according to preferences on 
consumer information and on furthering free trade. They differ in terms of how 
influential they are. That is, the EU developed the approach to inform consumers due 
to their wariness towards GM products. This approach took the form of compulsory 
regulations, which meant that some national preferences may have been sidelined. On 
the opposite stand, the NAFTA region has continued to focus on trade and 
equivalence of products. Here, national preferences are shared; hence, adopting a 
region-wide preference has proven adequate. Nonetheless, key issues for Mexico 
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have proven that her maize legacy and her preference to keep this crop outside the 
realm of biotechnology influence have resulted in a lesser extent of convergence.  
The adoption of such preferences and legacies has been possible due to the influence 
that consumer and environment-supporting political parties exerted during debates 
leading to tailor-made regulations in the EU. Information retrieved in this study has 
also suggested that trade perspectives of political parties in power have driven the 
position of North American governments. In fact, it could be suggested that it is 
under this context that the trilateral agreement was signed.  
With regard to discourse, the voluntary labelling approach in North America 
represents a good example of the discursive power of equivalency (Andrée, 2007: 
97). These governments do not directly challenge the notion of choice. Perhaps they 
do this as it would be a tough argument to win. Instead, they state that there is no 
scientifically justifiable reason for singling out GMF and GM maize from their 
conventional counterparts. This thus can exemplify the way that an issue that may be 
perceived to be political is ostensibly decided on the basis of a scientific judgement.  
However, the Mexican Law on Biodiversity and GMOs, and the Trilateral Agreement 
on the Documentation Requirements for Living Modified Organisms for Food or 
Feed infer that there is a deeper perspective on labelling as opposed to the generally 
assumed equivalence between GM and non-GM food.  
National policies have converged due to own views for and against labelling GMF 
and GM maize. The existence of EU regulations, the North American trilateral 
agreement, and the establishment of similar North American national policies have 
allowed proving this aspect. In this regard, the identification of causal mechanisms 
leading to convergence is as follows. It can be suggested that harmonisation is the 
causal mechanism through which labelling policies are converged in both regions. 
This is because nation-states have found it compulsory to adopt such common 
labelling policies, which are shaped under the influence of EU institutions and the 
Codex Alimentarius Committee in North America. Furthermore, regulatory 
competition also appears as a causal mechanism (Holzinger and Knill, 2005) in North 
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America. The implementation of similar policies due to competitive pressures to 
mutually adjust them for the sake of free trade confirms this regard.   
 
However, regardless of whether international harmonisation or regulatory 
competition appears as causal mechanisms of policy convergence, σ-convergence 
may not necessarily move in a given direction. This study has shown that European 
GMF policies have become stricter over time, while North American GMF policies 
remain partially stagnant. This comes despite of each region‟s policy makers‟ 
differing views on the level of strictness that their respective policies imply. 
 
At the end, thus, convergence has taken place. However, it has come towards a 
presumed different direction, at different speeds and at diverse degrees. The policy 
outputs have exemplified cases when nation-states remain at the core of policy-
making at the regional level. Although some policy-making powers have been 
conferred at EU level, national governments remain focused on preserving their 
sovereign rights when they consider it convenient. Mexico has done so when 
imposing compulsory labels to GM maize seeds, while European countries, like 
Austria, France, Germany and Hungary, have reacted to developments proposed and 
implemented by the Commission on authorising the introduction of GM maize. 
 
8.4 Observations 
 
This study has contributed to explain the manner in which policy convergence 
appears and develops by assessing the establishment of GMF and GM maize labelling 
policies in the EU and in the NAFTA region. Such an assessment has made plausible 
the opinion that convergence has taken place. This comes with different degrees, 
scopes, and directions. In this sense, it is the latter that has provided an insight about 
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the potential existence of „trading up‟ with respect to policy outputs. Harmonised and 
approximated policies in each region have resulted from similar previous national 
preferences and legacies. This in turn implies that regional policies have not 
experienced major direction changes in comparison to national views. In fact, it is all 
the opposite since it is due to this that policies have been deepened to cover related 
areas. Nevertheless, European developments have become stricter while widening the 
scope of GMF policies. 
 
The assessment of legal measures adopted in each region has allowed observing 
„trading up‟ in only one region. This refers to a constant improvement and 
development of strict policies in the EU. In an opposite stance is found North 
America, since the observed convergence has remained similar to the positions 
adopted previously at the national level. No „trading up‟ has appeared in the US 
approval process with regard to what has been achieved in the EU. With regard to 
labelling, there seems to be a refusal from American authorities to comply with 
mandatory labelling in its own region. In addition, other features appear when 
considering the context of North America as a whole. For example, the evolution of 
Mexican labelling policies shows a downgrading movement through time. That is, 
initial accounts of this policy demonstrate that the Mexican government aimed at 
identifying GM crops when setting up a phytosanitary certificate and the moratorium 
of GM maize seeds; thus setting a tough stance towards these products. However, the 
trilateral agreement and the new national approach have implied a redirection of the 
policy. Hence Mexico‟s performance appears likely to fit in within the concept of 
race to the bottom. The recent authorisations granted to transnational biotechnology 
companies to experimentally cultivate maize, the lifting of the moratorium, and 
Mexico‟s position in CPB meetings can corroborate this.  
The EU seems to experience a different stance. An approach developed to adjust 
policies with the purpose to satisfy consumers‟ demands has being developed at the 
regional level, where views from different actors have been taken into account. 
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Tightening up GMF labelling policies shows that the EU has not been heavily 
influenced by external developments. Nonetheless, the EU is keen on following 
labelling approaches that better suit the European view on GM products, like those 
established in the CPB.  
 
Gathered information has shown that there is a general approach between GMF and 
GM maize in the EU, despite the latter receiving special consideration in legislation 
about labels. North America presents a different position, where maize entails a series 
of factors that affect the position that Mexico has had on the topic. In fact, it is 
Mexico‟s position the cause of the greatest difference between both regions when 
determining convergent policies in both regions. That is, the EU has developed a 
policy stating compulsory labels for GM maize, where GM maize seeds look heading 
towards a similar approach. The NAFTA region has embraced a policy suggesting 
only voluntary labels on this crop. However, compulsory labels on GM maize seeds 
at Mexico‟s request have blocked any increase on the extent to which North America 
could have developed a full common approach. 
Then, North American approaches to sound science and the EU‟s perception on the 
relevance of consumers‟ right to be informed imply that no profound coincidences 
can be reached between both regions. In this sense, the wider the divergence, the 
more complicated and costly it is for change to take place. 
 
Policy convergence has been examined and linked up with the concept of trading up. 
The results shown in this study demonstrate that they can appear with time, and only 
if nation-states agree to take part on them. This comes regardless of the position that 
regional institutions have, although they may influence to some extent. In fact, it is 
through international agreements that convergence seems more approachable. 
Subsequently, signatory countries are committed and obliged to follow the resulting 
policies. Nonetheless, this study has focused only on the position that national 
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governments and regional institutions have on GM maize labelling policies. In this 
regard, the present study could be complemented by assessing the roles that civil 
society and the biotechnology industry perform in the evolution of such policies. 
Otherwise, the cases analysed in this study refer to only one dimension of the 
different policies that take place at the regional level. Also, different outcomes may 
appear when other policies are examined.  
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